Essays in Empirical Asset Pricing by Chiang, I-Hsuan Ethan
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/713
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2009
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Essays in Empirical Asset Pricing
Author: I-Hsuan Ethan Chiang
Boston College
The Carroll Graduate School of Management
Department of Finance
ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL ASSET PRICING
a dissertation
by
I-HSUAN ETHAN CHIANG
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Finance
May, 2009
c© copyright by I-HSUAN ETHAN CHIANG, 2009
Essays in Empirical Asset Pricing
I-Hsuan Ethan Chiang
Abstract
This dissertation consists of two essays in empirical asset pricing. Chapter I, “Skew-
ness and Co-skewness in Bond Returns,” explores skewness and co-skewness in discrete-
horizon bond returns. Using data for 1976–2005, we find bond skewness is comparable
to that in equities, varies with the holding period and varies over time. Speculative-
grade bonds and collateralized securities have substantial negative skewness. The
sign of the price of co-skewness risk in fixed income market is in general consistent
with the theoretical prediction of the three-moment CAPM. Co-skewness against the
market portfolio is priced differently in various bond sectors: taking a unit of co-
skewness risk is rewarded with 0.43% and 2.47% per month for corporate bonds and
collateralized securities, respectively. Co-skewness risk helps explain the cross section
of expected bond returns when state variables such as inflation, real activity, or short
term interest rates are included, or when conditioning information is exploited.
Chapter II, “Modern Portfolio Management with Conditioning Information,” stud-
ies models in which active portfolio managers optimize performance relative to a
benchmark and utilize conditioning information unavailable to their clients. We pro-
vide explicit solutions for the optimal strategies with multiple risky assets, with or
without a risk free asset, and also consider various constraints on portfolio risk or
on portfolio weights. The equilibrium implications of the models are discussed. A
currency portfolio example shows that the optimal solutions improve the measured
performance by 53% out of sample, compared with portfolios ignoring conditioning
information.
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Chapter I
Skewness and Co-skewness in Bond
Returns†
Abstract: This chapter explores skewness and co-skewness in discrete-horizon bond
returns. Using data for 1976–2005, we find bond skewness is comparable to that
in equities, varies with the holding period and varies over time. Speculative-grade
bonds and collateralized securities have substantial negative skewness. The sign of
the price of co-skewness risk in fixed income market is in general consistent with the
theoretical prediction of the three-moment CAPM. Co-skewness against the market
portfolio is priced differently in various bond sectors: taking a unit of co-skewness risk
is rewarded with 0.43% and 2.47% per month for corporate bonds and collateralized
securities, respectively. Co-skewness risk helps explain the cross section of expected
bond returns when state variables such as inflation, real activity, or interest rates are
included, or when conditioning information is exploited.
JEL Classification: C44, G11, G12
Key Words: skewness, co-skewness, higher moments, bond return, multifactor models, risk premium
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the skewness and co-skewness properties of discrete holding period
bond returns. We ask three empirical questions: are bond returns skewed? Does the
skewness matter in explaining the cross section of expected bond returns? Does it
still matter when other state variables affecting investment opportunities, or other
conditioning variables predicting returns and their higher moments, are taken into
account?
We find that U.S. bond returns display asymmetric distributions, and their co-
skewness against risk factors helps explain the cross sectional variation in returns
in some bond sectors. For a corporate bond taking a unit of co-skewness risk, its
co-skewness risk premium is 0.43% per month. Taking a unit of co-skewness risk in
collateralized security is rewarded with 2.47% per month. We propose a new three-
moment Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) focusing on the higher
co-moments that become relevant for discrete holding period returns. When state
variables such as real activity, inflation, or short term interest rates are considered, the
models with co-skewness terms capture on average about 65% of the cross sectional
variation in the sample of bond portfolio returns. When implementing the asset
pricing models in a conditional setting, we find that including conditional co-skewness
also helps explain the cross section of expected returns.
Classical mean-variance portfolio analysis confines its attention to the first two
moments of returns, assuming that the distributions of asset returns are fully char-
acterized by the first two moments (as in a normal distribution) or that investors
do not care about higher moments. The resulting equilibrium asset pricing model
is Sharpe (1964) and Lintner’s (1965) two-moment Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM). Arditti (1967), Arrow (1971), Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) and Scott
and Horvath (1980) show that risk-averse investors with non-increasing absolute risk
aversion have positive preference for portfolio skewness, and Kraus and Litzenberger
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(1976) and Simkowitz and Beedles (1978) discuss portfolios featuring such a prefer-
ence. Arditti (1967) relates stock returns to total skewness, and Barberis and Huang
(2008) provide theoretical justification using prospect theory. Kraus and Litzenberger
(1976, 1983), in the same vein with rational perspectives, advocate a “three-moment”
asset pricing model, in which both covariance and co-skewness, which is the contri-
bution to portfolio skewness, drive cross sectional variation in expected asset returns.
Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), Friend and Westerfield (1980), Barone-Adesi (1985),
Sears and Wei (1988), Lim (1989), and Barone-Adesi, Gagliardini, and Urga (2004)
find mixed empirical evidence for the three-moment model using equity market data.
Recent literature introduces conditioning information in this context. Harvey and
Siddique (1999, 2000) and Smith (2007) find conditional co-skewness matters in eq-
uity returns. Patton (2004) finds conditional skewness matters in forming optimal
stock portfolios.1 A growing literature extends to even higher moments than skew-
ness, such as Dittmar (2002), Chung, Johnson, and Schill (2006), and Ang, Chen, and
Xing (2005). However, the empirical literature on skewness and co-skewness pricing
has largely ignored bond returns.2
This paper studies skewness and co-skewness in discrete holding period bond re-
turns. In many continuous-time models, instantaneous bond returns that follow Itoˆ
processes contain no skewness or co-skewness.3 However, investors care about dis-
crete holding period returns since they can not realistically re-balance their portfolios
continuously. If instantaneous returns contain jump and regime shifting components,
even short-horizon bond returns may be skewed. Therefore it is important to examine
1Skewness in other financial instruments has been studied in the literature, including foreign
exchange (Peiro´ (1999)), futures (Eastman and Lucey (2006)), and lottery tickets (Bhattacharyya
and Garrett (2006)).
2The few exceptions include Alles and Kling (1994), who examine the skewness of daily bond
returns in 1980s and find it tends to be smaller than that of stocks, and that skewnesses for different
asset classes have different signs. Korkie, Sivakumar, and Turtle (2006) study the relation between
time-varying second and third moments in three constant maturity Treasury bonds.
3Recent literature has begun to develop more flexible frameworks to allow for different patterns
of skewness in excess bond returns; see Duffee (2002) for an example.
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whether discrete bond returns have skewness and what asset pricing implications it
has.
The fundamental characteristics of bonds motivate asymmetry in bond returns.
Unlike stock prices, bond prices face an upper bound: the maximum price of a bond
is the sum of future promised cash flows. Furthermore, jumps, regime switching in
state variables, default risk (e.g. in high yield bonds), or underlying optionality (e.g.
in callable/putable bonds or in prepayable mortgages) may create asymmetry in bond
returns. Thus, bond returns are skewed by nature.4
The important empirical question is what asset pricing content the third moments
in bond returns carry. An economic interpretation of co-skewness is that it is a
measure of the ability of a security to hedge against shocks to the volatility. Consider
that when the market is turning more volatile and distressed, investors tend to unload
their equity holdings and swarm into the Treasury market. This is a typical “flight
to quality” behavior. On the other hand, riskier bonds do not have this distinct
insurance feature, and they behave like most stocks when market is distressed. Our
time series evidence shows that safe bond returns are convex in a market portfolio
return, and tend to reduce negative systematic skewness, which can be interpreted as
attractive given a “flight to quality.” In riskier bonds, we instead find concavity in
a market return. With the possible sign differences the third moment asset pricing
implications in fixed income securities can be richer than in equities.
We extend the three-moment CAPM in several different ways. We test a condi-
tional version of the three-moment model, highlighting the effects of dynamic betas
and co-skewnesses, driven by conditioning variables. We consider conditioning vari-
ables such as a short rate, empirical yield curve factors, and other macroeconomic
variables. We motivate an intertemporal version of the three-moment CAPM by ex-
4See Appendix A.1.4 for the analysis of models with jumps by Das and Foresi (1996) and Das
(2002), and Appendix A.1.5 for the analysis of an affine model in which the state variable follows a
first-order autoregressive Gaussian Markov switching process as in Timmermann (2000).
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tending models of Merton (1973), Long (1974), and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a)
and generalizing models with higher moments by Dittmar (2002) and Vanden (2006).
We use them to examine models with higher moments of macroeconomic variables.
The state variables we examine, including inflation, real activity, short term interest
rates, credit spreads, and a term premium, are particularly interesting in bond pricing,
see e.g. Vasicek (1977), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985b), Fama and French (1993),
and Ang and Piazzesi (2003). In addition, we implement the three-moment CAPM
for different asset classes to address potential market segmentation. This extends the
classical market segmentation viewpoints of Culbertson (1957) and Modigliani and
Sutch (1966) for bond markets to higher moment pricing. We also examine the roles
of total variance and total skewness, or of fourth co-moments in bond pricing, by
augmenting the three-moment CAPM.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews preference for
skewness, co-skewness and its asset pricing implication. We also introduce a new
three-moment ICAPM in the same section. Section 3 conducts empirical tests of
skewness and co-skewness in bond returns. Section 4 implements the conditional
version of the three-moment CAPM. Tests of the new three-moment ICAPM in Sec-
tion 5 examine the explanatory powers of second and third co-moments of several
state variables. A test of market segmentation in co-skewness pricing allowing us to
investigate how co-skewness is priced in different market sectors appears in Section
6. Section 7 examines roles of other higher moments, such as total skewness, and
co-kurtosis. Section 8 concludes the paper.
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2 Skewness, Co-skewness, and Asset Prices
2.1 Preference for Skewness
Throughout this section, let µx, σx, and Sx denote the mean, standard deviation, and
skewness of a random variable x, where skewness is defined as
Sx ≡ M
3
x
σ3x
, (1)
whereMkx ≡ IE[(x−µx)k] is the k-th central moment of x. If Sx > 0, the distribution
of x has longer right tail, and we call x is “skewed to the right.” On the other hand,
x is skewed to the left when Sx < 0. The distribution of x is symmetric when Sx = 0,
of which the normal and student’s t distributions are special cases.
Intuitively, an investor prefers a positively skewed payoff since this implies sub-
stantial chances of large payoffs. Formally, the risk averse investor’s preference for
skewness can be motivated by a cubic approximation of the expected utility func-
tion. Consider a risk averse investor who maximizes the expected utility function
IE[U(w)], where U is increasing and concave in wealth w. A Taylor’s series expansion
of IE[U(w)] around µw yields
IE[U(w)] ≈ U(µw) + Uw(µw)IE(w − µw) + 1
2
Uww(µw)IE[(w − µw)2] + 1
6
Uwww(µw)M3w
= U(µw) +
1
2
Uww(µw)σ
2
w +
1
6
Uwww(µw)Swσ
3
w.
(2)
Arrow (1971) argues that absolute risk aversion should be non-increasing in wealth,
i.e. risky assets are not inferior goods. This implies that
d
dw
(
−Uww
Uw
)
=
−UwwwUw + (Uww)2
(Uw)2
≤ 0⇒ Uwww ≥ (Uww)
2
Uw
> 0; (3)
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also see Arditti (1967).5 Equations (2) and (3) combined show that an investor with
non-increasing absolute risk aversion has a preference for positive skewness.
2.2 Co-skewness and Equilibrium Asset Prices
When forming portfolios to maximize expected utility, the investor cares about an
individual asset’s marginal contribution to the portfolio skewness. Kraus and Litzen-
berger (1976) derive the equilibrium implication of this skewness preference. They
consider the optimal portfolio problem of the representative expected utility maxi-
mizing investor with a utility function characterized by the first three moments of
wealth. They show that in equilibrium the following “three-moment” CAPM holds,
IE(ri) = λmβm,i + ηmγm,i, (4)
for all i, where ri is the return of asset i in excess of riskless rate Rf . βm,i is asset i’s
beta against the market portfolio, γm,i is asset i’s co-skewness (or “gamma”) against
the market portfolio, and λm and ηm are the risk premiums for beta and co-skewness
risks, respectively. The co-skewness term is defined as
γm,i =
cov[ri, (rm − µm)2]
IE[(rm − µm)3] , (5)
5Note that Equation (2) is only a cubic approximation of expected utility. Levy (1969) points out
the domain for wealth is restricted when a cubic approximation is imposed. Arditti (1969) shows
that Equation (3) applies to general forms of utility functions and thus is not subject to Levy’s
critique. While it is feasible to compare portfolio performance without specifying utility function
using stochastic dominance criteria, assumptions regarding the signs of derivatives of the utility
function are required. For example, third stochastic dominance criterion requires Uwww ≤ 0; see
Tehranian (1980).
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where rm is the market portfolio excess return with mean µm.
6 Note that an asset
with positive co-skewness makes the distribution of the market portfolio more skewed
in the direction depending on the market portfolio skewness. If the market portfolio
is positively skewed, the investor is willing to pay to include this asset in his portfolio.
If the market portfolio is negatively skewed, inclusion of this asset makes portfolio dis-
tribution more negatively skewed, and the investor requires a positive risk premium.
It follows that the market portfolio has unit beta and co-skewness, and
IE(rm) = λm + ηm. (7)
Also, a preference for positive portfolio skewness implies that ηmSm < 0.
Kraus and Litzenberger’s (1976) three-moment CAPM is the baseline model of
our empirical tests in Section 3.
A conditional version of the three-moment CAPM, generalized by Harvey and
Siddique (2000) and Smith (2007), is formulated as
IEt(ri,t+1) = λm,t+1βmi,t+1 + ηm,t+1γmi,t+1, (8)
where IEt(·) denotes conditional expectation given conditioning information set avail-
able at t, βmi,t+1 and γmi,t+1 are asset i’s time-(t+1) beta and co-skewness conditioned
on available information, and λm,t+1 and ηm,t+1 are corresponding conditional prices
6Co-skewness can be interpreted as asset i’s scaled marginal contribution to the portfolio skew-
ness. Consider
∂
∂xi
IE[(rm − µm)3] = ∂
∂xi
IE{[
∑
i
xi(ri − µi)]3}
= IE{3[
∑
i
xi(ri − µi)]2(ri − µi)}
= 3IE{(rm − µm)2(ri − µi)}
= 3cov[ri, (rm − µm)2].
(6)
Re-scaling (6) by 1/3IE[(rm − µm)3] (so that the market co-skewness is 1) produces γm,i in (5).
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of risks.7 Similarly, with non-increasing absolute risk aversion, ηm,t+1Sm,t+1 < 0,
which implies a testable hypothesis of IE[sign(Sm,t+1)ηm,t+1] < 0, where sign(x) is
the sign of x. A test of the conditional three-moment CAPM using publicly available
information appears in Section 4.
2.3 A Three-moment ICAPM
2.3.1 Derivation of a Three-moment ICAPM
We introduce a new three-moment ICAPM in this subsection. Many existing mul-
tifactor models include an array of different state variables but they usually ignore
higher moments.8
In our three-moment ICAPM, the second and third co-moments together explain
the cross section of asset returns. Similar consideration appears in Dittmar (2002),
Vanden (2006), and Smith (2007). Dittmar (2002) uses human capital growth in an
attempt to complement the market portfolio.9 This paper is the first to generalize
such higher moment consideration to other state variables.10
We begin from the intertemporal optimization problem for a representative agent
considered by Merton (1973), Long (1974), or Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a),
J(wt, st) ≡ max
Ct,xt
U(Ct) + IEt[J(wt+1, st+1)], (9)
s.t. wt+1 = (wt − Ct)(x′trt+1 +Rf,t), (10)
7Note that while time-variation in beta or co-skewness measures or in risk premiums is allowed,
it is not required. For example, the conditional mean of a risk premium can be constant over time.
8Although Chung, Johnson, and Schill (2006) claim that some factors, e.g. Fama and French
(1993) size and book-to-market factors, may in part proxy for higher moments in equity returns.
Similarly, Barone-Adesi, Gagliardini, and Urga (2004) find that firm size effect in equity can be
explained by co-skewness.
9Vanden (2006) proposes an “option co-skewness model,” which uses the second and third co-
moments of the equity market and an optimally traded call option to explain expected stock returns
in an economy where agents have “piecewise” utility functions. Smith (2007) puts co-skewness
against market portfolio in some existing multifactor pricing models, but higher moments of other
factors are absent.
10I thank Min Kim for her contribution to this section.
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where r is a vector of asset excess returns with mean µr, J is the indirect utility
function of wealth w, which depends on state variables s, with means µw and µs, and
variances σ2w and σ
2
s , respectively. The first order conditions are
UC(Ct) = IEt[Jw(wt+1, st+1)(x
′
trt+1 +Rf,t)], (11)
IEt[rt+1Jw(wt, st)] = 0. (12)
Taking unconditional expectation on Equation (12) yields
IE[rt+1Jw(wt, st)] = 0. (13)
We can drop time subscripts and expand the unconditional expectation as
IE[rJw(w, s)] = cov[r, Jw(w, s)] + IE(r)IE[Jw(w, s)] = 0. (14)
Jw is ∂J/∂w, which from the envelope condition satisfies,
Jw = UC , (15)
where the direct utility function U is a function of consumption C, and UC denotes
a derivative of U .
Take a second order Taylor series expansion of Jw(w, s) around (µw, µs) to capture
the effects of the third central moments,
Jw(w, s) ≈ J¯w + J¯ww(w − µw) + J¯ ′ws(s− µs)
+
1
2
[
J¯www(w − µw)2 + (s− µs)′J¯wss′(s− µs) + 2(s− µs)′J¯wws′(w − µw)
]
,
(16)
where J¯w and J¯ww and the first and second derivatives of J with respect to w, evalu-
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ated at (µw, µs). The k-vectors J¯ws and J¯wws are the first derivatives of Jw(w, s) and
Jww(w, s) with respect to s, both evaluated at (µw, µs). The k× k matrix J¯wss′ is the
second derivative of Jw with respect to s, evaluated at (µw, µs).
Plug (16) into the first order condition (14) to obtain,
IE(r) =
−J¯ww
IE(Jw)
cov(r, w) +
∑
i
−J¯wsi
IE(Jw)
cov(r, si) +
−J¯www
2IE(Jw)
cov[r, (w − µw)2]
+
∑
i
∑
j
−J¯wsisj
2IE(Jw)
cov[r, (s− µsi)(s− µsj)]
+
∑
i
−J¯wwsi
IE(Jw)
cov[r, (w − µw)(si − µsi)]
= λwβw +
∑
i
λsiβsi + ηwγw +
∑
i
∑
j
ηsisjγsisj +
∑
i
ηwsiγwsi ,
(17)
where
λw = − J¯wwσ
2
w
IE(Jw)
, βw =
cov(r, w)
σ2w
, (18)
λsi = −
J¯wsiσ
2
si
IE(Jw)
, βsi =
cov(r, si)
σ2si
, (19)
ηw = − J¯wwwM
3
w
2IE(Jw)
, γw =
cov[r, (w − µw)2]
M3w
, (20)
ηsisj = −
J¯wsisicov[w, (si − µsi)(sj − µsj)]
2IE(Jw)
, γsisj =
cov[r, (si − µsi)(sj − µsj)]
cov[w, (si − µsi)(sj − µsj)]
,
(21)
ηwsi = −
J¯wwsicov[w, (w − µw)(si − µsi)]
IE(Jw)
, γwsi =
cov[r, (w − µw)(si − µsi)]
cov[w, (w − µw)(si − µsi)]
.
(22)
Here γ’s are defined such that they take the value of one for the market portfolio
return, when we use market return as a proxy of wealth. Note most multifactor
models restrict their attention to the first two terms of (17) and ignore the other
co-moment terms. It is interesting to examine whether the higher terms help explain
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the cross section of expected bond returns. We empirically test model (17) in Section
5.
It is natural to introduce conditioning information in the intertemporal setting.
Starting from Equation (12) and using the same algebraic steps we can derive a condi-
tional version of the model in which moments are conditioned on time-t information:
IEt(rt+1) = λw,t+1βw,t+1 +
∑
i
λsi,t+1βsi,t+1
+ ηw,t+1γw,t+1 +
∑
i
∑
j
ηsi,t+1γsi,t+1 +
∑
i
ηwsi,t+1γwsi,t+1,
(23)
where beta, co-skewness, risk premiums are time-varying. When the Taylor series
expansion of Jw(wt+1, st+1) is taken around conditional means (µw,t+1, µs,t+1), those
parameters are defined as
λw,t+1 = −
J˜wwσ
2
w,t+1
IEt(Jw)
, βw,t+1 =
covt(rt+1, wt+1)
σ2w,t+1
, (24)
λsi,t+1 = −
J˜wsiσ
2
si,t+1
IEt(Jw)
, βsi,t+1 =
covt(rt+1, si,t+1)
σ2si,t+1
, (25)
ηw,t+1 = −
J˜wwwM3w,t+1
2IEt(Jw)
, γw,t+1 =
covt[rt+1, ²
2
w,t+1]
M3w,t+1
, (26)
ηsisj ,t+1 = −
J˜wsisjcovt[wt+1, ²si,t+1²sj ,t+1]
2IEt(Jw)
, γsisj ,t+1 =
covt[rt+1, ²si,t+1²sj ,t+1]
covt[wt+1, ²si,t+1²sj ,t+1]
, (27)
ηwsi,t+1 = −
J˜wwsicovt[wt+1, ²w,t+1²si,t+1]
IEt(Jw)
, γwsi,t+1 =
covt[rt+1, ²w,t+1²si,t+1]
covt[wt+1, ²w,t+1²si,t+1]
. (28)
where ²w,t+1 ≡ wt+1 − µw,t+1 and ²si,t+1 ≡ si,t+1 − µsi,t+1. Alternatively, when the
Taylor series expansion of Jw(wt+1, st+1) is taken around lagged wealth and state
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variables (wt, st), those risk loadings and premiums are defined as
λw,t+1 = −
J˜wwσ
2
∆w,t+1
IEt(Jw)
, βw,t+1 =
covt(rt+1,∆wt+1)
σ2∆w,t+1
, (29)
λsi,t+1 = −
J˜wsiσ
2
∆si,t+1
IEt(Jw)
, βsi,t+1 =
covt(rt+1,∆si,t+1)
σ2∆si,t+1
, (30)
ηw,t+1 = − J˜wwwIEt[(∆wt+1)
3]
2IEt(Jw)
, γw,t+1 =
covt[r, (∆wt+1)
2]
IEt[(∆wt+1)3]
, (31)
ηsisj ,t+1 = −
J˜wsisjcovt[∆wt+1, (∆si,t+1)(∆sj,t+1)]
2IEt(Jw)
,
γsisj ,t+1 =
covt[rt+1, (∆si,t+1)(∆sj,t+1)]
covt[∆wt+1, (∆si,t+1)(∆sj,t+1)]
, (32)
ηwsi,t+1 = −
J˜wwsiIEt[∆wt+1, (∆wt+1)(∆si,t+1)]
IEt(Jw)
,
γwsi,t+1 =
covt[rt+1, (∆wt+1)(∆si,t+1)]
covt[∆wt+1, (∆wt+1)(∆si,t+1)]
, (33)
such that possible nonstationarity in wealth or in state variables is addressed and
the need for estimating conditional expected wealth and state variables is eliminated.
Note, however, the risk loadings are not one for the market portfolio return when we
replace wealth by it.
2.3.2 Comparative Statistics
Our new three-moment ICAPM allows us to study how consumption responds to
wealth and other state variables. The shape and determinants of consumption func-
tion have long been studied in economics literature; see for example, Friedman (1957),
Ando and Modigliani (1963), and Hall (1978). Following the common assump-
tions UC > 0 (positive marginal utility on consumption), UCC < 0 (decreasing
marginal utility of consumption), and Cw > 0 (consumption as normal good), we
have Jw(w, s) = UC > 0 and Jww(w, s) = UCCCw < 0, so that λw > 0. The pre-
mium for covariance with market wealth should be positive as in the Sharpe-Lintner
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CAPM. If we assume UCCC > 0 (non-increasing absolute risk aversion) and Cww < 0
(decreasing marginal consumption), we have
Jwww = UCCCC
2
w + UCCCww > 0, (34)
ηwSw < 0, (35)
as in Kraus and Litzenberger’s (1976) one-factor three-moment CAPM.
The signs of other premiums rely on assumptions on the relation between con-
sumption and the state variables. If we assume Csi > 0, then we have
Jwsi(w, si) = UCCCsi < 0, (36)
λsi > 0. (37)
On the other hand, if Csi < 0, then λsi < 0. Thus a state variable that is positively
related to consumption has a positive risk premium as in Merton (1973) and Breeden
(1979).
Now we consider the sign of ηsisi . If we assume Csisi < 0 (consumption increases
at a decreasing rate when Csi > 0) we have
Jwsisi = UCCCC
2
si
+ UCCCsisi > 0, (38)
ηsisicov[w, (si − µsi)2] < 0. (39)
For further comparative statistics results we need to make assumptions about the
sign of the elasticity of consumption with respect to si, which is defined as Csisi/C.
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From (38) we know (we temporarily drop subscript i)
Jwss T 0⇔ Uccc T −UCCCss
CsCs
, (40)
⇔ −UCCCC
UCC
T Csss
Cs
1
Cs
C
s
(positive consumption), (41)
⇔

(
UCCCC
−UCC
) (
Css
C
)
T
(
Csss
Cs
)
, if Cs > 0,(
UCCCC
−UCC
) (
Css
C
)
S
(
Csss
Cs
)
, if Cs < 0,
(42)
⇔ ηsisicov[w, (si − µsi)2] S 0. (43)
The signs of ηwsi depends on the elasticity of the marginal consumption out of
wealth with respect to si, which is defined as Cwsisi/Cw, as
Jwws = UCCCCwCs + UCCCws T 0, (44)
⇔
(
UCCCC
−UCC
)(
Css
C
)
T
(
Cwss
Cw
)
, (45)
⇔ ηwsicov[w, (w − µw)(si − µsi)] S 0. (46)
3 Tests of Skewness and Co-skewness in Bond Re-
turns
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
We use monthly U.S. bond index returns for the period January 1976 to December
2005, totaling 360 months. We consider four categories of bond portfolios, including as
many as 12 Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Fama Treasury bond port-
folios11, 14 Lehman Corporate bond indexes, 9 Lehman Government-Related bond
indexes, and 16 Lehman Securitized portfolios, a maximum total of 51 bond portfo-
11While most of our test assets are from Lehman Brothers, whose Treasury indexes are not avail-
able before 1991. We use Fama Treasury bond portfolios from CRSP instead.
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lios. The choice of test assets reflects the composition of the Lehman U.S. Universal
Bond Index.12 Notice that our dataset is an “unbalanced panel” because the number
of test assets increases over time, a natural consequence of the evolution of the U.S.
fixed income market. Initially we have only 28 tests assets as of January 1976, most of
which are Treasury, government-related, and investment-grade corporate bond port-
folios. Mortgage-backed security data become available in the first half of 1980’s,
speculative-grade corporate bond portfolios and asset-backed securities are included
in our dataset since early 1990’s, and finally commercial mortgage-backed security
data are introduced since 1997.
All bonds in the indexes are dollar denominated. The Treasury bond indexes are
equal weighted portfolios, while the Lehman indexes are value weighted portfolios.
Both CRSP and Lehman Brothers use bid prices to calculate bond returns. Securities
in all but two indexes [Treasury bonds with time to maturity between zero to six
months, Trsy(0-0.5), and between six months to one year, Trsy(0.5-1)] have at least
one year until final maturity. Credit ratings of bonds in Lehman indexes are based
on the middle ratings of Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. Bonds with embedded options
are allowed, except for convertible bonds due to their equity features.13 Portfolios
are rebalanced monthly, but intra-month principal and coupon payments are not
reinvested until month-end. Only fixed-rate bonds are included, although step-ups
and step-downs are allowed in the indexes. Structure notes with embedded swaps are
excluded. Partially or fully tax-exempt Treasury issues and flower bonds are excluded
from the Treasury indexes; on the other hand, taxable Municipal issues are excluded
from the Lehman Municipal Index. See Appendix A.2 for data description, sources,
and variable abbreviations.
12The Lehman U.S. Universal Index is the union of Lehman Brothers’ U.S. Aggregate Index (a
common benchmark index covering dollar-denominated investment-grade fixed-rate taxable bonds),
U.S. High-Yield Corporate Index, 144A Index, Eurodollar Index, U.S. Emerging Markets Index,
CMBS Index, CMBS High-Yield Index, and Emerged Bonds Index; see Lehman Brothers (2006).
13It is important to note that the underlying callability or putability may induce asymmetric
return distributions as well as co-skewness against interest rate related factors.
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For the market index, we form the value-weighted index using a CRSP stock index
and the Lehman Universal bond index. We use a one month Treasury bill rate as the
locally risk free rate.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the 51 bond portfolio monthly returns,
CRSP stock and Lehman bond index returns and their value-weighted average. We
use Hansen’s (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate the means,
standard deviations, and skewness.14 The term premium is positive on average over
our sample: bonds with longer maturities have higher average ex post returns and
higher volatilities. For example, the index for Treasury bonds with more than ten
years to maturity [Trsy(10+)] has average return of 0.80% per month, and standard
deviation of 2.92%, while the monthly index return for Treasury bonds with time
to maturity between six months to one year [Trsy(0.5-1)] has average of 0.57% and
standard deviation of 0.50%. Long term corporate bonds with Aaa rating [Corp-
Aaa(L)] offer 0.78% of average monthly return, while long term corporate bonds with
Baa rating [Corp-Baa(L)] offer 0.87%, and bonds with Caa rating [Corp-Caa(L)] offer
0.98%.
We focus on the skewness of the 51 bond portfolios. The range of the skewness is
from −3.94 [commercial mortgage-backed securities with rating of B, (CMBS-B)] to
2.59 (Treasury bonds with maturities of 6 months to one year [Trsy(0.5-1)]). Most
Treasury, government-related, and investment-grade corporate bond portfolios have
positive skewness, while most speculative-grade corporate bonds and securitized port-
folios have negative skewness. Evidently, negative skewness is associated with default
risk and underlying optionality. Among the 51 bond portfolios, 16 have significant
14See Appendix A.3 for the GMM estimator for skewness and its variance. Many existing studies
use an unbiased estimator Sˆx = T 2
∑
(x − x¯)3/(T − 1)(T − 2)sˆ3x, where x¯ is the sample mean of
x and sˆ2x is the unbiased estimator of σ
2
x. They also use the standard error
√
6T/(T − 1)(T − 2)
under the null hypothesis of i.i.d. normality to evaluate the statistical significance of Sˆx. The above
mentioned unbiased estimator produces similar point estimates for skewness to those in Table 1,
and their statistical significance assessed by standard error of
√
6T/(T − 1)(T − 2) is much stronger
than our results in Table 1. Our GMM estimator and its variance are asymptotically equivalent to
the above estimators under i.i.d. normality. Proof is available in Appendix A.3.
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skewness given the 5% significance level.15 Fourteen of the 95% bootstrap confidence
intervals do not include zero.16 The skewness of bond returns in excess of the risk
free rate has very similar patterns; see Table 2 for summary statistics for excess index
returns.
The statistical significance of bond skewness is comparable to that of stocks. While
not tabulated here, during the full sample period, the 25 Fama-French size and book-
to-market sorted portfolios17 have negative skewness estimates, ranging from −1.10 to
−0.05, and 8 of them are significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.
The CRSP aggregate stock index is negatively skewed (with skewness of −0.69), while
the Lehman Universal bond index has skewness of 0.63, as shown in Figure 2. The
value-weighted market index has negative skewness of −0.33, which is statistically
significant at the 10% significance level, and the 95% confidence interval of value-
weighted index skewness does not include zero.
Figure 3 shows the bond return skewness estimates for different holding periods,
ranging from 1 to 12 months. We roll over monthly returns to form the longer horizon
returns, and estimate their skewness using overlapping observations.18 We find the
1- to 12-month holding horizon returns for Lehman Universal bond index returns are
all positively skewed, and those for CRSP stock index are mostly negatively skewed.
Interestingly, shorter horizon returns for stocks are more skewed than longer horizon
returns, which are close to zero when holding horizon is longer than half of a year. For
bond horizon returns, the least skewed is the 6-month return, and neither longer nor
15We use the GMM with covariance matrix of Newey and West (1987) to calculate t-ratios. The
number of lags for Newey and West covariance matrix is determined by the number of significant
partial autocorrelations in the moment conditions.
16For each bond portfolio, we use a block bootstrap to generate 1,000 pseudo time series of returns
and find the GMM estimates of skewness for each series. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the 1,000
GMM skewness estimates construct the confidence interval.
17Available from Kenneth French’s website.
18Note that even periodic returns are i.i.d. and symmetrically distributed, the compounded returns
can be skewed. For example, suppose the periodic return is i.i.d. normal, the third central moment
of the two-period compounded return is generally non-zero. The proof is available upon request.
Furthermore, the skewness of compounded returns can be amplified by holding horizons, which is
confirmed by an unreported simulation calibrated by the sample statistics of our data.
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shorter horizon returns are near zero. The latter result does not seem to match the
prediction of many term structure models with state variables following Itoˆ processes
in which the instantaneous returns have zero skewness. One explanation is the one-
month return is not a good proxy for an instantaneous return, and we need higher
frequency data to evaluate the prediction. Another explanation is that the underlying
process for the state variables does not follow an Itoˆ diffusion process. For example,
when the short rate follows a jump-diffusion process as in Das and Foresi (1996) and
Das (2002), instantaneous bond return skewness does not converge to zero; instead,
it is a function of third moment of jump size and jump frequency.19
To address the above issue we use a separate dataset of Treasury bonds–an un-
smoothed Fama-Bliss term structure dataset for the period June 1961 to Decem-
ber 2002, to construct daily observations of holding period returns, namely weekly,
monthly, quarterly, and annual returns. Note the returns we consider are buy-and-
hold returns, differing from the roll-over returns unless the pure expectation hypoth-
esis holds. Table 3 summarizes the skewness of the above holding period returns. We
find all Treasury bond returns are positively skewed, and their skewness is statistically
significant (not tabulated). Interestingly, total returns of short term bonds tend to
have higher skewness than that of long term bond total returns. Excess returns have
similar patterns for monthly and quarterly holding horizons. These results match
our findings from monthly bond index roll-over returns. We also find that skewness
increases in holding horizons, but the skewness of weekly returns is still not trivial.
Figure 4 depicts the rolling estimates of skewness for monthly bond and stock
returns, using a 60-month rolling window. Lehman Universal bond index and CRSP
stock index have time-varying skewness with very different patterns. Stock returns
are very negatively skewed after the “Black Monday” of 1987 and after the Asian
financial crisis. Bond return skewness has a declining pattern over the sample period,
19See Appendix A.1.4 for the analysis of models of Das and Foresi (1996) and Das (2002).
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being mostly negative after mid-1980s. It seems the skewness of the two market
indexes move in opposite directions most of the time.
Our univariate analysis results are summarized as follows. Over the sample period,
safer bonds (Treasury, government-related, and investment-grade corporate bonds)
have positive skewness, while defaultable bonds and collateralized securities have
substantial negative skewness. The skewness in monthly bond returns is comparable
to that in equities. Like stock skewness, bond skewness varies with the holding period
and varies over time.
3.2 Time Series Tests for Co-skewness
We assess the significance of co-skewness in this section. Let r denote a return in
excess of risk free rate. For each bond portfolio i, we consider the following moment
conditions,
IE(rm − µm) = 0, (47)
IE(²i) ≡ IE[ri,t − c0,i − c1,irm,t − c2,i(rm,t − µm)2] = 0, (48)
where rm is the market index excess return with mean µm and standard deviation
σm. Kraus and Litzenberger (1976, 1983) call a regression based on Equation (48)
the “quadratic characteristic line,” and link the coefficients c1,i and c2,i with beta and
co-skewness,
βm,i = c1i + c2i
M3m
σ2m
, γm,i = c1i + c2i
M4m − σ4m
M3m
. (49)
When c2i = 0, γm,i collapses to βm,i, and Equation (48) reduces to the Sharpe (1964)
and Lintner (1965) CAPM regression. When c2i is non-zero, co-skewness is significant.
To address the estimation error in µm, we use the GMM to estimate (47) and
(48) simultaneously. We test the null hypothesis that c2,i = 0 for all i. Table 4
reports the estimation results using all 51 bond portfolios. Individual t-tests show
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that 36 out of 51 bond portfolios have non-zero c2,i, at the 5% significance level.
Most bond portfolios are convex (c2 > 0) in the market index return, except for some
speculative-grade corporate bonds, asset-backed securities, and lower grade commer-
cial mortgage-backed securities, although their concavity is statistically weak. We
also report the adjusted R-squared20 based on Equation (48) under column R2. The
quadratic characteristic line can explain 10% to 34% of time-series variation in ex-
cess returns for Treasury, government-related, and corporate bonds. The explanatory
power for commercial mortgage-backed or asset-backed securities are poorer, however.
We perform three different types of joint tests of the null hypothesis that c2,i = 0
for all i. At the bottom of Table 4, we report overall t-statistic using a binomial
approximation,
Overall t =
qˆ − q√
1
N
q(1− q)[1 + ρ(N − 1)]
, (50)
where N is the number of test assets, qˆ is the fraction of the individual tests rejecting
the null hypothesis at the nominal significance level q. Here N = 51, qˆ = 36/51, and
q is set to 0.05. We assume that any pair of tests has a constant correlation of ρ. In
the row labeled “Overall t,” we impose independence between any pair of individual
tests, i.e. ρ = 0, and report the t statistics. We then relax the independence restriction
and evaluate ρ using the average correlation between (²i, ²j), i 6= j, and report the
t statistics in the row labeled “Adj Overall t.” The third metric we report is the
number of individual tests rejecting the null hypothesis under Bonferroni criterion.
We shrink the nominal significance level, 5%, by dividing it by the number of test
assets (N) and perform individual tests under the stringent significance level. When
the number of individual tests rejecting the null hypothesis is greater than zero, the
joint hypothesis is rejected.
All three joint tests disfavor the joint hypothesis of c2,i = 0 for all i. The the
20With estimates from (48) we are able to calculate sum of squares of estimation and sum of
squares of errors.
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overall t-statistic is 20.21 when independence is imposed, and 3.57 when a constant
correlation between tests is used. We also reject the null hypothesis under Bonferroni
criterion using a 5% overall significance level. The strong non-linearity motivates us
to test whether co-skewness is priced in bond returns.
The last two columns of Table 4 report GMM estimates of bond beta and co-
skewness against a market index. We estimate the market mean and standard devia-
tion, individual betas and co-skewness altogether to address estimation errors in any
of the parameters. Safer bonds tend to have negative co-skewness. Lower grade cor-
porate bonds and commercial mortgage-backed securities have positive co-skewness,
which is particularly significant for speculative grade corporate bonds. Recall from
Table 2, the value-weighted market index excess return is significantly negatively
skewed. Our interpretation is that safer bonds on average perform well when the
market performs poorly becomes distressed, while on the other hand lower grade
securities provide low returns at such times.
In general bonds with longer time to maturities have higher beta. While it is true
for corporate bonds that lower grade bonds have higher beta, the statement does
not hold for commercial mortgage backed securities. This motivates us to examine
co-skewness pricing in bonds in general and possibly in different bond sectors.
3.3 Cross Sectional Tests for Co-skewness Pricing
We use cross sectional regressions to assess the importance of co-skewness in explain-
ing the cross section of expected bond returns. For each time t, we use all available
test asset data to run the following three cross-sectional regressions,
ri,t = at + λm,tβm,i + εi,t, (51)
ri,t = at + λm,tβm,i + ηm,tγm,i + εi,t, (52)
ri,t − βm,irm,t = at + ηm,t(γm,i − βm,i) + εi,t, (53)
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where βm,i is bond portfolio i’s beta against market, and γm,i is bond portfolio i’s
co-skewness against market. Here both βm,i and γm,i are assumed to be constant over
time. We estimate both βm,i and γm,i by GMM before running above regressions.
Equation (51) tests classical two-moment CAPM. Equations (52) and (53) test three-
moment CAPM, while the latter imposes a restriction that the market is correctly
priced, i.e. IE(rm) = λm + ηm, as described in Equation (7).
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We find time series averages of monthly cross sectional regression coefficients for
the full sample period, and assess their statistical significance using an array of differ-
ent ways. The averages of regression coefficients λm,t and ηm,t are interpreted as the
prices of beta and co-skewness risks, or equivalently, the risk premiums of a unit-beta
and a unit-coskewness portfolios, respectively.
Panel A of Table 5 takes simple averages of the coefficients and assumes the cross
sectional risk premium estimate is i.i.d., and therefore uses Fama and MacBeth (1973)
standard errors to assess statistical significance.
Panel B of Table 5 again computes simple averages of the coefficients, but uses
Newey and West (1987) standard errors to calculate t-statistics so that possible het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the monthly slope coefficient estimates can be
captured.
Panel C of Table 5 takes into account the unbalanced panel data. The weighted
average of λm,t is computed as
λ¯m =
T∑
t=1
Nt∑
sNs
λm,t =
1
N
T∑
t=1
Ntλm,t, (54)
whereNt denotes the number of available test assets at t, andN ≡
∑
tNt. Further, we
assume that the estimation error in λm,t is inversely related to the number of available
test assets. Specifically, we model var(λm,t) = Λ
2/Nt, and let cov(λm,ti , λm,tj) =
21Here we replace λm in (52) by rm−ηm to produce (53). This restriction is motivated by Shanken
(1992), and Sears and Wei (1985) also address similar issues.
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0, ti 6= tj. The variance of λ¯m is
var(λ¯m) =
1
N 2
T∑
t=1
N2t var(λm,t) =
1
N 2
T∑
t=1
N2t
Λ2
Nt
=
1
N Λ
2. (55)
We estimate Λ2 by finding the sample variance of
√
Ntλm,t. Cross-section adjusted
co-skewness risk premium and its standard error are calculated using similar fashion
in Panel C of Table 5.22
Panel D of Table 5 addresses the stale pricing problem in bond trading. In practice,
fund managers may include bonds in their portfolios for immunization or benchmark-
ing certain return requirements. In such situations those bonds are rarely traded
and thus the price quotes are stale. Following the approach of Getmansky, Lo, and
Makarov (2004), we adjust beta and co-skewness estimates to take into account ar-
tificial return autocorrelation and illiquidity exposure.23 We then run cross sectional
regressions and report simple averages of regression coefficients and Fama and Mac-
Beth t-ratios.
The major finding are summarized as follows. The two-moment CAPM is clearly
a misspecified model. Throughout Panels A–D of Table 5, the average of intercept
term is significantly different from zero, and the beta risk premium is not significant.
The average adjusted R2 is 32%.
Adding a co-skewness improves the model fit, but the effect is marginal. Through-
out Panels A–C of Table 5, the price of co-skewness risk is about 0.13% per month
(or 1.59% per annum), when restriction (7) is not imposed. The sign of price of
co-skewness risk is opposite to that of the market skewness. This evidence is con-
sistent with Kraus and Litzenberger’s (1976) theoretical prediction that ηmSm < 0.
22Besides that above approach, we extend Stambaugh’s (1997) maximum likelihood and Bayesian
approaches to construct beta and co-skewness estimated. We obtain a slightly larger price of beta
risk, and the price of co-skewness risk has the wrong sign.
23Similar issue is explored in Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) and addressed by
alternative methods.
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While the price of co-skewness risk is not statistically significant, the amount is eco-
nomically substantial compared to the risk premium on the Lehman Universal bond
market index (0.23% per month, or 2.76% per annum). The co-skewness premium
is even smaller when stale pricing is adjusted in Panel D. When restriction (7) is
imposed, the prices of co-skewness risk are smaller than the unrestricted ones.
Adding the co-skewness term to the market beta pricing model improves the ex-
planatory power. Take Panels A–C for example, the average cross-sectional adjusted
R2 for two-moment model is 0.32, while it improves to 0.49, after a co-skewness term
is added in these panels.24
Subsample analyses lead to similar conclusions as the full-sample analysis. We
divide the sample into three equal-length subsamples, each containing 10 years of
data. In each subperiod we re-estimate betas and the co-skewness coefficients, and
find risk premium estimates from cross sectional regression. We find that neither
the two- nor the three-moment CAPM is a good description of the cross section of
average bond returns in the first decade (1976–1985). In the second decade (1986–
1995), the two-moment CAPM performs well: the beta risk premium is marginally
significant, and the intercept is statistically indifferent from zero. In the third decade
(1996–2005), the co-skewness risk premium is much larger than in the previous two
decades, but it is only significant when stale pricing is adjusted. Throughout Panels
A–D, adding the co-skewness term improves the goodness of fit in all subsamples.
It is interesting to examine what categories of bonds drive the results. We find
that bonds in different sectors display distinct patterns of co-skewness risk pricing.
Figure 5 allows us to compare the realized average returns, in excess of risk free
rate and beta premiums, with those implied by the empirical model (fitted values).
The corporate bond portfolios lie along the “regression line” (whose slope is ηm) and
24While Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2008) raised a warning flag that cross sectional regression
R2s are misleading in many asset pricing tests, this is in the context of “spread” portfolios e.g. Fama
and French (1993) size and book-to-market sorted factors.
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have more dispersion in co-skewness. The average excess returns of the securitized
portfolios, after beta premium adjustments, are positively related to co-skewness, and
the relation is very steep. On the other hand, the relation between co-skewness and
average returns for Treasury bonds in excess of risk free rate and beta premiums
appears negatively sloped.25
Another interesting question is whether including stocks changes the results. Panel
E of Table 5 adds the 25 Fama and French size and book-to-market sorted stock
portfolios in the cross sectional regressions and computes simple averages of risk
premium estimates and their t-ratios using Fama-MacBeth standard errors. It seems
that the stock portfolios change the full-period results dramatically, but they create
little difference in the subperiods. In the full sample, the co-skewness risk premium
for a unit co-skewness asset is 0.23% per month, or 2.76% per annum, statistically
different from zero.26 The three-moment CAPM is a better description of the cross
section of average asset returns than the two-moment CAPM in the first decade, but
the point estimate of the co-skewness premium (4 basis points) is close to the results
when only bonds are considered (3 basis points). Figure 6 uses the full sample to
depict the excess return to co-skewness relation. Compared with Figure 5, the slope
(co-skewness risk premium of a unit co-skewness portfolio) is steeper, and stocks are
the main driver. It suggests that third moment may be priced differently for stocks
and bonds.
Panels F of Table 5 uses only stock index to approximate market portfolio, a
common practice in many existing empirical asset pricing studies. It can be justified
by the argument that bonds are not net worth to the economy; see e.g. Barro (1974).
Our empirical results are similar to those obtained using value-weighted index. This
25Motivated by Knez, Litterman, and Scheinkman’s (1994) principle component analysis of the
first two moments of spot rates, we reduce the number of Treasury portfolios to three in our cross-
sectional analysis. This does not alter the above mentioned results.
26Note this number is somewhere between Harvey and Siddique’s (2000) estimate (3.60%), and
Smith’s (2007) estimate (1.80%) conditional on that market is negatively skewed.
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is because most variation in the value-weighted index is governed by stocks; see
Stambaugh (1982).
Panel G of Table 5 drops the intercept term from the regression models. The no-
intercept constraint helps generate more efficient estimates under the null hypothesis
of zero intercept; see Cochrane (2001). The co-skewness risk premium estimates are
negative or insignificant. In the full sample and the second subsample, we do not
reject a two-moment CAPM.
Table 5, Panel H adjusts for errors-in-variables using Shanken’s (1992) approach.
In order to implement Shanken’s (1992) correction, we treat (rm−µm)2 as a factor27,
replace co-skewness measures by the new “factor betas” cov[ri, (rm−µm)2]/var[(rm−
µm)
2], and then run cross sectional regressions to test the “multi-beta” model. We find
the sign of the modified co-skewness premium is consistent with prediction of three-
moment CAPM.28 The Shanken’s (1992) adjustment term imposes some penalty to
the model with third co-moment: it increases the variance of price of co-skewness risk
by 2% in the full sample, and it can inflate the variance by as high as 38% in the
subsamples. However, it imposes very little penalty to the variance of price of beta
risk.
4 Conditional Tests for Co-skewness Pricing in Bond
Returns
This section conducts conditional tests for beta and co-skewness pricing in bond
returns. As Cochrane (2001) points out, an unconditional test of an asset pricing
model may fail, even the conditional version of the model holds. Further, an asset
pricing model is not testable for an econometrician when its pricing kernel contains
27See Barone-Adesi, Gagliardini, and Urga (2004) for similar treatment.
28With the modified definition, the unit beta risk premium of the co-skewness factor should be
negative regardless the sign of market skewness.
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information unavailable to the econometrician. Cochrane dubs this the “Hansen and
Richard (1987) critique.”
We extend our time series and cross sectional tests in Section 3 by introducing
time-varying beta and co-skewness estimates, whose dynamic aspects are examined
by using rolling window estimation or conditioning variables. Our tests begins with
a simple specification, in which a detrended short term interest rate is the sole condi-
tioning variable. While there are numerous ways to specify the conditional version of
the two- or three-moment asset pricing models, our simple tests highlight new insights
when the models are specified in a conditional setting.
As a robustness check, we also extend some of the tests using a larger set of in-
strumental variables similar to Ferson, Henry, and Kisgen (2006), including lagged
term structure variables (level, slope, and curvature, also see Knez, Litterman, and
Scheinkman (1994)) and other lagged macroeconomic variables (inflation, real activ-
ity, and credit spread; see Fama and French (1993) and Ang and Piazzesi (2003)).
4.1 Time Series Test
We use a time series test to examine whether bond returns are associated with mar-
ket portfolio return and its squared prediction error in a dynamic way. We test a
conditional version of the quadratic characteristic line:
ri,t = c0,i(Zt−1) + c1,i(Zt−1)rm,t + c2,i(Zt−1)[rm,t − IEt−1(rm,t)]2 + ²i,t, (56)
where Zt−1 ≡ (Z0,t−1, Z1,t−1, . . . , ZL−1,t−1)′ is an L-vector of conditioning variables,
known at t− 1 to the econometrician. The conditional mean of market excess return
for each period is assumed to be the fitted value of the regression below,
rm,t = δ
′
mZt−1 + ²m,t, (57)
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and for every asset i, cj,i(Zt−1) ≡
∑L−1
l=0 cjl,iZl,t−1. If c1l,i or c2l,i is nonzero for l > 0,
the conditional co-skewness is significant.29
Throughout this section we use a constant and a detrended lagged short term
interest rate30 as the conditioning variables. The use of a short rate can be justified
by many term structure of interest rate models, e.g., Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll,
and Ross (1985b). For interpretation purposes, we standardize the detrended short
rate using its unconditional mean and standard deviation.
Our test results reported in Table 6 show that c10, c20 are both jointly significantly
different from zero. This result confirms that co-skewness is significant in the uncon-
ditional setting. Moreover, c11 is also jointly significant, using overall-t statistic or
Bonferroni criterion. This implies that both beta and co-skewness are time-varying,
whose dynamics can be at least partially captured by short term interest rate. Com-
pared with Table 4, the goodness of fit is also improved for all bond sectors, featuring
an average of adjusted R2 of 21%.
4.2 Cross Sectional Regressions with Rolling Estimates
This subsection uses cross sectional regressions to estimate average beta and co-
skewness risk premiums. In these regressions, we approximate time-varying betas
and co-skewnesses by utilizing a rolling window estimation. We consider the following
models,
ri,t = at + λm,tβmi,t + εi,t,
ri,t = at + λm,tβmi,t + ηm,tγmi,tsign(Sm,t) + εi,t,
ri,t − βmi,trm,t = at + ηm,t[γmi,tsign(Sm,t)− βmi,t] + εi,t.
(58)
29Note that conditional co-skewness is nonlinear in functions c1(Z) and c2(Z); it has time-varying
feature as long as any of the coefficients associated with non-constant term in those functions is
nonzero.
30We smooth short rate levels by subtracting their 12-month moving average to avoid near non-
stationarity, as suggested in Ferson and Harvey (1999).
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where βmi,t and γmi,t are security i’s time-t beta and co-skewness estimates, respec-
tively, obtained using data for the period t−τ to t−1, τ > 1. Sm,t is a rolling estimate
of market skewness, using rolling window with the same window size. The first model
is a conditional two-moment CAPM, the second model is a conditional three-moment
CAPM, and the third model imposes that the market portfolio return is priced cor-
rectly. To address that co-skewness risk premium varies as the direction of market
skewness changes, we adjust co-skewness by sign(Sm,t), where sign(x) is the sign of
x.31 If the three-moment market model holds, theory predicts that IE(ηm,t) < 0 and
significant.
We set τ = 60 and report the results in Table 7. While allowing rolling beta
and co-skewness improves goodness of fit, the results do not support a three-moment
CAPM in general. The average of adjusted co-skewness risk premium is insignificant
and has the wrong sign. The pricing error (intercept) is statistically different from
zero for both two- and three-moment models.
4.3 Cross Sectional Tests with Conditioning Information
We model dynamic betas and co-skewnesses by exploiting conditioning variables and
estimate co-skewness risk premium in this section. While there are numerous applica-
tions which aggressively capture the dynamics of conditional moments32, we present
a simple specification here.
We test conditional models in (58). To construct the risk loadings, consider the
31This adjustment is similar to Harvey and Siddique (2000).
32For example, Engle’s (1982) ARCH model and following ARCH-family models capture con-
ditional heteroskedasticity, and Harvey and Siddique’s (1999) autoregressive conditional skewness
model estimates conditional third moments. When implementing Harvey and Siddique’s (1999) ap-
proach in the data, we find the coefficients for conditional skewness process are usually unreliable
(with large gradients, for example).
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following predictive regressions,
rm,t = δ
′
mZt−1 + ²m,t, (59)
ri,t = δ
′
iZt−1 + ²i,t, (60)
²3m,t = ζ
′
mZt−1 + ut, (61)
²i,t²
2
m,t = ζ
′
iZt−1 + ui,t, (62)
where (59) and (60) are linear models for conditional expected market and asset i’s
returns, respectively. Equation (61) models the third central conditional moment of
market excess return, and (62) estimates covt−1(ri,t, [rm,t − IEt−1(rm,t)]2).33 To find
the conditional betas34, we run regression
ri,t = βmi(Zt−1)rm,t + wt, (63)
βmi,t ≡ ϕ′iZt−1, (64)
and the conditional co-skewness can be obtained by
γmi,t =
ζ ′iZt−1
ζ ′mZt−1
. (65)
Again since the sign of co-skewness is adjusted according to market skewness, IE(ηm,t) <
0 is the theoretical prediction.
Table 8 reports full sample and subsample estimation results for conditional two-
and three-moment CAPMs in which the conditioning variables are a constant and
the de-trended short rate (Panel A), level, slope, and curvature of the yield curve
33Korkie, Sivakumar, and Turtle (2006) show that the persistence in conditional skewness is largely
removed when the first two moments are well captured. In this regard, (61) can be further simplified.
34Similar results are found when we use the ratio of conditional covariance between excess re-
turn and market to conditional market variance, where the conditional moments are estimated by
predictive regressions.
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(Panel B), inflation and real activity35 (Panel C), term and credit premiums (Panel
D), or the union of above conditioning variables (Panel E). Our results provide some
support for the conditional three-moment CAPM: first, the average of the price of
co-skewness risk has the correct sign. Second, adding conditional co-skewness term
increases overall explanatory power. Third, we find significant price of co-skewness
risk when the conditioning variables are the term structure (unconstrained model)
or the union of all conditioning variables considered here (restricted model). Fourth,
the results are the weakest during the second subperiod. Figure 8 compares rolling
market skewness and the market skewness conditioned on short rate. Figure 9 depicts
the time series of prices of beta and (unadjusted) co-skewness risks, obtained by a
cross sectional regression of bond returns on beta and co-skewness conditioned on
short rate.
We also compute the difference between the average market excess return, and the
unit beta portfolio risk premium implied by two-moment model, or the risk premium
of a portfolio with unit beta and unit co-skewness implied by the three-moment
model.36 We find that such a difference is usually insignificant.
5 Tests for Three-moment ICAPM
This section tests the three-moment ICAPM proposed in 2.3. In the single state
variable case, the unconditional model reduces to
IE(r) = λwβw + λsβs + ηwγw + ηssγss + ηwsγws.
35Inflation and real activity variables are constructed in the spirit of Ang and Piazzesi (2003). We
extract the first principal component of monthly growth rates of CPI, PPI of finished goods, and
spot market commodity prices index, and call it the inflation factor. Similarly, we extract the first
principal component of monthly growth rates of help wanted index, unemployment, employment,
and industrial production, and call it the real activity factor.
36Note here the sign adjustment in price of co-skewness risk should be reversed.
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We also consider two conditional versions of the model. We call the specification
motivated by a Taylor series expansion around conditional means of wealth and state
variables “conditional specification (1),” and the one motivated by a Taylor series
expansion around lag values of wealth and state variables “conditional specification
(2).” To make the signs of the coefficient estimates tractable, we adjust the signs of
the conditional third co-moment terms using similar procedure in sections 4.2 and
4.3.
We are interested in the following questions. First, what is the explanatory power
of the new factors suggested by the model for bond returns? Second, do the higher
co-moments induced by extra factors help explain the cross section of expected bond
returns? Third, what is the role of conditioning information in the three-moment
ICAPM setting?
We consider five state variables: inflation, real activity, short term interest rate,
credit spread, and term premium. Table 9 reports the cross sectional regression
results, with or without the third co-moments, when inflation is the state variable.
Compared with Table 5, the average adjusted R2 in Panel A increases substantially,
from 32%–49% to 48%–64%. The intercept a is also reduced a bit. Although neither of
the two inflation-related third co-moment terms is significant, the market co-skewness
risk premium is 56 basis points per month and statistically significant in the full
sample. In the first conditional specification, the covariance between asset return and
the interaction between market and inflation is also priced. Gylfason (1981) shows
that increase in inflation increases log consumption, but our significant results display
different pattern (λs < 0).
Our second state variable is real activity. Table 10, Panel A shows that covari-
ance with the squared real activity is priced in the full sample, and covariance with
the interaction between market and real activity is priced in the final subperiod.
Conditional covariances with squared market and squared real activity are priced
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in the second conditional specification. Gylfason (1981) shows that increase in un-
employment increases log consumption, which is supported by our first conditional
specification (λs < 0), as unemployment and real activity are negatively related by
construction (Ang and Piazzesi’s (2003)).
Our next state variable is a short term interest rate. Weber (1970) finds that an
increase in interest rate increases aggregate consumption due to income effect, while
Wright (1967) finds opposite results, and he also finds the interest rate elasticity of
consumption is negative. Short rate is particularly interesting in the fixed income
area since many models, e.g. Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985b),
explicitly use a short rate as the factor driving the term structure of interest rates.37
Table 11 uses a one-month Treasury rate as the state variable and performs cross
sectional regressions. Like in the previous two tables, the intercept is smaller and the
explanatory power is higher when the third co-moment terms are included. Interest-
ingly, short rate related third co-moment terms have significant explanatory power
in the second subperiod, which does not favor co-skewness pricing in other specifi-
cations. We also find strong support for Weber’s (1970) results in the unconditional
specification (full sample) and the first conditional specification (all samples) in which
the price of interest rate beta risk estimates are positive.
Tables 12 and 13 report the estimation results of the three-moment ICAPM in
which credit spread or term premium are the state variables, respectively, in addition
to a market portfolio. Both variables are found to be common factors in bond pricing
(e.g. Fama and French (1993)), and they correlate or predict consumption growths.
Ludvigson (1999) shows that consumer credit growth predicts higher consumption.
If consumer credit is inversely related to credit spread, then credit spread predicts
lower consumption. Under the unconditional specification and the first conditional
specification, credit premium beta explains the cross section of expected bond returns
37An alternative view is that short rate is a proxy for shock to expected growth; see Fama (1981).
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well.
The last state variable we consider is the term premium. Harvey (1988) shows
the slope of expected real yield curve predicts consumption growth, and Chapman
(1997) finds expected real yields are correlated with expected consumption growth.
We find that the term premium beta does not explain much of the cross section, but
the conditional third-moments induced by wealth and term premium have significant
explanatory power, especially in the full sample.
For comparison, Table 14 considers both Fama and French (1993) common fac-
tors, dropping the market factor. We find beta against credit premium has better
explanatory power in the full sample than does beta against term premium, and they
perform equally well in the second subperiod. However, the explanatory power of this
two-moment model featuring Fama and French (1993) bond factors is not as good
as other previously estimated models featuring third moments. The full sample R2
for Fama and French (1993) model is 45%, around 20% lower than other uncondi-
tional three-moment ICAPM. Interestingly, the Fama and French (1993) bond factors
become more important when their third co-moment terms are also included in the
model. This result holds for the full sample, and the first and the second subsamples.
6 Tests for Market Segmentation
Our results in Section 3 suggest that co-skewness pricing may differ across bond
sectors. This section tests the conjecture and measures co-skewness premiums in
different markets. We begin our analysis with four bond sectors, and then include
stock portfolios in our analysis. In addition, we also separate bond portfolios in
alternative ways, according to maturity or credit rating.
Market segmentation is a classical issue in bond pricing. Among the traditional
term structure theories, the expectations hypothesis argues that long term yields
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predict future short rates, the liquidity preference theory suggests that yields contain
maturity-dependent liquidity premium, while the preferred habitat theory suggests
there is market segmentation and bond yield is determined by the supply and demand
of each market segment; see Culbertson (1957) and Modigliani and Sutch (1966) for
more discussions. We extend our empirical attention to third moments, and examine
different maturities and bond sectors. Furthermore, it is arguable whether equity
and debt securities can be priced in the same way. Mehra and Prescott (1985) use
a calibration to show that the observed equity premium is higher than preference
theory suggests (equity premium puzzle), while bond returns are relatively too low,
which is dubbed as the risk free rate puzzle by Weil (1989). Testing the co-skewness
pricing in different classes of securities provides a new angle to examine the above
puzzles.
Suppose security market can be divided into J segments. We consider the following
two cross sectional regressions,
ri,t = a˜1,t +
J∑
j=2
a˜j,tDi,j + (λ˜1m,t +
J∑
j=2
λ˜jm,tDi,j)βm,i + εi,t,
ri,t = a˜1,t +
J∑
j=2
a˜j,tDi,j + (λ˜1m,t +
J∑
j=2
λ˜jm,tDi,j)βm,i + (η˜1m,t +
J∑
j=2
η˜jm,tDi,j)γm,i + εi,t,
where ri,t is excess return of test asset i at time t, βm,i and γm,i are asset i’s beta and
co-skewness, respectively, against the market index, whose excess return at time t is
rm,t. Di,j denotes a dummy variable, taking the value of one if security i is in sector
j and zero otherwise. We calculate time series averages of the coefficient estimates,
in percentage points, and also find risk premium estimates:
a1 = a˜1, λ1 = λ˜1, η1 = η˜1,
aj = a˜1 + a˜j, λj = λ˜1 + λ˜j, ηj = η˜1 + η˜j,∀j 6= 1.
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We assess statistical significance by Fama-MacBeth t-ratios.
Table 15 uses bond portfolios as test assets and treats different bond sectors as
different segments. When co-skewness is ignored, all beta risk premiums are positive,
except for the one for securitized portfolios. When co-skewness risk is included in the
model, we find all beta risk premiums are uniformly positive. While co-skewness risk
premiums for Treasury or government-related bonds have the wrong signs, they are
not statistical significant. On the other hand, co-skewness risk is important in pricing
corporate and securitized bonds. Taking a unit of co-skewness risk is reward with
0.43% and 2.47% per month for corporate and securitized portfolios, respectively, and
both premiums are statistically significant. In either specification, allowing for market
segmentation improves goodness-of-fit, but intercepts are still significant, especially
for Treasury and securitized bonds.
The above results imply that co-skewness is substantial in explaining returns of
corporate bonds are securitized portfolios. A back-of-the-envelop calculation shows
that, e.g., corporate bonds with Ba rating and 10 or more years to maturity [Corp-
Ba(L)] offer co-skewness risk premium of 0.60× 0.43× 12 = 3.1% per annum, while
their average excess return is 6.8%. Similarly, commercial mortgage backed securities
with BB rating (CMBS-BB) give 0.14× 2.47× 12 = 4.1% of annual co-skewness risk
premium, which is more than half the magnitude of their total risk premium (7.9%).
In the subsamples, co-skewness is priced in the securitized sector in the first (0.90%
per month for unit co-skewness) and third subperiods (2.34% per month for unit co-
skewness), while it is not priced for government-related and corporate sectors. In the
second decade, taking a unit of co-skewness risk has risk premium of −0.52% in the
Treasury sector, but the sign of the premium is against theoretical prediction.
Table 16 considers bond and stock markets as two separate markets, which is
suggested by the results of Panels A and E of Table 5. We again use the 25 Fama-
French size and book-to-market sorted portfolios and the 51 bond portfolios as the test
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assets. Interestingly, all of the risk premium parameter estimates for bond portfolios
as well as their statistical significance do not deviate from those in Panel A of Table
5. Consistent with existing literature investigating higher-moment pricing in stocks,
our results show that co-skewness risk is priced in stocks, and taking a unit of co-
skewness risk is rewarded with 0.39% per month, or 4.68% per annum. However, beta
risk premium for stocks is negative, and mispricing is still present for both bonds and
stocks. Subsample analysis also suggests that co-skewness risk is priced in the equity
market, but not in the bond market.
Table 17 treats four bond sectors and the stock market as five distinct market
segments. The parameter estimates for bonds are identical to those in Table 15, and
the parameter estimates for stocks are the same as those in Table 16.
Table 18 defines two market segments by credit rating. “Investment-grade” seg-
ment includes Treasury bonds, government-related bonds, investment-grade corporate
bonds, and investment-grade securitized portfolios. “Speculative-grade” segment con-
tains low-grade corporate bonds and commercial mortgage-backed securities. We find
that co-skewness risk is priced in neither investment-grade nor junk bonds, in the full
sample and in the subsamples.38
Alternatively, Table 19 divides bond market into two market segments based on
time to maturity, using a cutoff of 10 years to maturity. The division according to
maturity is potentially interesting because traditional term structure theories suggests
that the term structure of bond yields may be explained by time to maturity. We
find that neither short- and intermediate-term bonds nor long-term bonds contain
significant co-skewness risk premium in the full sample and in the second and third
subsamples, while taking a unit of co-skewness risk of a long-term bond is rewarded
with 7 basis points in the first subsample.
Our results suggest that the price of co-skewness risk is different in stock and bond
38We do not have any junk bond return data for the first half, so the estimates for risk premiums
of junk bonds are absent.
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markets. While the bond market as a whole does not offer a statistically significant
co-skewness risk premium, we find some subsectors do. On the other hand, alternative
division of markets according to credit rating or maturities does not create material
distinction in the price of co-skewness risk.
7 Other Higher Moments
7.1 Total Skewness
Barberis and Huang (2008) recently use prospect theory to show that stock returns
are related to their own skewness. Empirically Arditti (1967) tests this relation using
stock returns. In this Section we use bond returns to examine the empirical relation
between expected returns and total variance and skewness, with or without controlling
for beta and co-skewness. Table 20 summarizes estimation results of the following
models:
ri,t = at + λ
†
tσ
2
i + η
†
tSi + εi,t, (66)
ri,t = at + λm,tβm,i + ηm,tγm,i + λ
†
tσ
2
i + η
†
tSi + εi,t, (67)
ri,t − βm,irm,t = at + ηm,t[γm,i − βm,i] + λ†tσ2i + η†tSi + εi,t. (68)
Note the third regression imposes that market average return is equal to the sum of
price of beta risk and price of co-skewness risk.
Our results show that the total skewness, after controlling for beta, co-skewness,
and variance, may explain the cross sectional variation in expected bond returns,
especially in the full sample and in the third subsample. Expected return and total
skewness are inversely related. The full sample result suggests an investor is willing
to pay 60 to 96 basis points per annum to hold a bond with unit skewness.
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7.2 Co-kurtosis
To examine the effects of co-kurtosis in the cross section of expected bond returns,
we consider the following models:
ri,t = at + λm,tβm,i + ηm,tγm,i + ϕm,tκm,i + εi,t, (69)
ri,t − βm,irm,t = at + ηm,t[γm,i − βm,i] + ϕm,t[κm,i − βm,i] + εi,t, (70)
where κm,i ≡ cov[ri, (rm−µm)3]/IE[(rm−µm)4] is asset i’s co-kurtosis against market
portfolio return, i.e. asset i’s marginal contribution to market kurtosis. The first
model is an unconstrained model, and the second model restricts that the market
portfolio is priced correctly in a four-moment CAPM: IE(rm) = λm+ ηm+ϕm. Table
21 summarizes estimation results. We find that the explanatory power of co-kurtosis
is weaker than co-skewness, and the sign of price of co-kurtosis risk is wrong in the
third subperiod.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper empirically tests the skewness and co-skewness in discrete bond returns.
While a large literature explores the skewness and co-skewness in equity returns, no
one has yet focused on that in bond returns.
This paper tries to answer three empirical questions: Do bond returns contain
skewness? Does it matter in explaining the cross sectional variation in expected bond
returns? When state variables or conditioning variables are taken into consideration,
what asset pricing implications does skewness make?
Using monthly data for 1976–2005, we find bond skewness is of a similar magnitude
to skewness in stocks. When different holding horizons are considered, the skewness of
holding period returns of Treasury bonds increases in holding horizon, and decreases
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in maturity. The skewness of bond returns is time-varying, with very different pattern
from that of stock returns.
Using time series and cross sectional regressions, we find the two-moment CAPM
is rejected and the model with third co-moments has better performance. In a test
of the unconditional Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) model, we do not find strong
significant evidence for co-skewness pricing in bond returns. However, the sign of the
price of co-skewness risk consistently matches theoretical prediction.
We consider several extensions to the three-moment CAPM. We investigate a
conditional version of the three-moment CAPM in the spirit of Harvey and Siddique
(2000) and Smith (2007). Tests of the conditional three-moment CAPM show that,
conditional co-skewness helps explain the cross section of expected bond returns, and
the sign of the price of co-skewness risk meets theoretical prediction. We then extend
the Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) model to intertemporal settings, motivated by
Merton (1973), Long (1974) and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a) and generalizing
Vanden (2006) and Smith (2007). When state variables such as inflation, real activity,
and short rate are considered, we find models with third co-moments have smaller
pricing errors and on average capture about 65% of the cross sectional variation
in expected bond returns. Next, we find the price of co-skewness risk is different for
various bond sectors, and it is more pronounced in corporate bonds and collateralized
portfolios. A unit co-skewness portfolio offers risk premium of 0.43% and 2.47% per
month for corporate bonds and securitized portfolios, respectively. Finally, we find
that total skewness can explain the cross section of expected bond returns as well,
even when beta, variance, and co-skewness are controlled.
Our results have the following implications. Bond returns respond to squared
market over time, a hint that co-skewness is important in explaining returns, but
the three-moment CAPM has weak explanatory power in cross section of average
bond returns. This can be due to missing factor(s), as we are able to increase the
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explanatory power by including additional factors or total skewness. Our results are
of practical importance. Bond fund or balanced fund portfolio managers may want to
know a bond’s marginal contribution to the portfolio skewness, and how co-skewness
in bonds affects the portfolio expected returns. Fund sponsors should consider co-
skewness risk borne by a managed portfolio when evaluating a portfolio manager’s
performance. Corporate financial managers face co-skewness premiums when issuing
new debts or determining costs of capital. The recent sub-prime mortgage crisis
raises a caution flag that skewness and co-skewness are crucial issues in credit and
mortgage-back instruments.
42
A Appendix
A.1 Higher Moment Properties of Bond Returns in Selective
Term Structure Models
A.1.1 Useful Formulae
For any random variable z with finite first three moments, we have
IE[(z − µz)3] = IE(z3)− 3µzIE(z2) + 2µ3z
= IE(z3)− 3µzvar(z)− µ3z.
(71)
Let Z = k0 + k1z where a, b are constants,
IE[(Z − µZ)3] = k31IE[(z − µz)3], (72)
SZ = sign(k1)Sz. (73)
Suppose x is i.i.d. normal, i.e. x ∼ N(µx, σ2x). Let y = exp(x), i.e. y is lognormal.
The moment generating function of y is
IE(ys) = exp[sµx + 0.5sσ
2
x]. (74)
The first three raw moments of y are
IE(y) = exp(µx + 0.5σ
2
x), (75)
IE(y2) = exp(2µx + 2σ
2
x), (76)
IE(y3) = exp(3µx + 4.5σ
2
x). (77)
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The second and third central moments are
var(y) = exp(2µx + σ
2
x)[exp(σ
2
x)− 1], (78)
IE[(y − µy)3] = [exp(µx + 0.5σ2x)]3[exp(σ2x)− 1]2 exp(σ2x + 2), (79)
and the skewness of y is
Sy = [exp(σ
2
x) + 2][exp(σ
2
x − 1)]
1
2 . (80)
Let bnt denote the time-t price of the zero coupon bond with maturity n and
principal $1, and its yield to maturity is
ynt = −
1
n
ln bnt . (81)
Let R˜n+Tt+T and R
n+T
t+T denote the T -period gross return and continuously compounded
return, respectively, on an (n+ T )-period bond,
R˜n+Tt+T =
bnt+T
bn+Tt
, (82)
Rn+Tt+T = ln b
n
t+T − ln bn+Tt = (n+ T )yn+Tt − nynt+T . (83)
Also, let mt > 0 denote the time-t pricing kernel, and we have
IEt(mt+1R˜t+1) = 1, (84)
IEt(mt+1rt+1) = 0, (85)
where R˜t+1 and rt+1 are gross and excess returns, and the above relations imply
unconditional cases as well.
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A.1.2 Vasicek (1977)
The following discrete-time treatment of the Vasicek (1977) model is due to Backus,
Foresi, and Telmer (1998). Assume ²t is i.i.d. standard normal. The state variable
z follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in continuous time, and in discrete time, it
follows an AR(1) process,
zt+1 = φzt + (1− φ)θ + σ²t+1
= zt + (1− φ)(θ − zt) + σ²t+1,
(86)
which has
IE(zt) = θ, (87)
var(zt) =
σ2
1− φ2 , (88)
IEt(zt+1) = (1− φ)θ + φzt, (89)
vart(zt+1) = σ
2. (90)
Bond prices are exponential affine in the state variable,
− ln bnt = An +Bnzt, (91)
and in turn, log returns are affine in z,
Rn+1t+1 = −An −Bnzt+1 + An+1 +Bn+1zt
= (An+1 − An) +Bn+1zt −Bnzt+1.
(92)
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The first two conditional moments of R are
IEt(R
n+1
t+1 ) = (An+1 − An) +Bn+1zt −Bn[(1− φ)θ + φzt]
= [An+1 − An −Bn(1− φ)θ] + (Bn+1 −Bnφ)zt, (93)
vart(R
n+1
t+1 ) = B
2
nσ
2. (94)
Since (Rn+1t+1 ) is conditional normal,
St(R
n+1
t+1 ) = 0, (95)
St(R˜
n+1
t+1 ) = [exp(B
2
nσ
2) + 2] exp(B2nσ
2 − 1)1/2. (96)
For the unconditional moments,
IE(Rn+1t+1 ) = [An+1 − An −Bn(1− φ)θ] + (Bn+1 −Bnφ)E(zt)
= (An+1 − An) + (Bn+1 −Bn)θ, (97)
var(Rn+1t+1 ) = B
2
nσ
2 + (Bn+1 −Bnφ)2 σ
2
1− φ2
= σ2
[
B2n +
(Bn+1 −Bnφ)2
1− φ2
]
, (98)
S(Rn+1t+1 ) = 0, (99)
S(R˜n+1t+1 ) =
(
exp(σ2
[
B2n +
(Bn+1 −Bnφ)2
1− φ2
]
) + 2
)
× exp
(
σ2
[
B2n +
(Bn+1 −Bnφ)2
1− φ2
]
− 1
)1/2
. (100)
The pricing kernel is also exponential affine in z,
− lnmt+1 = δ + zt + λ²t+1, (101)
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Using a Taylor series expansion,
mt+1 = exp(−δ − zt − λ²t+1)
≈ e−δ[1− zt − λ²t+1].
(102)
Then IEt(mt+1rt+1) = 0 implies
IEt[(1− zt − λ²t+1)rt+1] = 0, (103)
(1− zt)IEt[rt+1] = λ
σ
IEt([zt+1 − φzt − (1− φ)θ]rt+1), (104)
IEt[rt+1] =
λ
σ
[
1 + θ − φθ
(
λφ
σ
− 1
)
zt
]−1
IEt(zt+1rt+1)
= Ct[covt(zt+1, rt+1) + IEt(zt+1)IEt(rt+1)]
=
Ct
1− Ct[(1− φ)θ + φzt]covt(zt+1, rt+1), (105)
Ct ≡ λ
σ
[
1 + θ − φθ
(
λφ
σ
− 1
)
zt
]−1
. (106)
Unconditional expected excess return is
IE(rt+1) = [σ(1− θ) + φθ(λ− 1)]−1 [(σ − λφ)cov(zt, rt+1) + λcov(zt+1, rt+1)] . (107)
A.1.3 Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985b)
The following discrete-time treatment of the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985b) model
is due to Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (1998). Assume ²t is i.i.d. standard normal.
The state variable z follows a square root process,
zt+1 = φzt + (1− φ)θ + σ√zt²t+1
= zt + (1− φ)(θ − zt) + σ√zt²t+1,
(108)
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which has
IE(zt) = θ, (109)
var(zt) = θ
σ2
1− φ2 , (110)
IEt(zt+1) = (1− φ)θ + φzt, (111)
vart(zt+1) = ztσ
2, (112)
IEt[(zt+1 − IEt(zt+1))3] = 0. (113)
The last result is striking as the conditional density of the state variable is noncentral
χ2 and its skewness is nonzero in continuous time.
Log returns are affine in z,
Rn+1t+1 = −An −Bnzt+1 +Bn+1zt −Bnzt+1
= (An+1 − An) +Bn+1zt −Bnzt+1.
(114)
The conditional mean and variance of Rn+1t+1 are
IEt(R
n+1
t+1 ) = (An+1 − An) +Bn+1zt −Bn[(1− φ)θ + φzt]
= [An+1 − An −Bn(1− φ)θ] + (Bn+1 −Bnφ)zt, (115)
vart(R
n+1
t+1 ) = B
2
nztσ
2. (116)
The skewness of (Rn+1t+1 ) is,
St(R
n+1
t+1 ) = St(zt+1) = 0, (117)
which follows IEt[(zt+1 − IEt(zt+1))3] = 0.
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The pricing kernel is,
− lnmt+1 = (1 + λ2/2)zt + λ
√
zt²t+1. (118)
Using a Taylor series expansion,
mt+1 = exp[−(1 + λ2/2)zt − λ
√
zt²t+1]
= exp
(
σ−1[−σ(1 + λ2/2)zt − zt+1 + φzt + (1− φ)θ]
)
≈ exp[(1− φ)θ/σ][1 + Czt − σ−1zt+1],
(119)
where C = σ−1[φ− σ(1 + λ2/2)]. Then IEt(mt+1rt+1) = 0 implies
IEt[(1 + Czt − σ−1zt+1)rt+1] = 0, (120)
IEt[rt+1] =
1
σ(1 + Czt)
IEt(zt+1rt+1)
=
1/[σ(1 + Czt)]
1− IEt(zt+1)/[σ(1 + Czt)]covt(zt+1, rt+1). (121)
Unconditional expected excess return is
IE(rt) =
IE(1/[σ(1 + Czt)])
1− IE(zt)IE(1/[σ(1 + Czt)])cov(zt, rt). (122)
A.1.4 Das and Foresi (1996) and Das (2002)
In Das and Foresi’s (1996) model (Proposition 1, pp. 12–13), bond prices are expo-
nential affine in the short rate y0t ,
ln bnt = An −Bny0t , (123)
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where short rate y0t follows a Poisson-Gaussian process:
∆y0t = K(θ − y0t )∆t+ v∆²+ J (µJ , σ2J )∆pi(q), (124)
where v2 is the variance of the Gaussian shock, and ∆² is standard normal. J
is the normal shock with mean and variance of µJ and σ2J , respectively. pi is the
discrete-time Poisson increment with jump intensity q = h∆t + O(∆t). Given the
conditional skewness of the process derived by Das (2002), the T -period log return of
the (n+ T )-period bond has conditional skewness of
St(R
n+T
t+T ) = (−Bn)3
2
√
2Ke−KT (1 + eKT + e2KT )hIE(J 3)
3(1 + eKT )[v2 + hIE(J 2)]√(1− e−2KT )[v2 + hIE(J 2)] , (125)
which is nonzero as long as short rate contains a jump component.
A.1.5 Regime Switching
Following Timmermann (2000), we assume a state variable zt follows a first-order
autoregressive Gaussian Markov switching process,
zt+1 = µst+1 + φ(zt − µst) + σst+1²t+1, (126)
in which mean µst and volatility σst differ in different states, denoted by st =
1, 2, . . . , k, but the autoregressive parameter φ is state-independent and |φ| < 1. By
Timmermann (2000), the mean, variance, autocovariance, and third central moment
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of z are
µz = IE(zt) = pi
′µs, (127)
IE[(zt − µz)2] = pi′
[
µˆ¯ µˆ+ σ
2
s
1− φ2
]
, (128)
IE[(zt+1 − µz)(zt − µz)] = pi′
[
(Bˆµˆ)¯ µˆ
]
+ φpi′(I − φ2Bˆ)−1σ2s , (129)
IE[(zt − µz)3] = pi′(µˆ¯ µˆ¯ µˆ)
+ 3φ2pi′
[
(Bˆ(I − φ2Bˆ)−1σ2s)¯ µˆ
]
+ 3pi′(µˆ¯ σ2s), (130)
where ¯ is an element-by-element multiplication operator, µs and σs are k-vectors of
means and volatilities, respectively, Bˆ is a k-dimensional square matrix of backward
transition probabilities with typical element Bˆij ≡ p(st = j|st+1 = i), pi is a vector of
unconditional probabilities of each state, and µˆ is defined as µˆ ≡ µs − IE(zt)1.
Suppose bond prices are exponential affine in the state variable and thus log
returns are affine in z:
− ln bnt = An +Bnzt, (131)
Rn+1t+1 = (An+1 − An) +Bn+1zt −Bnzt+1. (132)
The unconditional mean and variance of log return are
IE(Rn+1t+1 ) = (An+1 − An) + (Bn+1 −Bn)pi′µs, (133)
var(Rn+1t+1 ) = (B
2
n+1 −B2n)pi′
[
µˆ¯ µˆ+ σ
2
s
1− φ2
]
− 2Bn+1Bn
(
pi′
[
(Bˆµˆ)¯ µˆ
]
+ φpi′(I − φ2Bˆ)−1σ2s
)
,
(134)
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The unconditional third central moment of log return is
IE[(Rn+1t+1 − IE(Rn+1t+1 ))3] = (B3n+1 −B3n)IE[(zt − µz)3]
− 3(B2n+1Bn)IE[(zt+1 − µz)2(zt − µz)]
+ 3(Bn+1B
2
n)IE[(zt+1 − µz)(zt − µz)2],
(135)
where
IE[(zt+1 − µz)2(zt − µz)] = IE
(
IE[(zt+1 − µz)2(zt − µz)|st]
)
= IE
(
µˆ¯ IE[(zt+1 − µz)2|st]
)
= IE
(
µˆ¯ [Bˆ−1IE((zt+1 − µz)2|st+1)]
)
= pi′
(
µˆ¯ [Bˆ−1(µˆ¯ µˆ)]
)
,
(136)
IE[(zt+1 − µz)(zt − µz)2] = IE
(
IE[(zt+1 − µz)(zt − µz)2|st]
)
= IE (µˆ¯ µˆ¯ IE[(zt+1 − µz)|st])
= IE
(
µˆ¯ µˆ¯ [BˆIE(zt+1 − µz|st+1)]
)
= pi′
(
µˆ¯ µˆ¯ [Bˆµˆ]
)
,
(137)
and the skewness can be found by IE[(Rn+1t+1 − IE(Rn+1t+1 ))3]/var(Rn+1t+1 )3/2.
A.2 Data Description and Sources
Treasury portfolios (Trsy): We acquire the Fama US Treasury Maturity Portfolios Re-
turns File from CRSP. The File uses six-month maturity intervals to define portfolios
of bonds within five years to maturity. In this paper, for example, we use Trsy(2.5-3)
to denote the portfolio of Treasury bonds with 2.5 to 3 years to maturity. The File
has two portfolios for bonds with more than five years to maturity: Trsy(5-10) and
Trsy(10+). Totally we have 12 Treasury bond portfolios, all available from January
1976.
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Government-Related Bond Portfolios: We use 9 Lehman Government-Related
Bond Indexes from Datastream: four Agencies bond portfolios (Agns) with 1 to
3, 3 to 5, 5 to 10, and more than 10 years to maturity. 2 sovereign bond portfolios,
and 2 supranational (Spnat) bond portfolios, whose maturity is either 1 to 10 years
(M) or more than 10 years (L). A municipal bond portfolio (Muni) is also included
in our analysis.
Corporate Bond Portfolios (Corp): We use 14 Lehman Corporate Bond Indexes
from Datastream. The indexes use credit ratings and maturities to define portfolios.
They include ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, and Caa. For each rating, they
have intermediate (M, 1 to 10 years to maturity) and long (L, more than 10 years to
maturity) bond portfolios. For example, we use Corp-AA(M) to denote portfolio of
corporate bonds with rating AA and intermediate maturity.
Securitized Portfolios: We use the Lehman Securitized Indexes from Datastream.
We have six mortgage-backed portfolios, issued by FHLMC, FNMA, or GNMA, each
with 15 or 30 years to maturity. We have three asset-backed security (ABS) portfo-
lios, backed by credit card (CC), home equity (HE), and auto (AU). We also have
seven Lehman Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security (CMBS) portfolios, defined by
ratings, including AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and other rating.
A.3 GMM Estimator for Skewness
Suppose {x} is a stationary time series with length T . Consider the moment condi-
tions IE(g) = 0, where g ≡ T−1∑t gt, and
gt =

xt − µx
(xt − µx)2 − σ2x
(xt − µx)3 − Sxσ3x
 . (138)
Setting g = 0 yields the following GMM estimators for mean, variance, and skew-
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ness,
µˆx =
1
T
∑
t
xt, (139)
σˆ2x =
1
T
∑
t
(xt − µˆx)2, (140)
Sˆx =
T−1
∑
t(xt − µˆx)3
σˆ3x
. (141)
Define φx ≡ (µx, σx,Sx)′ and let φˆx denote its estimator. The covariance estimator of
φˆ has the form var(φˆ) = IE(d)−1var(g)IE(d′)−1, where
d ≡

−1 0 0
−2(x− µx) −1 0
−3(x− µx)2 −32Sxσx −σ3
 , (142)
IE(d) ≡

−1 0 0
0 −1 0
−3σ2x −32Sxσx −σ3
 . (143)
When there is no serial correlation between (gt, gτ ), t 6= τ ,
var(g) ≡ 1
T

σ2x M3x M4x
M3x M4x − σ4x M5x − σ2xM3x
M4x M5x − σ2xM3x M6x − (M3x)2
 . (144)
54
where Mkx ≡ IE[(x− µx)k]. Let Vij denote the (i, j) element of var(φˆx). We have
V11 =
σ2x
T
, (145)
V12 = V21 =
M3x
T
, (146)
V13 = V31 = −3σx
T
− 3
2
(M3x)2
σ5xT
+
1
σ3x
M4x
T
, (147)
V22 =
M4x
T
− σ
4
x
T
, (148)
V23 = V32 = − 3
σx
M3x
T
− 3
2
M3x
σ5x
M4x − σ4x
T
+
1
σ3x
M5x − σ2xM3x
T
, (149)
V33 =
3
σx
(
3σx
T
+
3
2
(M3x)2
σ5xT
− 1
σ3x
M4x
T
)
+
3
2
M3x
σ5x
(
3
σx
M3x
T
+
3
2
M3x
σ5x
M4x − σ4x
T
− 1
σ3x
M5x − σ2xM3x
T
)
− 1
σ3x
(
3
σx
M4x
T
+
3
2
M3x
σ5x
M5x − σ2xM3x
T
− 1
σ3x
M6x − σ2x(M3x)2
T
)
. (150)
If x is normal, then M3x = M5x = 0, M4x = 3σ4x, and M6x = 15σ6x. The above
expressions reduce to
V11 =
σ2x
T
, (151)
V22 =
2σ4x
T
, (152)
V33 =
6
T
, (153)
Vij = 0 ∀i 6= j. (154)
Note that V33 is the usual large sample variance estimator for skewness, which is
widely used in the literature.
When gt is serially correlated we use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent covariance matrix, e.g. Newey and West (1987), instead.
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A.4 GMM Estimator for Co-skewness
Suppose {x, y} are stationary processes with length T . Consider the moment condi-
tions IE(g) = 0, where g ≡ T−1∑t gt, and
gt =

xt − µx
yt − µy
(yt − µy)(xt − µx)2 − γy(xt − µx)3
 , (155)
where γy is the co-skewness of y against x.
Setting g = 0 yields the following GMM estimators for φ = (µx, µy, γy)
′,
µˆx =
1
T
∑
t
xt, (156)
µˆy =
1
T
∑
t
yt, (157)
γˆy =
∑
t(yt − µy)(xt − µx)2∑
t(xt − µx)3
. (158)
Let φˆ = (µˆx, µˆy, γˆy)
′. The covariance estimator of φˆx has the form
var(φˆx) = IE(d)
−1var(g)IE(d′)−1, (159)
where
d ≡

−1 0 0
0 −1 0
−2(y − µy)(x− µx) + 3γy(x− µx)2 −(x− µx)2 −(x− µx)3
 , (160)
and var(g) is estimated using a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
covariance matrix estimator, e.g. Newey and West (1987).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Bond Returns 197601 to 200512
This table reports the following summary statistics of monthly bond portfolio returns
for the period January 1976 to December 2005: sample mean in percentage points
under “Mean,” standard deviation in percentage points under “St Dev,” skewness un-
der “Skew,” t-ratio of skewness under “t(Skew),” and 95% block bootstrap confidence
interval for skewness under “95%CI.” All statistics are GMM estimates. Beginning
month, in yyyymm format, and number of observations of each series are reported
under “Begin” and “Obs,” respectively.
Asset Begin Obs Mean St Dev Skew t(Skew) 95%CI
Market Indexes
LB Univ 197601 360 0.72 1.71 0.63 1.25 (-0.45, 1.36)
CRSP Stock 197601 360 1.11 4.41 -0.69 -2.03 (-1.29,-0.04)
Value-weighted 197601 360 0.98 2.95 -0.33 -1.83 (-0.71,-0.02)
Treasury Bond Portfolios
Trsy(0-0.5) 197601 360 0.54 0.32 1.87 5.36 (0.03, 2.89)
Trsy(0.5-1) 197601 360 0.57 0.50 2.59 4.60 (0.40, 3.62)
Trsy(1-1.5) 197601 360 0.60 0.70 2.16 3.26 (0.32, 3.03)
Trsy(1.5-2) 197601 360 0.61 0.87 1.59 2.76 (-0.06, 2.40)
Trsy(2-2.5) 197601 360 0.63 1.06 1.49 2.19 (-0.44, 2.48)
Trsy(2.5-3) 197601 360 0.65 1.21 1.16 1.97 (-0.31, 2.16)
Trsy(3-3.5) 197601 360 0.67 1.32 0.63 1.54 (-0.41, 1.48)
Trsy(3.5-4) 197601 360 0.67 1.46 0.49 1.18 (-0.51, 1.19)
Trsy(4-4.5) 197601 360 0.67 1.55 0.35 1.01 (-0.51, 1.01)
Trsy(4.5-5) 197601 360 0.68 1.69 0.75 1.34 (-0.42, 1.77)
Trsy(5-10) 197601 360 0.71 1.99 0.45 1.34 (-0.31, 1.00)
Trsy(10+) 197601 360 0.80 2.92 0.35 1.45 (-0.23, 0.76)
Government-Related Bond Portfolios
Angs(1-3) 197601 360 0.63 0.90 1.86 2.87 (-0.18, 2.78)
Agns(3-5) 197601 360 0.68 1.40 0.78 1.64 (-0.62, 1.65)
Agns(5-10) 197601 360 0.73 1.97 0.14 0.38 (-0.80, 0.81)
Angs(10+) 197601 360 0.84 3.02 0.13 0.59 (-0.36, 0.56)
Sovereign(M) 197601 360 0.75 1.48 0.20 0.54 (-0.54, 0.98)
Sovereign(L) 197606 355 0.89 2.69 -0.02 -0.10 (-0.57, 0.46)
Spnat(M) 197601 360 0.72 1.55 0.54 1.00 (-0.83, 1.56)
Spnat(L) 197601 360 0.84 2.77 0.06 0.20 (-0.64, 0.65)
Muni 198001 312 0.64 2.20 -0.18 -0.35 (-1.30, 0.77)
Corporate Bond Portfolios
Corp-Aaa(M) 197601 360 0.70 1.48 0.88 1.42 (-0.80, 1.80)
Corp-Aaa(L) 197601 360 0.78 2.71 0.29 0.87 (-0.53, 0.91)
Corp-Aa(M) 197601 360 0.71 1.49 0.80 1.30 (-0.75, 1.69)
Corp-Aa(L) 197601 360 0.80 2.65 0.21 0.63 (-0.50, 0.83)
Corp-A(M) 197601 360 0.73 1.48 0.75 1.32 (-0.64, 1.61)
Corp-A(L) 197601 360 0.81 2.61 0.13 0.43 (-0.60, 0.64)
Continued on next page
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Asset Begin Obs Mean St Dev Skew t(Skew) 95%CI
Corp-Baa(M) 197601 360 0.77 1.52 0.60 1.16 (-0.58, 1.39)
Corp-Baa(L) 197601 360 0.87 2.65 0.19 0.55 (-0.74, 0.79)
Corp-Ba(M) 199003 190 0.72 1.58 -1.36 -3.22 (-2.00,-0.28)
Corp-Ba(L) 199003 190 0.90 2.06 -1.33 -2.39 (-2.09,-0.16)
Corp-B(M) 199003 190 0.70 2.21 -0.46 -1.06 (-1.41, 0.52)
Corp-B(L) 199003 190 1.13 2.93 0.79 1.40 (-0.62, 1.76)
Corp-Caa(M) 199003 190 0.79 3.77 -0.20 -0.59 (-0.87, 0.43)
Corp-Caa(L) 199003 190 0.98 8.07 -0.25 -0.22 (-2.37, 2.08)
Securitized Portfolios
FHLMC(15) 198508 245 0.61 0.99 -0.16 -0.90 (-0.45, 0.18)
FHLMC(30) 197705 344 0.74 2.13 1.17 2.14 (-0.52, 2.06)
FNMA(15) 198508 245 0.62 0.99 -0.11 -0.66 (-0.43, 0.23)
FNMA(30) 198211 278 0.75 1.31 -0.06 -0.26 (-0.64, 0.52)
GNMA(15) 198605 236 0.60 0.96 -0.24 -0.90 (-0.76, 0.27)
GNMA(30) 197601 360 0.73 2.07 1.24 2.24 (-0.41, 2.08)
ABS-CC 199112 169 0.53 0.82 -0.20 -1.38 (-0.49, 0.10)
ABS-HE 199112 169 0.52 0.71 -0.29 -1.12 (-0.77, 0.28)
ABS-AU 199112 169 0.45 0.45 -0.22 -1.29 (-0.58, 0.08)
CMBS-AAA 199701 108 0.60 1.38 -0.60 -2.34 (-1.05, 0.00)
CMBS-AA 199701 108 0.64 1.59 -0.55 -1.99 (-1.05, 0.05)
CMBS-A 199701 108 0.65 1.58 -0.52 -1.81 (-1.03, 0.13)
CMBS-BBB 199701 108 0.69 1.78 -0.93 -1.94 (-1.62, 0.15)
CMBS-BB 199701 108 0.95 2.94 -3.18 -3.05 (-4.05, 0.63)
CMBS-B 199701 108 0.98 2.91 -3.94 -4.19 (-5.03, 0.70)
CMBS-Oth 199701 108 1.56 5.40 -3.55 -1.63 (-6.74, 4.09)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Bond Excess Returns 197601 to 200512
This table reports the following summary statistics of monthly bond portfolio returns
in excess of one-month Treasury bill rate for the period January 1976 to Decem-
ber 2005: sample mean in percentage points under “Mean,” standard deviation in
percentage points under “St Dev,” skewness under “Skew,” t-ratio of skewness under
“t(Skew),” and 95% block bootstrap confidence interval for skewness under “95%CI.”
All statistics are GMM estimates. Beginning month, in yyyymm format, and number
of observations of each series are reported under “Begin” and “Obs,” respectively.
Asset Begin Obs Mean St Dev Skew t(Skew) 95%CI
Market Indexes
LB Univ 197601 360 0.23 1.69 0.20 0.50 (-0.77, 0.93)
CRSP Stock 197601 360 0.62 4.42 -0.71 -2.11 (-1.31,-0.06)
Value-weighted 197601 360 0.49 2.96 -0.41 -2.23 (-0.77,-0.09)
Treasury Bond Portfolios
Trsy(0-0.5) 197601 360 0.05 0.16 2.16 3.50 (-0.05, 3.45)
Trsy(0.5-1) 197601 360 0.08 0.41 1.38 1.96 (-0.94, 2.33)
Trsy(1-1.5) 197601 360 0.11 0.63 1.07 1.36 (-1.01, 2.28)
Trsy(1.5-2) 197601 360 0.12 0.82 0.66 1.07 (-1.05, 1.88)
Trsy(2-2.5) 197601 360 0.14 1.02 0.73 1.08 (-1.14, 1.87)
Trsy(2.5-3) 197601 360 0.16 1.17 0.53 0.93 (-0.96, 1.67)
Trsy(3-3.5) 197601 360 0.18 1.29 0.12 0.32 (-0.84, 0.74)
Trsy(3.5-4) 197601 360 0.18 1.43 0.05 0.16 (-0.85, 0.83)
Trsy(4-4.5) 197601 360 0.18 1.53 -0.01 -0.04 (-0.71, 0.60)
Trsy(4.5-5) 197601 360 0.19 1.67 0.40 0.79 (-0.63, 1.39)
Trsy(5-10) 197601 360 0.22 1.97 0.14 0.50 (-0.56, 0.69)
Trsy(10+) 197601 360 0.30 2.91 0.22 0.99 (-0.26, 0.60)
Government-Related Bond Portfolios
Angs(1-3) 197601 360 0.14 0.85 0.97 1.42 (-0.90, 2.19)
Agns(3-5) 197601 360 0.19 1.38 0.27 0.73 (-0.95, 1.07)
Agns(5-10) 197601 360 0.24 1.96 -0.18 -0.52 (-1.06, 0.49)
Angs(10+) 197601 360 0.34 3.02 0.04 0.17 (-0.37, 0.40)
Sovereign(M) 197601 360 0.26 1.46 -0.08 -0.30 (-0.73, 0.61)
Sovereign(L) 197606 355 0.40 2.69 -0.14 -0.68 (-0.57, 0.31)
Spnat(M) 197601 360 0.23 1.53 0.12 0.25 (-1.07, 1.15)
Spnat(L) 197601 360 0.35 2.76 -0.11 -0.41 (-0.74, 0.44)
Muni 198001 312 0.16 2.20 -0.60 -1.18 (-1.67, 0.42)
Corporate Bond Portfolios
Corp-Aaa(M) 197601 360 0.21 1.47 0.44 0.80 (-0.93, 1.33)
Corp-Aaa(L) 197601 360 0.29 2.70 0.08 0.31 (-0.58, 0.65)
Corp-Aa(M) 197601 360 0.22 1.48 0.37 0.79 (-1.00, 1.23)
Corp-Aa(L) 197601 360 0.31 2.65 0.02 0.09 (-0.62, 0.58)
Corp-A(M) 197601 360 0.24 1.47 0.33 0.76 (-0.85, 1.11)
Corp-A(L) 197601 360 0.32 2.61 -0.05 -0.18 (-0.66, 0.44)
Continued on next page
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Asset Begin Obs Mean St Dev Skew t(Skew) 95%CI
Corp-Baa(M) 197601 360 0.28 1.51 0.24 0.64 (-0.86, 1.03)
Corp-Baa(L) 197601 360 0.38 2.65 0.00 0.01 (-0.76, 0.58)
Corp-Ba(M) 199003 190 0.39 1.59 -1.38 -3.62 (-1.96,-0.38)
Corp-Ba(L) 199003 190 0.57 2.07 -1.22 -2.26 (-1.97,-0.17)
Corp-B(M) 199003 190 0.37 2.22 -0.51 -1.19 (-1.35, 0.42)
Corp-B(L) 199003 190 0.80 2.95 0.77 1.32 (-0.69, 1.71)
Corp-Caa(M) 199003 190 0.46 3.79 -0.22 -0.68 (-0.85, 0.40)
Corp-Caa(L) 199003 190 0.65 8.07 -0.28 -0.25 (-2.27, 2.15)
Securitized Portfolios
FHLMC(15) 198508 245 0.23 0.97 -0.31 -1.68 (-0.63, 0.06)
FHLMC(30) 197705 344 0.25 2.12 0.66 1.26 (-0.88, 1.69)
FNMA(15) 198508 245 0.24 0.96 -0.27 -1.55 (-0.60, 0.08)
FNMA(30) 198211 278 0.33 1.27 -0.40 -1.49 (-0.93, 0.23)
GNMA(15) 198605 236 0.23 0.94 -0.41 -1.49 (-0.93, 0.08)
GNMA(30) 197601 360 0.24 2.05 0.72 1.30 (-0.77, 1.60)
ABS-CC 199112 169 0.22 0.80 -0.13 -0.97 (-0.38, 0.13)
ABS-HE 199112 169 0.21 0.70 -0.30 -1.27 (-0.70, 0.23)
ABS-AU 199112 169 0.14 0.42 0.01 0.03 (-0.30, 0.28)
CMBS-AAA 199701 108 0.31 1.37 -0.50 -2.07 (-0.94, 0.06)
CMBS-AA 199701 108 0.36 1.58 -0.46 -1.76 (-0.99, 0.12)
CMBS-A 199701 108 0.37 1.57 -0.42 -1.54 (-0.91, 0.18)
CMBS-BBB 199701 108 0.41 1.78 -0.88 -1.76 (-1.58, 0.17)
CMBS-BB 199701 108 0.66 2.94 -3.18 -3.01 (-4.06, 0.70)
CMBS-B 199701 108 0.70 2.91 -3.96 -4.20 (-5.07, 0.82)
CMBS-Oth 199701 108 1.28 5.38 -3.61 -1.66 (-6.59, 4.25)
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Table 3: Term Structure of Skewness in Treasury Bond Returns
This table summarizes skewness in weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual Treasury (Trsy)
zero-coupon bond total (Panel A) or excess (Panel B) returns. The maturities of Treasury
bonds are in the parentheses.
Panel A: Total Returns
Asset Weekly Monthly Quarterly Annual
Trsy(1-month) 1.74 . . .
Trsy(3-month) 2.51 2.02 . .
Trsy(6-month) 2.26 2.78 1.93 .
Trsy(9-month) 1.90 2.68 2.28 .
Trsy(1-year) 1.32 2.07 2.24 .
Trsy(2-year) 1.04 1.35 1.70 1.33
Trsy(3-year) 0.76 1.01 1.30 1.23
Trsy(4-year) 0.83 0.84 0.97 1.10
Trsy(5-year) 0.70 0.77 1.05 1.02
Trsy(6-year) 0.76 0.91 1.03 1.11
Trsy(7-year) 0.68 0.76 1.01 1.09
Trsy(8-year) 0.73 0.71 1.07 1.25
Trsy(9-year) 0.69 0.61 0.93 1.21
Trsy(10-year) 0.77 0.78 0.96 1.18
Panel B: Excess Returns
Asset Weekly Monthly Quarterly Annual
Trsy(1-month) 0.58 . . .
Trsy(3-month) 0.80 1.85 . .
Trsy(6-month) 0.76 1.47 1.46 .
Trsy(9-month) 0.78 1.18 1.00 .
Trsy(1-year) 0.50 0.63 0.69 .
Trsy(2-year) 0.59 0.49 0.52 0.07
Trsy(3-year) 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.14
Trsy(4-year) 0.62 0.44 0.36 0.22
Trsy(5-year) 0.52 0.44 0.56 0.29
Trsy(6-year) 0.61 0.61 0.57 0.49
Trsy(7-year) 0.56 0.51 0.60 0.50
Trsy(8-year) 0.62 0.50 0.73 0.72
Trsy(9-year) 0.60 0.42 0.62 0.74
Trsy(10-year) 0.70 0.62 0.67 0.73
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Table 4: Time Series Regressions (GMM Estimates): 197601 to 200512
This table reports the GMM estimation results of the following model:
rm,t = µm + ²m,t,
ri,t = c0i + c1irm,t + c2i(rm,t − µm)2 + ²i,t,
where ri are the excess returns of the test assets, rm is the value-weighted market
index excess return with mean µm. R
2 are the R-squares of individual regressions.
GMM beta and co-skewness estimates of each portfolio are reported under “Beta”
and “Co-skew,” respectively. t-ratios of estimates are reported under corresponding
estimates.
Test c0 c1 c2 R2 Beta Co-Skew
Asset (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio)
Treasury Bond Portfolios
Trsy(0-0.5) 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.02 -0.01
(1.97) (2.79) (2.77) (2.70) (-0.77)
Trsy(0.5-1) 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.05 -0.04
(0.30) (3.29) (2.87) (3.33) (-0.89)
Trsy(1-1.5) 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.07 -0.08
(0.11) (3.53) (3.22) (3.44) (-1.08)
Trsy(1.5-2) -0.02 0.11 0.01 0.14 0.09 -0.11
(-0.28) (3.57) (3.30) (3.36) (-1.09)
Trsy(2-2.5) -0.03 0.13 0.01 0.14 0.12 -0.13
(-0.31) (3.42) (3.03) (3.34) (-1.07)
Trsy(2.5-3) -0.04 0.16 0.01 0.15 0.14 -0.15
(-0.42) (3.59) (3.19) (3.41) (-1.10)
Trsy(3-3.5) -0.04 0.17 0.02 0.15 0.15 -0.17
(-0.39) (3.91) (3.35) (3.74) (-1.09)
Trsy(3.5-4) -0.06 0.19 0.02 0.15 0.17 -0.19
(-0.53) (4.06) (3.47) (3.97) (-1.10)
Trsy(4-4.5) -0.06 0.20 0.02 0.14 0.18 -0.17
(-0.48) (3.96) (3.08) (3.95) (-0.96)
Trsy(4.5-5) -0.08 0.22 0.02 0.15 0.20 -0.18
(-0.59) (3.87) (3.10) (3.67) (-1.02)
Trsy(5-10) -0.14 0.29 0.02 0.18 0.26 -0.25
(-0.86) (4.62) (3.72) (4.45) (-1.09)
Trsy(10+) -0.22 0.43 0.04 0.18 0.39 -0.36
(-0.99) (5.03) (4.01) (4.47) (-1.06)
Government-Related Bond Portfolios
Angs(1-3) 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.16 0.11 -0.09
(0.02) (3.44) (2.77) (3.24) (-0.81)
Agns(3-5) -0.03 0.19 0.01 0.16 0.18 -0.12
(-0.23) (4.03) (2.85) (3.56) (-0.74)
Agns(5-10) -0.09 0.28 0.02 0.17 0.25 -0.18
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Test c0 c1 c2 R2 Beta Co-Skew
Asset (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio)
(-0.53) (4.53) (3.12) (4.41) (-0.77)
Angs(10+) -0.21 0.44 0.04 0.18 0.39 -0.42
(-0.89) (5.11) (4.11) (4.40) (-1.11)
Sovereign(M) 0.02 0.24 0.01 0.22 0.23 -0.04
(0.21) (6.63) (2.91) (6.50) (-0.26)
Sovereign(L) -0.08 0.49 0.03 0.26 0.45 -0.04
(-0.39) (8.07) (3.69) (7.47) (-0.18)
Spnat(M) -0.03 0.23 0.02 0.18 0.20 -0.14
(-0.20) (4.68) (3.21) (4.74) (-0.82)
Spnat(L) -0.10 0.42 0.03 0.19 0.39 -0.18
(-0.45) (5.51) (3.22) (5.26) (-0.61)
Muni -0.08 0.31 0.01 0.16 0.30 0.11
(-0.40) (3.93) (1.13) (4.27) (0.66)
Corporate Bond Portfolios
Corp-Aaa(M) 0.00 0.22 0.01 0.19 0.21 -0.03
(-0.03) (4.38) (2.13) (4.16) (-0.16)
Corp-Aaa(L) -0.18 0.45 0.03 0.23 0.41 -0.17
(-0.83) (6.11) (3.45) (5.85) (-0.58)
Corp-Aa(M) -0.01 0.24 0.01 0.21 0.22 -0.06
(-0.10) (4.58) (2.41) (4.48) (-0.33)
Corp-Aa(L) -0.13 0.44 0.03 0.22 0.41 -0.12
(-0.59) (5.92) (3.03) (5.90) (-0.42)
Corp-A(M) 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.23 0.23 -0.04
(0.02) (5.21) (2.53) (5.03) (-0.22)
Corp-A(L) -0.10 0.45 0.02 0.24 0.42 -0.06
(-0.52) (6.57) (3.00) (6.47) (-0.23)
Corp-Baa(M) 0.05 0.26 0.01 0.25 0.25 0.03
(0.42) (5.69) (2.10) (5.91) (0.19)
Corp-Baa(L) -0.04 0.50 0.02 0.29 0.47 0.04
(-0.22) (7.12) (2.65) (7.25) (0.14)
Corp-Ba(M) 0.33 0.30 -0.01 0.31 0.32 0.47
(1.55) (3.82) (-1.12) (5.79) (3.18)
Corp-Ba(L) 0.56 0.33 -0.02 0.24 0.36 0.60
(1.83) (3.22) (-1.32) (5.03) (2.88)
Corp-B(M) 0.51 0.36 -0.04 0.34 0.44 0.91
(2.15) (4.50) (-3.66) (6.93) (5.27)
Corp-B(L) 0.75 0.46 -0.02 0.22 0.51 0.77
(2.20) (4.23) (-1.45) (5.62) (3.44)
Corp-Caa(M) 0.71 0.47 -0.07 0.21 0.58 1.28
(1.51) (3.50) (-2.96) (5.51) (4.83)
Corp-Caa(L) 0.54 0.90 -0.05 0.11 0.98 1.50
(0.48) (2.71) (-0.84) (4.42) (2.05)
Securitized Portfolios
FHLMC(15) 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.09 -0.11
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Test c0 c1 c2 R2 Beta Co-Skew
Asset (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio)
(0.24) (3.89) (3.98) (3.11) (-1.69)
FHLMC(30) -0.11 0.33 0.02 0.19 0.30 -0.08
(-0.55) (4.02) (2.50) (4.10) (-0.44)
FNMA(15) 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.10 -0.10
(0.35) (3.93) (3.90) (3.12) (-1.61)
FNMA(30) 0.13 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.15 -0.02
(1.06) (4.05) (2.32) (4.02) (-0.26)
GNMA(15) 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.08 -0.12
(0.36) (3.39) (3.76) (2.53) (-1.52)
GNMA(30) -0.08 0.32 0.02 0.20 0.30 -0.09
(-0.47) (4.09) (2.41) (4.07) (-0.42)
ABS-CC 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.06
(1.34) (0.67) (1.14) (0.44) (-1.31)
ABS-HE 0.17 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.04
(1.90) (0.57) (0.98) (0.38) (-1.11)
ABS-AU 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04
(1.74) (0.55) (1.37) (0.17) (-1.68)
CMBS-AAA 0.19 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.11
(0.81) (0.33) (1.02) (-0.04) (-1.65)
CMBS-AA 0.26 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.09
(0.94) (0.25) (0.79) (-0.04) (-1.30)
CMBS-A 0.27 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.09
(0.99) (0.22) (0.75) (-0.07) (-1.26)
CMBS-BBB 0.34 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07
(1.28) (0.06) (0.56) (-0.17) (-0.99)
CMBS-BB 0.83 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.14
(2.18) (-0.30) (-0.95) (-0.08) (0.80)
CMBS-B 0.80 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.08
(2.22) (-0.19) (-0.63) (-0.05) (0.61)
CMBS-Oth 1.51 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.13
(2.87) (-0.41) (-1.22) (-0.26) (0.64)
Overall t 2.22 24.70 20.21 24.70 2.22
Adj Overall t 0.39 4.36 3.57 4.49 0.42
Bonferroni 0.00 37.00 10.00 36.00 3.00
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Table 5: Cross Sectional Regression for Monthly Bond Returns–Market as the Factor
This table reports the estimation results of the following three models:
ri,t = at + λm,tβm,i + εi,t,
ri,t = at + λm,tβm,i + ηm,tγm,i + εi,t,
ri,t − βm,irm,t = at + ηm,t[γm,i − βm,i] + εi,t,
where ri,t is excess return of test asset i at time t, βm,i and γm,i are asset i’s beta
and co-skewness, respectively, against the market index, whose excess return at time
t is rm,t. Market skewness is reported under “Skew(m).” Time series averages of
the coefficient estimates, in percentage points, are reported. t-ratios are reported
in parentheses. Avg R2 are the time series average of adjusted R-squares of cross
sectional regressions. Panel A uses Fama-MacBeth standard errors. Panel B uses
Newey-West standard errors. Panel C adjusts averages and their standard errors
to take into account variation in the size of cross section over time. Panel D adjusts
beta and co-skewness estimates to mitigate stale pricing problem. Panel E adds Fama-
French stock portfolios in the estimation. Panel F excludes bond market index from
the proxy for market portfolio. Panel G excludes intercepts from the above regression
models. Panel H replaces co-skewness by cov[ri, (rm−µm)2]/var[(rm−µm)2] and uses
standard errors adjusted for errors-in-variables due to Shanken (1992).
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth
Period a λ η Skew(m) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.16 0.38 0.32
o (2.93) (1.22)
200512 0.18 0.32 0.13 -0.41 0.49
(4.40) (1.12) (0.84) (-2.23)
0.17 0.12 0.29
(3.37) (0.66)
197601 0.11 0.09 0.46
o (1.72) (0.19)
198512 0.10 0.15 0.03 -0.03 0.47
(1.66) (0.32) (1.53) (-0.11)
0.02 0.05 0.15
(0.15) (1.26)
198601 0.11 0.80 0.38
o (1.24) (1.83)
199512 0.10 0.86 0.03 -0.77 0.55
(2.42) (2.46) (0.13) (-1.51)
0.18 0.01 0.38
(2.87) (0.06)
199601 0.26 0.20 0.28
o (2.50) (0.33)
200512 0.31 -0.69 0.56 -0.62 0.38
(2.89) (-0.58) (0.98) (-2.73)
0.23 0.03 0.18
(2.35) (0.06)
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Panel B: Newey-West
Period a λ η Skew(m) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.16 0.38 0.32
o (2.74) (1.04)
200512 0.18 0.32 0.13 -0.41 0.49
(4.33) (0.99) (0.79) (-2.23)
0.17 0.12 0.29
(2.94) (0.59)
197601 0.11 0.09 0.46
o (1.74) (0.19)
198512 0.10 0.15 0.03 -0.03 0.47
(1.68) (0.30) (1.53) (-0.11)
0.02 0.05 0.15
(0.13) (1.19)
198601 0.11 0.80 0.38
o (1.13) (1.65)
199512 0.10 0.86 0.03 -0.77 0.55
(2.43) (2.25) (0.14) (-1.51)
0.18 0.01 0.38
(2.57) (0.06)
199601 0.26 0.20 0.28
o (2.51) (0.30)
200512 0.31 -0.69 0.56 -0.62 0.38
(2.90) (-0.54) (0.93) (-2.73)
0.23 0.03 0.18
(2.36) (0.06)
Panel C: Size of Cross Section Adjusted
Period a λ η Skew(m) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.18 0.39 0.32
o (3.14) (1.22)
200512 0.20 0.31 0.13 -0.41 0.49
(4.70) (1.06) (0.79) (-2.23)
0.18 0.12 0.29
(3.56) (0.63)
197601 0.11 0.10 0.46
o (1.76) (0.22)
198512 0.10 0.16 0.03 -0.03 0.47
(1.70) (0.35) (1.49) (-0.11)
0.02 0.05 0.15
(0.19) (1.23)
198601 0.11 0.81 0.38
o (1.29) (1.84)
199512 0.10 0.88 0.02 -0.77 0.55
(2.43) (2.51) (0.10) (-1.51)
0.18 0.01 0.38
(2.97) (0.08)
199601 0.26 0.24 0.28
o (2.52) (0.40)
200512 0.30 -0.53 0.49 -0.62 0.38
(2.84) (-0.45) (0.85) (-2.73)
0.24 0.03 0.18
(2.42) (0.07)
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Panel D: Stale Pricing Adjusted
Period a λ η Skew(m) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.19 0.32 0.31
o (3.26) (1.12)
200512 0.22 0.32 0.07 -0.41 0.47
(4.95) (1.30) (0.78) (-2.23)
0.17 0.04 0.27
(3.42) (0.33)
197601 0.08 0.17 0.44
o (1.22) (0.34)
198512 0.09 0.22 0.00 -0.03 0.51
(1.35) (0.44) (0.28) (-0.11)
0.06 0.01 0.19
(0.61) (0.65)
198601 0.19 0.52 0.37
o (2.35) (1.34)
199512 0.17 0.56 -0.07 -0.77 0.44
(2.75) (1.90) (-0.34) (-1.51)
0.15 -0.07 0.43
(2.47) (-0.36)
199601 0.27 0.06 0.28
o (2.67) (0.16)
200512 0.36 -0.88 0.66 -0.62 0.40
(3.40) (-1.24) (1.88) (-2.73)
0.25 0.13 0.14
(2.53) (0.45)
Panel E: Market Integration
Period a λ η Skew(m) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.18 0.46 0.46
o (1.87) (2.36)
200512 0.28 0.05 0.23 -0.41 0.54
(3.84) (0.27) (1.85) (-2.23)
0.15 0.06 0.34
(3.53) (0.38)
197601 -0.16 0.84 0.48
o (-0.66) (2.15)
198512 0.01 0.49 0.04 -0.03 0.55
(0.07) (1.41) (2.95) (-0.11)
0.08 0.04 0.29
(0.89) (2.18)
198601 0.26 0.29 0.43
o (2.05) (1.02)
199512 0.20 0.43 -0.08 -0.77 0.53
(2.14) (1.56) (-0.55) (-1.51)
0.05 -0.16 0.29
(1.08) (-1.05)
199601 0.29 0.34 0.46
o (2.76) (1.02)
200512 0.32 -0.23 0.49 -0.62 0.51
(3.07) (-0.45) (1.11) (-2.73)
0.23 0.06 0.20
(2.86) (0.11)
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Panel F: Only Equities in Market Index
Period a λ η Skew(m) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.18 0.71 0.31
o (3.23) (1.13)
200512 0.20 0.60 0.16 -0.71 0.49
(4.46) (1.01) (0.51) (-2.11)
0.20 0.08 0.31
(3.78) (0.20)
197601 0.11 0.17 0.45
o (1.68) (0.19)
198512 0.09 0.22 0.02 -0.01 0.47
(1.38) (0.25) (1.57) (-0.05)
0.01 0.02 0.04
(0.07) (1.17)
198601 0.18 1.41 0.37
o (2.10) (1.56)
199512 0.12 1.93 -0.10 -1.46 0.54
(2.63) (2.54) (-0.22) (-1.81)
0.22 -0.12 0.39
(3.17) (-0.29)
199601 0.27 0.17 0.29
o (2.67) (0.20)
200512 0.32 -3.44 2.47 -0.70 0.39
(3.08) (-1.45) (1.87) (-2.94)
0.26 0.53 0.16
(2.53) (0.63)
Panel G: No Intercept
Period λ η Skew(m) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.83 0.55
o (2.49)
200512 0.86 -0.05 -0.41 0.69
(2.78) (-0.32) (-2.23)
-0.18 0.46
(-0.88)
197601 0.30 0.75
o (0.62)
198512 0.36 0.03 -0.03 0.77
(0.75) (1.74) (-0.11)
0.05 0.48
(0.49)
198601 1.06 0.60
o (2.65)
199512 1.13 -0.01 -0.77 0.74
(3.15) (-0.05) (-1.51)
-0.05 0.42
(-0.26)
199601 0.71 0.26
o (1.22)
200512 1.53 -0.60 -0.62 0.45
(1.40) (-1.03) (-2.73)
-0.34 0.17
(-0.71)
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Panel H: Errors-in-Variables Adjusted
Period a λ η Skew(m) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.16 0.38 0.32
o (2.72) (1.03)
200512 0.18 0.30 -0.02 -0.41 0.49
(4.23) (0.94) (-0.73) (-2.23)
197601 0.11 0.09 0.46
o (1.74) (0.19)
198512 0.10 0.08 0.02 -0.03 0.52
(1.69) (0.17) (0.34) (-0.11)
198601 0.11 0.80 0.38
o (1.03) (1.51)
199512 0.10 0.87 0.00 -0.77 0.58
(2.02) (2.03) (-0.06) (-1.51)
199601 0.26 0.20 0.28
o (2.51) (0.30)
200512 0.31 -0.69 -0.06 -0.62 0.38
(2.47) (-0.46) (-0.79) (-2.73)
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Table 6: Time Series Regressions: 197601 to 200512
This table reports the estimation results of the following model:
rm,t = δ
′
mZt−1 + ²m,t,
ri,t = c0,i(Zt−1) + c1,i(Zt−1)rm,t + c2,i(Zt−1)(rm,t − δ′mZt−1)2 + ²i,t,
where ri are the excess returns of the test assets, rm,t is the value-weighted market
index excess return with conditional mean δ′mZt−1, and cj,i(Zt−1) ≡
∑1
k=0 cjk,iZk,t−1.
Zt−1 = (Z0,t−1, Z1,t−1)′, where Z0,t−1 is a constant, and Z1,t−1 is de-trended short term
interest rate. R2 are the adjusted R-squares of individual regressions.
Test c00 c01 c10 c11 c20 c21 R2
Asset (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio)
Treasury Bond Portfolios
Trsy(0-0.5) 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.27
(4.04) (-2.94) (3.02) (-1.64) (1.49) (-1.72)
Trsy(0.5-1) 0.02 -0.12 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.30
(1.13) (-3.93) (3.99) (-0.96) (2.08) (-1.53)
Trsy(1-1.5) 0.02 -0.20 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.27
(0.64) (-3.87) (4.08) (-0.57) (2.34) (-0.87)
Trsy(1.5-2) 0.00 -0.23 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.25
(0.00) (-3.43) (4.21) (-0.49) (2.28) (-0.93)
Trsy(2-2.5) -0.01 -0.29 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.24
(-0.11) (-3.30) (4.48) (-0.22) (2.20) (-0.76)
Trsy(2.5-3) -0.02 -0.30 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.23
(-0.30) (-3.07) (4.71) (-0.32) (2.30) (-0.81)
Trsy(3-3.5) -0.02 -0.33 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.22
(-0.28) (-3.14) (4.94) (-0.17) (2.34) (-0.47)
Trsy(3.5-4) -0.04 -0.35 0.17 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.21
(-0.50) (-2.99) (5.11) (-0.25) (2.38) (-0.39)
Trsy(4-4.5) -0.04 -0.35 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.20
(-0.44) (-2.79) (5.22) (-0.14) (2.14) (-0.46)
Trsy(4.5-5) -0.06 -0.35 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.20
(-0.62) (-2.70) (5.08) (0.01) (2.23) (-0.74)
Trsy(5-10) -0.11 -0.42 0.26 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.23
(-0.96) (-2.86) (5.65) (-0.33) (2.37) (-0.33)
Trsy(10+) -0.20 -0.37 0.40 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.21
(-1.16) (-1.82) (6.37) (-0.29) (2.55) (-1.00)
Government-Related Bond Portfolios
Angs(1-3) 0.02 -0.27 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.29
(0.51) (-4.46) (4.30) (-0.38) (2.27) (-1.49)
Agns(3-5) 0.00 -0.39 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.27
(-0.01) (-3.60) (5.35) (0.07) (2.29) (-1.05)
Agns(5-10) -0.06 -0.47 0.25 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.23
(-0.53) (-2.93) (6.00) (-0.01) (2.18) (-0.43)
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Test c00 c01 c10 c11 c20 c21 R2
Asset (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio)
Angs(10+) -0.20 -0.38 0.41 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.21
(-1.07) (-1.78) (6.35) (0.02) (2.63) (-0.94)
Sovereign(M) 0.05 -0.32 0.22 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.28
(0.54) (-3.10) (7.77) (-0.33) (1.70) (-0.64)
Sovereign(L) -0.04 -0.39 0.46 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.28
(-0.25) (-1.97) (9.53) (-1.00) (1.86) (-0.27)
Spnat(M) 0.00 -0.37 0.20 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.25
(0.03) (-2.90) (5.85) (-0.46) (2.03) (-0.55)
Spnat(L) -0.06 -0.48 0.39 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.23
(-0.38) (-2.24) (6.50) (-0.44) (1.97) (-0.65)
Muni -0.07 -0.42 0.29 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.21
(-0.63) (-2.46) (5.72) (0.44) (0.85) (-0.92)
Corporate Bond Portfolios
Corp-Aaa(M) 0.03 -0.34 0.20 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.28
(0.35) (-3.77) (5.64) (-0.21) (1.70) (-1.92)
Corp-Aaa(L) -0.13 -0.42 0.41 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.27
(-0.84) (-2.24) (7.50) (-0.81) (1.94) (-1.01)
Corp-Aa(M) 0.02 -0.34 0.21 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.30
(0.22) (-3.87) (5.91) (-0.39) (1.93) (-1.88)
Corp-Aa(L) -0.09 -0.45 0.40 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.27
(-0.55) (-2.40) (7.64) (-0.64) (1.81) (-0.98)
Corp-A(M) 0.03 -0.36 0.22 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.32
(0.44) (-3.74) (7.15) (-0.40) (1.85) (-1.47)
Corp-A(L) -0.06 -0.47 0.42 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.29
(-0.42) (-2.56) (8.29) (-0.55) (1.78) (-0.88)
Corp-Baa(M) 0.09 -0.36 0.23 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.35
(1.14) (-3.46) (8.25) (-0.45) (1.42) (-1.54)
Corp-Baa(L) 0.00 -0.50 0.45 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.34
(0.03) (-2.73) (9.58) (-0.64) (1.62) (-1.19)
Corp-Ba(M) 0.31 -0.46 0.28 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.33
(2.71) (-2.42) (6.34) (-0.40) (-1.28) (1.60)
Corp-Ba(L) 0.51 -0.67 0.33 0.12 -0.02 0.04 0.25
(3.31) (-2.43) (4.68) (1.38) (-1.19) (2.09)
Corp-B(M) 0.49 -0.52 0.35 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.35
(3.76) (-2.07) (6.05) (-0.25) (-3.41) (0.95)
Corp-B(L) 0.73 -0.55 0.46 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.24
(3.55) (-1.89) (5.49) (0.15) (-1.91) (-0.98)
Corp-Caa(M) 0.69 -0.76 0.44 -0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.21
(2.49) (-1.28) (4.31) (-0.12) (-3.54) (0.84)
Corp-Caa(L) 0.50 -1.48 0.83 -0.24 -0.05 0.05 0.11
(0.75) (-1.56) (3.64) (-0.67) (-0.88) (0.59)
Securitized Portfolios
FHLMC(15) 0.03 -0.20 0.15 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.19
(0.39) (-1.97) (5.79) (3.45) (2.49) (0.01)
Continued on next page
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Continued on next page
Test c00 c01 c10 c11 c20 c21 R2
Asset (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio)
FHLMC(30) -0.06 -0.49 0.29 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.26
(-0.45) (-3.35) (4.80) (-0.71) (2.18) (-0.68)
FNMA(15) 0.04 -0.21 0.15 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.19
(0.53) (-2.08) (5.79) (3.34) (2.40) (0.08)
FNMA(30) 0.17 -0.19 0.20 0.11 0.00 -0.01 0.18
(1.79) (-1.67) (5.52) (2.34) (0.47) (-1.47)
GNMA(15) 0.05 -0.17 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.19
(0.77) (-1.62) (5.43) (3.24) (1.96) (-0.55)
GNMA(30) -0.05 -0.43 0.29 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.26
(-0.39) (-3.41) (4.84) (-0.49) (1.93) (-1.10)
ABS-CC 0.14 -0.25 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.08
(1.95) (-2.16) (1.54) (4.11) (1.43) (0.64)
ABS-HE 0.16 -0.21 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.05
(2.51) (-1.91) (1.37) (4.19) (1.41) (0.94)
ABS-AU 0.10 -0.18 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.11
(2.63) (-3.15) (1.28) (4.11) (1.72) (0.36)
CMBS-AAA 0.19 -0.28 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.02
(1.10) (-1.16) (0.70) (2.69) (1.26) (0.77)
CMBS-AA 0.25 -0.36 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.01
(1.28) (-1.30) (0.50) (2.76) (0.99) (1.30)
CMBS-A 0.27 -0.46 0.02 0.21 0.01 0.03 0.02
(1.36) (-1.60) (0.41) (3.20) (1.04) (2.03)
CMBS-BBB 0.34 -0.50 0.02 0.30 0.01 0.04 0.05
(2.03) (-2.44) (0.23) (3.64) (0.89) (3.05)
CMBS-BB 0.83 -0.23 -0.02 0.54 -0.01 0.06 0.09
(3.42) (-0.67) (-0.16) (2.39) (-0.58) (1.95)
CMBS-B 0.80 -0.15 -0.02 0.44 0.00 0.06 0.06
(3.47) (-0.45) (-0.13) (1.79) (-0.24) (1.83)
CMBS-Oth 1.52 -0.07 -0.08 0.58 -0.01 0.08 0.01
(4.63) (-0.17) (-0.32) (1.14) (-0.37) (1.26)
Overall t 6.07 1.64 24.70 6.07 11.21 0.29
Adj Overall t 1.08 0.29 4.38 1.08 1.99 0.05
Bonferroni 6.00 0.00 40.00 6.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 7: Cross Sectional Regressions for Monthly Bond Returns–Rolling Estimates
This table reports the estimation results of the following models:
ri,t = at + λm,tβmi,t + εi,t,
ri,t = at + λm,tβmi,t + ηm,tγmi,tsign(Sm,t) + εi,t,
ri,t − βmi,trm,t = at + ηm,t[γmi,tsign(Sm,t)− βmi,t] + εi,t,
where ri,t is excess return of test asset i at time t, βmi,t and γmi,t are asset i’s 60-month
rolling beta and co-skewness, respectively, against the market index, whose excess
return at time t is rm,t. The average difference between a unit-beta(-coskewness)
portfolio and market portfolio returns are reported under “Diff.” Time series averages
of the coefficient estimates, in percentage points, are reported. t-ratios are reported
in parentheses. Avg R2 are the time series averages of adjusted R-squares of cross
sectional regressions. Fama-MacBeth standard errors are used to compute t-ratios.
Period a λ η Diff Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.16 0.63 0.14 0.43
o (3.37) (1.88) (0.49)
200512 0.13 0.73 0.16 0.20 0.55
(3.04) (2.09) (1.12) (0.71)
0.17 0.04 0.25
(2.85) (0.31)
197601 0.13 0.65 0.25 0.57
o (1.49) (0.78) (0.41)
198512 0.13 0.59 -0.09 0.56 0.62
(1.46) (0.69) (-0.37) (1.02)
0.26 -0.24 0.20
(2.04) (-0.88)
198601 0.10 0.77 0.20 0.48
o (2.14) (2.01) (0.63)
199512 0.08 0.64 0.20 0.01 0.57
(1.81) (1.96) (1.23) (0.02)
0.14 0.26 0.23
(1.59) (1.26)
199601 0.24 0.49 0.03 0.31
o (2.35) (0.78) (0.05)
200512 0.18 0.88 0.24 0.22 0.48
(2.06) (1.29) (0.83) (0.37)
0.16 -0.04 0.31
(1.52) (-0.22)
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Table 8: Cross Sectional Tests with Conditioning Information
This table reports the estimation results of the following three models:
ri,t = at + λm,tβmi,t + εi,t,
ri,t = at + λm,tβmi,t + ηm,tγmi,tsign(Sm,t) + εi,t,
ri,t − βmi,trm,t = at + ηm,t[γmi,tsign(Sm,t)− βmi,t] + εi,t,
where ri,t is excess return of test asset i at time t, βmi,t and γmi,t are asset i’s con-
ditional beta and co-skewness, respectively, against the market index, whose excess
return at time t is rm,t. The average difference between a unit-beta(-coskewness) port-
folio and market portfolio returns are reported under “Diff.” Time series averages
of the coefficient estimates, in percentage points, are reported. t-ratios are reported
in parentheses. Avg R2 are the time series average of adjusted R-squares of cross
sectional regressions. Fama-MacBeth standard errors are used to compute t-ratios.
Panel A: Cross Sectional Regression Conditional on Short Rate
Period a λ η Diff Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.13 0.31 -0.18 0.32
o (2.49) (0.99) (-0.69)
200512 0.13 0.29 -0.01 -0.19 0.48
(3.31) (0.93) (-0.08) (-0.82)
0.16 0.05 0.21
(2.39) (0.58)
197601 0.06 -0.30 -0.75 0.45
o (0.98) (-0.63) (-2.01)
198512 0.04 -0.16 -0.01 -0.65 0.52
(0.72) (-0.35) (-0.09) (-1.87)
-0.16 -0.17 0.18
(-1.53) (-1.77)
198601 0.16 0.81 0.24 0.41
o (2.10) (1.92) (0.61)
199512 0.11 0.81 0.15 0.13 0.57
(2.55) (2.23) (0.62) (0.30)
0.18 0.10 0.30
(2.46) (0.41)
199601 0.20 0.65 0.20 0.27
o (2.01) (1.19) (0.41)
200512 0.24 0.08 -0.15 -0.22 0.43
(2.64) (0.08) (-0.31) (-0.37)
0.23 0.07 0.24
(2.28) (0.38)
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Panel B: Cross Sectional Regression Conditional on Term Structure
Period a λ η Diff Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.11 0.25 -0.24 0.32
o (1.95) (0.84) (-0.95)
200512 0.10 0.36 -0.04 -0.17 0.47
(2.35) (1.17) (-0.26) (-0.69)
0.08 -0.19 0.20
(1.23) (-2.25)
197601 -0.06 -0.13 -0.58 0.42
o (-0.68) (-0.29) (-1.67)
198512 -0.02 0.15 -0.15 -0.39 0.49
(-0.25) (0.35) (-1.12) (-1.24)
-0.09 -0.19 0.27
(-1.00) (-1.08)
198601 0.14 0.64 0.07 0.41
o (1.86) (1.67) (0.26)
199512 0.12 0.88 -0.03 0.49 0.57
(2.77) (2.58) (-0.12) (1.27)
0.16 -0.05 0.28
(2.15) (-0.24)
199601 0.24 0.33 -0.13 0.25
o (2.34) (0.68) (-0.33)
200512 0.27 0.29 -0.09 0.07 0.40
(3.11) (0.44) (-0.26) (0.15)
0.26 -0.02 0.21
(2.59) (-0.15)
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Panel C: Cross Sectional Regression Conditional on Inflation and Real Activity
Period a λ η Diff Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.10 0.56 0.07 0.33
o (2.06) (1.85) (0.27)
200512 0.11 0.52 0.00 0.01 0.48
(2.71) (1.77) (-0.01) (0.04)
0.11 0.01 0.22
(1.74) (0.07)
197601 0.09 -0.07 -0.52 0.42
o (1.31) (-0.17) (-1.56)
198512 0.10 -0.10 0.03 -0.54 0.51
(1.59) (-0.23) (0.38) (-1.73)
-0.04 0.07 0.24
(-0.33) (0.85)
198601 0.10 0.67 0.10 0.38
o (1.29) (1.57) (0.27)
199512 0.12 0.83 0.73 0.50 0.57
(2.16) (2.02) (2.69) (1.07)
0.14 0.12 0.22
(1.56) (0.62)
199601 0.15 0.75 0.30 0.28
o (1.55) (1.30) (0.59)
200512 0.15 1.11 0.24 0.38 0.45
(1.52) (1.17) (0.47) (0.72)
0.16 -0.15 0.23
(1.72) (-0.76)
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Panel D: Cross Sectional Regression Conditional on Term Premium and Credit Premium
Period a λ η Diff Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.14 0.52 0.03 0.32
o (2.66) (1.78) (0.12)
200512 0.15 0.64 -0.18 0.30 0.48
(3.52) (2.20) (-1.22) (1.36)
0.13 -0.09 0.23
(2.21) (-0.80)
197601 0.11 0.12 -0.33 0.44
o (1.65) (0.26) (-0.97)
198512 0.13 0.14 0.31 -0.44 0.50
(2.03) (0.29) (2.01) (-1.33)
0.02 0.23 0.19
(0.12) (1.46)
198601 0.15 0.46 -0.11 0.41
o (2.19) (1.18) (-0.28)
199512 0.12 0.63 0.11 -0.03 0.57
(2.43) (1.72) (0.59) (-0.12)
0.17 0.09 0.26
(2.11) (0.57)
199601 0.11 0.77 0.31 0.27
o (1.22) (1.41) (0.66)
200512 0.07 -0.07 -0.68 0.15 0.44
(0.91) (-0.06) (-1.01) (0.25)
0.18 -0.08 0.25
(1.82) (-0.40)
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Panel E: Cross Sectional Regression Conditional on Term Structure and Other
Macroeconomic Variables
Period a λ η Diff Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.10 0.34 -0.15 0.31
o (1.84) (1.20) (-0.64)
200512 0.11 0.52 -0.11 -0.03 0.44
(2.40) (1.77) (-0.85) (-0.14)
0.06 -0.23 0.18
(0.98) (-2.72)
197601 -0.02 -0.17 -0.62 0.41
o (-0.26) (-0.39) (-1.95)
198512 0.02 -0.04 -0.26 -0.46 0.49
(0.38) (-0.11) (-1.98) (-1.52)
-0.10 -0.15 0.26
(-1.22) (-1.14)
198601 0.15 0.19 -0.38 0.41
o (2.21) (0.52) (-1.52)
199512 0.13 0.50 0.17 -0.12 0.56
(2.80) (1.50) (0.80) (-0.40)
0.11 0.02 0.29
(1.61) (0.16)
199601 0.20 0.38 -0.08 0.26
o (1.95) (0.77) (-0.18)
200512 0.19 0.84 -0.04 0.27 0.42
(2.09) (1.55) (-0.10) (0.80)
0.20 -0.21 0.22
(1.94) (-1.36)
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Table 9: Cross Sectional Regressions: Market and Inflation
This table reports the estimation results of the unconditional (Panel A) and con-
ditional (Panels B and C) two- and three-moment ICAPMs. The state variable is
inflation, whose unconditional skewness is reported in Panel A under “Skew(s).”
Time series averages of the coefficient estimates, in percentage points, are reported.
t-ratios are reported in the parentheses. Avg R2 are the time series average adjusted
R-squares of cross sectional regressions.
Panel A: Unconditional Specification
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Skew(s) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.15 0.47 0.05 0.48
o (4.74) (1.33) (0.05)
200512 0.10 -0.09 -2.84 0.56 -0.25 0.04 -0.13 0.64
(3.72) (-0.18) (-2.37) (2.38) (-1.68) (0.96) (-0.69)
197601 0.10 0.10 -0.01 0.53
o (1.64) (0.18) (-0.01)
198512 0.07 -0.33 -0.37 0.02 0.17 -0.02 0.11 0.62
(1.06) (-0.54) (-0.30) (1.14) (0.99) (-1.26) (0.58)
198601 0.11 0.97 0.61 0.46
o (1.23) (2.35) (0.58)
199512 0.09 1.04 0.66 0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.21 0.75
(2.38) (2.73) (0.63) (0.11) (-0.53) (0.63) (0.43)
199601 0.11 0.18 -3.25 0.44
o (1.72) (0.30) (-1.80)
200512 0.09 -0.92 -5.13 0.35 0.21 -0.05 -0.54 0.71
(2.02) (-0.70) (-2.70) (0.55) (1.10) (-2.51) (-2.01)
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Panel B: Conditional Specification (1)
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.12 0.33 -0.04 0.46
o (3.18) (1.00) (-0.05)
200512 0.07 0.53 -1.13 -0.25 -0.04 0.18 0.62
(2.39) (1.15) (-1.22) (-1.47) (-0.87) (2.23)
197601 0.09 0.09 1.07 0.52
o (1.49) (0.18) (1.11)
198512 0.04 -0.24 0.21 -0.02 0.13 -0.05 0.65
(0.68) (-0.45) (0.20) (-0.26) (1.17) (-0.54)
198601 0.16 0.72 0.54 0.50
o (2.18) (1.80) (0.69)
199512 0.10 1.09 1.09 0.06 -0.01 -0.06 0.73
(2.88) (3.19) (1.21) (0.24) (-0.08) (-1.06)
199601 0.09 0.45 -2.98 0.41
o (1.07) (0.73) (-1.65)
200512 0.17 -1.89 -4.27 -0.77 -0.06 -0.22 0.71
(2.95) (-1.39) (-1.85) (-1.32) (-1.02) (-0.98)
Panel C: Conditional Specification (2)
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.14 0.39 -0.52 0.44
o (3.76) (0.69) (-0.46)
200512 0.11 0.03 -0.85 -0.19 -0.13 -0.08 0.63
(4.42) (0.04) (-0.96) (-0.85) (-1.28) (-0.80)
197601 0.10 -0.44 -0.29 0.52
o (1.62) (-0.60) (-0.31)
198512 0.14 -2.39 -0.81 -0.04 -0.04 -0.84 0.62
(2.80) (-2.44) (-0.78) (-0.16) (-0.20) (-2.24)
198601 0.27 0.00 -0.08 0.52
o (3.25) (0.00) (-0.09)
199512 0.21 0.94 0.46 -0.24 0.01 -0.15 0.73
(4.23) (1.39) (0.66) (-1.04) (0.27) (-0.69)
199601 0.09 2.21 -1.71 0.38
o (1.19) (1.57) (-0.90)
200512 0.13 -0.33 -1.12 -0.93 -0.06 0.00 0.65
(2.29) (-0.28) (-0.70) (-1.35) (-0.74) (0.01)
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Table 10: Cross Sectional Regressions: Market and Real Activity
This table reports the estimation results of the unconditional (Panel A) and con-
ditional (Panels B and C) two- and three-moment ICAPMs. The state variable is
real activity, whose unconditional skewness is reported in Panel A under “Skew(s).”
Time series averages of the coefficient estimates, in percentage points, are reported.
t-ratios are reported in the parentheses. Avg R2 are the time series average adjusted
R-squares of cross sectional regressions.
Panel A: Unconditional Specification
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Skew(s) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.14 0.14 -0.51 0.40
o (2.49) (0.40) (-2.09)
200512 0.15 0.53 -0.41 -0.23 0.06 0.09 -0.75 0.65
(3.73) (1.60) (-1.12) (-1.04) (2.84) (0.95) (-2.58)
197601 0.09 -0.11 -0.19 0.54
o (1.49) (-0.17) (-0.58)
198512 0.12 -0.31 0.23 0.01 -0.02 0.69 -0.76 0.65
(1.95) (-0.45) (0.40) (0.55) (-0.94) (1.51) (-3.02)
198601 0.11 0.80 0.00 0.47
o (1.24) (1.69) (0.01)
199512 0.06 1.00 -0.16 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.17 0.73
(1.74) (2.02) (-0.88) (-0.31) (0.94) (-0.61) (-0.56)
199601 0.26 0.19 -0.02 0.38
o (2.54) (0.29) (-0.13)
200512 0.31 0.20 0.35 0.64 0.43 0.31 0.09 0.64
(3.96) (0.19) (2.01) (0.88) (0.96) (2.01) (0.34)
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Panel B: Conditional Specification (1)
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.00 -0.25 -4.29 0.40
o (0.04) (-0.82) (-5.65)
200512 -0.02 -0.30 -4.27 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.67
(-0.66) (-0.96) (-5.54) (-0.36) (0.57) (-0.30)
197601 0.00 -0.29 -4.27 0.54
o (-0.04) (-0.50) (-2.96)
198512 -0.04 -0.60 -4.84 -0.04 0.15 0.02 0.67
(-0.78) (-0.93) (-3.54) (-0.56) (0.66) (0.20)
198601 0.05 0.00 -2.95 0.50
o (0.62) (0.00) (-1.82)
199512 0.00 -0.54 -5.23 -0.09 0.04 0.08 0.75
(0.11) (-1.19) (-4.76) (-0.39) (0.87) (0.19)
199601 -0.07 -0.17 -4.64 0.41
o (-0.79) (-0.25) (-3.73)
200512 -0.02 -1.02 -4.23 -0.37 0.02 -0.17 0.71
(-0.36) (-1.03) (-4.86) (-0.73) (0.15) (-0.47)
Panel C: Conditional Specification (2)
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.10 0.29 0.02 0.43
o (2.97) (0.29) (0.34)
200512 0.07 1.06 0.03 -0.51 0.18 0.29 0.60
(2.38) (1.51) (0.79) (-2.37) (2.25) (1.08)
197601 0.06 -1.23 -0.05 0.48
o (1.01) (-1.38) (-1.27)
198512 0.02 -0.95 -0.03 0.41 0.18 0.99 0.62
(0.32) (-0.94) (-0.61) (1.32) (1.11) (1.76)
198601 0.17 0.11 -0.03 0.56
o (4.10) (0.14) (-0.81)
199512 0.06 0.27 0.00 0.21 -0.23 0.06 0.74
(1.39) (0.33) (-0.11) (1.56) (-2.91) (0.30)
199601 0.13 4.65 0.05 0.33
o (1.34) (3.25) (0.68)
200512 0.08 2.74 0.01 -0.71 -0.01 -0.33 0.59
(1.16) (1.89) (0.12) (-1.56) (-0.12) (-0.74)
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Table 11: Cross Sectional Regressions: Market and Short Rate
This table reports the estimation results of the unconditional (Panel A) and con-
ditional (Panels B and C) two- and three-moment ICAPMs. The state variable is
short rate, whose unconditional skewness is reported in Panel A under “Skew(s).”
Time series averages of the coefficient estimates, in percentage points, are reported.
t-ratios are reported in the parentheses. Avg R2 are the time series average adjusted
R-squares of cross sectional regressions.
Panel A: Unconditional Specification
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Skew(s) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.15 1.11 2.26 0.40
o (2.88) (2.21) (2.02)
200512 0.13 1.22 2.38 -0.03 -0.11 0.12 0.84 0.66
(4.48) (2.52) (2.09) (-0.19) (-1.21) (1.07) (2.87)
197601 0.09 -0.24 -0.79 0.55
o (1.46) (-0.32) (-0.79)
198512 0.16 -0.92 -2.57 0.01 0.49 -0.56 0.58 0.66
(2.96) (-0.78) (-1.50) (0.60) (1.07) (-1.50) (2.37)
198601 0.11 0.81 0.06 0.45
o (1.28) (1.75) (0.07)
199512 0.08 0.84 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.68
(1.85) (2.26) (-0.05) (0.13) (0.51) (0.81) (0.40)
199601 0.25 0.53 0.60 0.38
o (2.39) (0.54) (0.49)
200512 0.14 0.48 1.26 0.18 0.43 0.02 -0.32 0.65
(3.34) (0.38) (1.26) (0.34) (1.18) (2.02) (-1.18)
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Panel B: Conditional Specification (1)
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 -0.02 -0.03 5.89 0.41
o (-0.31) (-0.12) (5.00)
200512 -0.04 0.00 5.91 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.65
(-1.33) (-0.01) (5.36) (-0.19) (0.18) (-0.92)
197601 -0.05 -0.25 8.03 0.53
o (-0.66) (-0.43) (2.70)
198512 -0.04 -0.51 8.21 -0.01 0.14 0.13 0.67
(-0.68) (-0.75) (3.24) (-0.13) (0.40) (0.64)
198601 0.07 0.42 2.23 0.51
o (0.79) (0.82) (1.02)
199512 0.02 0.18 3.48 0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.71
(0.43) (0.41) (2.00) (0.17) (-0.42) (0.31)
199601 0.01 0.39 3.61 0.43
o (0.11) (0.70) (3.64)
200512 -0.05 -1.85 6.68 -1.05 0.01 0.38 0.65
(-0.58) (-1.26) (3.43) (-1.56) (0.61) (1.03)
Panel C: Conditional Specification (2)
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.15 0.64 0.07 0.40
o (3.91) (1.00) (0.76)
200512 0.14 1.49 0.06 -0.44 -0.02 0.21 0.64
(4.36) (2.24) (0.57) (-1.56) (-0.05) (0.37)
197601 0.07 -1.48 -0.22 0.50
o (0.91) (-2.11) (-0.89)
198512 0.02 -2.29 -0.63 -0.51 -2.11 -2.21 0.63
(0.34) (-3.22) (-2.87) (-1.09) (-1.98) (-1.46)
198601 0.23 0.16 0.04 0.55
o (3.30) (0.21) (0.31)
199512 0.16 -1.59 0.02 0.18 -3.02 3.07 0.72
(3.25) (-1.45) (0.17) (0.86) (-2.44) (2.38)
199601 0.11 2.43 0.17 0.38
o (1.36) (1.76) (1.81)
200512 0.15 1.12 0.10 -0.26 0.07 -0.50 0.66
(2.41) (0.88) (1.07) (-0.40) (0.26) (-0.41)
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Table 12: Cross Sectional Regressions: Market and Credit Spread
This table reports the estimation results of the unconditional (Panel A) and con-
ditional (Panels B and C) two- and three-moment ICAPMs. The state variable is
credit spread, whose unconditional skewness is reported in Panel A under “Skew(s).”
Time series averages of the coefficient estimates, in percentage points, are reported.
t-ratios are reported in the parentheses. Avg R2 are the time series average adjusted
R-squares of cross sectional regressions.
Panel A: Unconditional Specification
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Skew(s) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.12 0.06 0.25 0.34
o (2.00) (0.17) (2.37)
200512 0.17 0.43 0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.07 1.34 0.60
(3.23) (1.27) (0.40) (-0.39) (-0.20) (-0.66) (4.47)
197601 0.10 0.15 -0.02 0.54
o (1.43) (0.18) (-0.07)
198512 0.03 -1.32 0.42 0.01 0.31 -0.08 0.57 0.68
(0.46) (-1.37) (1.50) (0.59) (1.43) (-0.22) (2.17)
198601 0.09 0.86 0.05 0.50
o (1.85) (2.18) (0.46)
199512 0.06 1.04 0.17 -0.03 -0.38 0.00 0.32 0.73
(1.50) (2.08) (1.53) (-0.15) (-1.52) (0.01) (1.31)
199601 0.28 0.26 -0.06 0.32
o (2.62) (0.40) (-0.56)
200512 0.16 2.34 -0.37 -0.30 0.02 -0.38 0.92 0.63
(3.91) (2.07) (-2.33) (-0.62) (0.23) (-2.02) (3.26)
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Panel B: Conditional Specification (1)
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.00 -0.21 1.18 0.40
o (0.01) (-0.74) (5.47)
200512 -0.02 -0.22 1.32 -0.07 -0.04 0.06 0.63
(-0.83) (-0.55) (5.77) (-0.53) (-0.47) (0.84)
197601 -0.01 -0.37 1.37 0.54
o (-0.18) (-0.69) (2.95)
198512 -0.02 -0.73 1.42 0.00 -0.05 0.15 0.67
(-0.33) (-1.22) (3.77) (0.00) (-0.74) (0.77)
198601 0.05 0.11 0.58 0.49
o (0.58) (0.20) (1.56)
199512 0.01 -0.60 1.09 0.00 0.28 -0.14 0.75
(0.13) (-1.19) (4.23) (0.01) (1.22) (-0.75)
199601 -0.07 -0.16 1.14 0.41
o (-0.78) (-0.25) (4.03)
200512 -0.04 -1.37 1.34 -0.52 -0.08 -0.12 0.68
(-0.74) (-1.15) (4.17) (-0.96) (-0.88) (-0.84)
Panel C: Conditional Specification (2)
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.13 0.91 -0.02 0.47
o (3.82) (1.50) (-1.00)
200512 0.14 1.67 0.01 -0.40 0.13 -0.15 0.59
(4.12) (2.55) (0.31) (-1.68) (0.75) (-0.55)
197601 0.08 -1.09 0.03 0.50
o (1.44) (-1.27) (0.72)
198512 0.10 -1.44 0.08 -0.48 -0.31 0.77 0.66
(1.88) (-1.42) (1.60) (-0.99) (-1.01) (0.99)
198601 0.14 1.40 -0.03 0.58
o (2.78) (2.16) (-2.29)
199512 0.13 1.52 -0.02 0.03 0.08 -0.08 0.76
(3.51) (2.15) (-1.61) (0.15) (0.47) (-0.79)
199601 0.19 1.69 0.00 0.40
o (2.40) (1.25) (0.11)
200512 0.12 2.49 0.03 -0.61 -0.26 0.08 0.65
(2.27) (1.63) (0.81) (-0.87) (-0.88) (0.17)
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Table 13: Cross Sectional Regression for Monthly Bond Returns–Market and Term
Spread as the Factors
This table reports the estimation results of the unconditional (Panel A) and con-
ditional (Panels B and C) two- and three-moment ICAPMs. The state variable is
term spread, whose unconditional skewness is reported in Panel A under “Skew(s).”
Time series averages of the coefficient estimates, in percentage points, are reported.
t-ratios are reported in the parentheses. Avg R2 are the time series average adjusted
R-squares of cross sectional regressions.
Panel A: Unconditional Specification
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Skew(s) Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.13 0.56 0.00 0.52
o (4.10) (1.70) (-0.02)
200512 0.04 0.69 -0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.67
(1.32) (1.50) (-0.13) (0.25) (0.70) (1.35) (0.71)
197601 0.10 0.18 -0.04 0.56
o (1.63) (0.21) (-0.08)
198512 0.11 0.46 -0.21 0.03 0.06 -0.12 0.36 0.65
(1.71) (0.52) (-0.34) (1.48) (0.82) (-0.74) (1.37)
198601 0.10 0.95 -0.04 0.60
o (2.23) (1.60) (-0.11)
199512 0.09 1.20 -0.16 -0.26 0.15 0.02 0.36 0.70
(2.66) (1.46) (-0.27) (-1.03) (0.89) (0.54) (1.07)
199601 0.10 0.41 0.35 0.54
o (2.76) (0.73) (1.49)
200512 0.15 0.31 -0.30 -0.68 0.78 0.04 -0.54 0.78
(3.77) (0.33) (-0.61) (-1.25) (2.73) (1.21) (-2.14)
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Panel B: Conditional Specification (1)
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.09 0.32 0.08 0.53
o (2.85) (0.99) (0.44)
200512 0.09 0.81 -0.25 0.36 -0.08 0.30 0.68
(2.82) (1.54) (-0.87) (2.06) (-2.22) (2.73)
197601 0.05 0.81 -0.69 0.56
o (0.83) (1.08) (-1.34)
198512 0.02 0.65 -0.50 0.06 0.01 -0.10 0.68
(0.35) (0.82) (-0.97) (0.75) (0.30) (-0.55)
198601 0.11 0.69 0.13 0.61
o (2.55) (1.25) (0.29)
199512 0.11 0.41 0.43 0.29 -0.04 0.18 0.75
(3.12) (0.68) (0.83) (0.91) (-0.88) (0.63)
199601 0.06 0.63 0.35 0.52
o (1.55) (1.17) (1.47)
200512 0.16 -0.60 -0.44 0.68 -0.24 1.08 0.75
(4.17) (-0.65) (-0.94) (1.33) (-2.13) (3.29)
Panel C: Conditional Specification (2)
Period a λm λs ηm ηss ηms Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.15 0.53 -0.08 0.49
o (4.01) (0.69) (-0.18)
200512 0.12 0.97 0.48 -0.78 -0.14 0.19 0.67
(4.38) (1.28) (1.09) (-2.92) (-1.59) (1.79)
197601 0.04 0.78 -0.99 0.53
o (0.66) (0.79) (-1.34)
198512 0.01 0.87 -1.76 1.30 -0.21 -0.71 0.65
(0.27) (0.74) (-2.07) (2.01) (-0.80) (-1.34)
198601 0.26 0.43 -0.12 0.55
o (3.59) (0.34) (-0.13)
199512 0.16 -0.32 0.62 0.25 -0.27 -0.07 0.72
(4.50) (-0.25) (0.64) (1.28) (-1.42) (-1.20)
199601 0.08 1.94 0.49 0.47
o (1.84) (1.30) (0.97)
200512 0.14 1.39 -1.14 -0.56 -0.37 0.10 0.71
(2.76) (0.90) (-1.49) (-0.65) (-2.86) (0.68)
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Table 14: Cross Sectional Regression for Monthly Bond Returns–Fama and French
(1993) Factors (Credit and Term Spreads)
This table reports the estimation results of the unconditional two- and three-moment
Fama and French (1993) models, in which the factors are credit spread and term
spread. Time series averages of the coefficient estimates, in percentage points, are
reported. t-ratios are reported in the parentheses. Avg R2 are the time series average
adjusted R-squares of cross sectional regressions.
Period a λs1 λs2 ηs1 ηs2 ηs1s2 Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.10 0.27 0.04 0.45
o (2.85) (2.39) (0.28)
200512 0.03 0.50 0.30 -0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.66
(1.10) (2.72) (1.73) (-1.24) (-0.90) (0.63)
197601 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.56
o (1.52) (0.09) (0.13)
198512 0.02 0.53 -1.25 -0.19 0.11 -0.05 0.66
(0.30) (1.96) (-2.16) (-1.83) (2.68) (-1.34)
198601 0.12 0.19 0.43 0.56
o (2.89) (1.76) (1.78)
199512 0.06 0.27 0.81 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.73
(1.53) (2.12) (2.12) (-0.86) (-1.77) (0.15)
199601 0.18 -0.04 0.25 0.33
o (2.01) (-0.36) (0.92)
200512 0.08 0.04 0.28 0.12 -0.01 -0.02 0.65
(1.47) (0.37) (0.48) (1.52) (-2.64) (-0.83)
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Table 16: Market Segmentation–Bonds versus Stocks
This table reports the estimation results of the following two models:
ri,t = a˜1,t + a˜2,tD + (λ˜1m,t + λ˜2m,tD)βm,i + εi,t,
ri,t = a˜1,t + a˜2,tD + (λ˜1m,t + λ˜2m,tD)βm,i + (η˜1m,t + η˜2m,tD)γm,i + εi,t,
where ri,t is excess return of test asset i at time t, βm,i and γm,i are asset i’s beta and
co-skewness, respectively, against the market index, whose excess return at time t is
rm,t. Market skewness is reported under “Skew(m).” D denotes stock dummy. We
compute risk premium estimates
a1 = a˜1, λ1 = λ˜1, η1 = η˜1,
a2 = a˜1 + a˜2, λ2 = λ˜1 + λ˜2, η2 = η˜1 + η˜2.
and report them in percentage points. Fama-MacBeth t-ratios are reported in paren-
theses. Avg R2 are the time series average of adjusted R-squares of cross sectional
regressions.
Period a1 a2 λ1 λ2 η1 η2 Skew(m) Avg
(t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) R2
197601 0.16 1.65 0.38 -0.52 0.60
o (2.93) (3.75) (1.22) (-1.48)
200512 0.18 1.96 0.32 -1.29 0.13 0.39 -0.41 0.70
(4.40) (4.79) (1.12) (-3.84) (0.84) (2.57) (-2.23)
197601 0.11 0.92 0.09 0.12 0.64
o (1.72) (1.54) (0.19) (0.21)
198512 0.10 2.19 0.15 -1.09 0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.71
(1.66) (3.27) (0.32) (-1.84) (1.53) (3.79) (-0.11)
198601 0.11 1.63 0.80 -0.55 0.55
o (1.24) (2.67) (1.83) (-1.22)
199512 0.10 1.87 0.86 -0.29 0.03 -0.26 -0.77 0.67
(2.42) (2.88) (2.46) (-0.63) (0.13) (-1.17) (-1.51)
199601 0.26 1.46 0.20 -0.43 0.61
o (2.50) (2.10) (0.33) (-0.73)
200512 0.31 1.65 -0.69 -1.79 0.56 1.10 -0.62 0.69
(2.89) (2.56) (-0.58) (-2.75) (0.98) (1.73) (-2.73)
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Table 18: Market Segmentation–Investment vs Speculative Grades
This table reports the estimation results of the following two models:
ri,t = a˜1,t + a˜2,tD + (λ˜1m,t + λ˜2m,tD)βm,i + εi,t,
ri,t = a˜1,t + a˜2,tD + (λ˜1m,t + λ˜2m,tD)βm,i + (η˜1m,t + η˜2m,tD)γm,i + εi,t,
where ri,t is excess return of test asset i at time t, βm,i and γm,i are asset i’s beta and
co-skewness, respectively, against the market index, whose excess return at time t is
rm,t. Market skewness is reported under “Skew(m).” D denotes a dummy variable,
taking the value of 1 if asset i is of speculative grade, and zero otherwise. We compute
risk premium estimates
a1 = a˜1, λ1 = λ˜1, η1 = η˜1,
a2 = a˜1 + a˜2, λ2 = λ˜1 + λ˜2, η2 = η˜1 + η˜2.
and report them in percentage points. Fama-MacBeth t-ratios are reported in paren-
theses. Avg R2 are the time series average of adjusted R-squares of cross sectional
regressions.
Period a1 a2 λ1 λ2 η1 η2 Skew(m) Avg
(t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) R2
197601 0.13 0.83 0.46 -0.44 0.50
o (3.69) (2.87) (1.61) (-0.59)
200512 0.12 0.87 0.46 -0.13 -0.03 -0.23 -0.41 0.59
(4.03) (3.30) (1.67) (-0.10) (-0.19) (-0.47) (-2.23)
197601 0.11 . 0.09 . 0.46
o (1.72) (.) (0.19) (.)
198512 0.10 . 0.15 . 0.03 . -0.03 0.47
(1.66) (.) (0.32) (.) (1.53) (.) (-0.11)
198601 0.09 0.32 0.88 0.73 0.60
o (2.24) (0.76) (1.99) (0.80)
199512 0.09 0.25 0.86 0.98 -0.01 -0.04 -0.77 0.69
(2.30) (0.79) (2.21) (0.91) (-0.06) (-0.22) (-1.51)
199601 0.20 1.06 0.78 -1.25 0.49
o (2.21) (2.74) (1.26) (-1.18)
200512 0.12 1.14 1.84 -0.29 -0.82 -0.75 -0.62 0.68
(3.90) (3.35) (1.16) (-0.20) (-0.95) (-1.22) (-2.73)
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Table 19: Market Segmentation–Short-and-Intermediate- vs Long-Terms
This table reports the estimation results of the following two models:
ri,t = a˜1,t + a˜2,tD + (λ˜1m,t + λ˜2m,tD)βm,i + εi,t,
ri,t = a˜1,t + a˜2,tD + (λ˜1m,t + λ˜2m,tD)βm,i + (η˜1m,t + η˜2m,tD)γm,i + εi,t,
where ri,t is excess return of test asset i at time t, βm,i and γm,i are asset i’s beta and
co-skewness, respectively, against the market index, whose excess return at time t is
rm,t. Market skewness is reported under “Skew(m).” D denotes a dummy variable,
taking the value of 1 if asset i has more than ten years to maturity, and zero otherwise.
We compute risk premium estimates
a1 = a˜1, λ1 = λ˜1, η1 = η˜1,
a2 = a˜1 + a˜2, λ2 = λ˜1 + λ˜2, η2 = η˜1 + η˜2.
and report them in percentage points. Fama-MacBeth t-ratios are reported in paren-
theses. Avg R2 are the time series average of adjusted R-squares of cross sectional
regressions.
Period a1 a2 λ1 λ2 η1 η2 Skew(m) Avg
(t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) R2
197601 0.07 -0.05 0.63 0.99 0.63
o (1.48) (-0.13) (1.70) (1.34)
200512 0.05 0.16 0.81 0.51 0.05 0.16 -0.41 0.78
(2.89) (0.45) (2.51) (0.70) (0.28) (0.87) (-2.23)
197601 0.07 -0.27 0.19 0.66 0.63
o (1.89) (-0.38) (0.38) (0.62)
198512 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.70
(1.87) (0.21) (0.36) (0.23) (0.22) (1.72) (-0.11)
198601 0.10 0.25 0.82 0.56 0.67
o (1.51) (0.69) (1.91) (0.63)
199512 0.08 0.31 0.96 0.41 0.02 0.01 -0.77 0.80
(4.02) (1.32) (2.57) (0.64) (0.09) (0.06) (-1.51)
199601 0.16 0.36 0.13 0.16 0.68
o (2.13) (1.46) (0.22) (0.18)
200512 0.07 0.50 2.02 -1.28 -0.86 1.01 -0.62 0.81
(1.84) (1.47) (1.85) (-0.54) (-1.47) (0.82) (-2.73)
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Table 20: Cross Sectional Regression for Monthly Bond Returns–Total Variance and
Skewness
This table reports the estimation results of the following three models:
ri,t = at + λ
†
tσ
2
i + η
†
tSi + εi,t,
ri,t = at + λm,tβm,i + ηm,tγm,i + λ
†
tσ
2
i + η
†
tSi + εi,t,
ri,t − βm,irm,t = at + ηm,t[γm,i − βm,i] + λ†tσ2i + η†tSi + εi,t,
where ri,t is excess return of test asset i at time t, βm,i and γm,i are asset i’s beta and
co-skewness, respectively, against the market index, whose excess return at time t is
rm,t. σ
2
i and Si are asset i’s variance and skewness, respectively. Time series averages
of the coefficient estimates, in percentage points, are reported. t-ratios are reported
in parentheses. Avg R2 are the time series average of adjusted R-squares of cross
sectional regressions. t-ratios are based on Fama-MacBeth standard errors.
Period a λ η λ† η† Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601 0.24 52150.45 -0.08 0.39
o (3.06) (0.53) (-2.47)
200512 0.12 0.57 0.03 -60192.52 -0.05 0.65
(2.36) (1.64) (0.18) (-0.65) (-1.55)
0.15 0.03 -24203.55 -0.07 0.52
(2.39) (0.19) (-0.28) (-2.08)
197601 0.15 -5418.72 -0.02 0.42
o (0.83) (-0.05) (-0.27)
198512 0.03 0.40 0.02 -76697.68 0.01 0.55
(0.21) (0.60) (0.58) (-0.74) (0.10)
0.01 0.01 -93354.29 0.03 0.39
(0.06) (0.52) (-1.15) (0.44)
198601 0.30 224779.71 -0.07 0.35
o (3.00) (0.84) (-0.66)
199512 0.09 0.87 0.04 8956.02 -0.01 0.65
(2.57) (2.53) (0.22) (0.11) (-0.13)
0.18 0.02 10245.09 0.00 0.51
(2.90) (0.13) (0.12) (0.04)
199601 0.20 2301.44 -0.13 0.35
o (2.29) (0.17) (-1.83)
200512 0.17 0.49 -0.10 -3203.43 -0.16 0.67
(3.24) (0.45) (-0.17) (-0.23) (-2.29)
0.16 -0.16 -4030.16 -0.15 0.51
(2.00) (-0.38) (-0.32) (-2.02)
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Table 21: Cross Sectional Regression for Monthly Bond Returns: Four-moment Model
This table reports the estimation results of the following five models:
ri,t = at + λm,tβm,i + εi,t,
ri,t = at + λm,tβm,i + ηm,tγm,i + εi,t,
ri,t − βm,irm,t = at + ηm,t[γm,i − βm,i] + εi,t,
ri,t = at + λm,tβm,i + ηm,tγm,i + ϕm,tκm,i + εi,t,
ri,t − βm,irm,t = at + ηm,t[γm,i − βm,i] + ϕm,t[κm,i − βm,i] + εi,t,
where ri,t is excess return of test asset i at time t, βm,i, γm,i, κm,i are asset i’s beta,
co-skewness, and co-kurtosis, respectively, against the market index, whose excess
return at time t is rm,t. Time series averages of the coefficient estimates, in percentage
points, are reported. t-ratios are reported in parentheses. Avg R2 are the time series
average of adjusted R-squares of cross sectional regressions. t-ratios are based on
Fama-MacBeth standard errors.
Period a λ η φ Avg
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) R2
197601.00 0.16 0.38 0.32
o (2.93) (1.22)
200512.00 0.18 0.32 0.13 0.49
(4.40) (1.12) (0.84)
0.17 0.12 0.29
(3.37) (0.66)
0.17 0.41 0.12 -0.11 0.53
(3.88) (0.58) (0.40) (-0.13)
0.16 0.07 0.08 0.37
(3.59) (0.21) (0.08)
197601.00 0.11 0.09 0.46
o (1.72) (0.19)
198512.00 0.10 0.15 0.03 0.47
(1.66) (0.32) (1.53)
0.02 0.05 0.15
(0.15) (1.26)
0.11 -0.65 0.01 0.82 0.54
(1.79) (-0.49) (0.67) (0.71)
0.03 0.03 1.14 0.20
(0.28) (1.00) (0.89)
198601.00 0.11 0.80 0.38
o (1.24) (1.83)
199512.00 0.10 0.86 0.03 0.55
(2.42) (2.46) (0.13)
0.18 0.01 0.38
(2.87) (0.06)
0.10 0.63 -0.28 0.57 0.64
(2.64) (1.23) (-0.82) (0.71)
0.14 -0.22 0.24 0.52
(3.00) (-0.67) (0.36)
199601.00 0.26 0.20 0.28
o (2.50) (0.33)
200512.00 0.31 -0.69 0.56 0.38
(2.89) (-0.58) (0.98)
0.23 0.03 0.18
(2.35) (0.06)
0.22 2.95 2.79 -6.24 0.48
(3.22) (1.80) (1.85) (-1.90)
0.19 0.70 -2.17 0.28
(3.04) (0.71) (-0.88)
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Figure 1: Time Series of Index Returns, 1976–2005
This figure depicts the time series of monthly Lehman Universal Bond Index (solid)
and CRSP Stock Index (dashed) returns for the period January 1976 to November
2005.
Figure 2: Histogram of Lehman Universal Bond Index, 1976–2005
This figure depicts the histogram of monthly Lehman Universal Bond Index returns
for the period January 1976 to December 2005.
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Figure 3: Skewness of Holding Period Returns, 1976–2005
This figure depicts the skewness of 1- to 12-month holding period returns of Lehman
Universal Bond Index (solid curve) as well as CRSP Stock Index (dashed curve) for
the period January 1976 to December 2005.
Figure 4: Rolling Estimates of Skewness: Bonds vs. Stocks
This figure depicts the time series of rolling skewness estimates of Lehman Universal
Bond Index (solid curve) and CRSP Stock Index (dashed curve) monthly returns for
the period January 1976 to December 2005, using a 60-month rolling window.
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Figure 5: Cross Sectional Regressions: Bonds Only
Figure 6: Cross Sectional Regressions: Bonds and Stocks
The above figures depict the relation between expected returns and co-skewness for
the period 1976 to 2005. The y-axis is the average bond returns in excess of the sum of
risk free rate, intercept, and beta risk premium. The x-axis is the co-skewness against
market. The slope of the regression line equals co-skewness premium. Triangles
are Treasury portfolios, circles are government-related bond portfolios, squares are
corporate bond portfolios, diamonds are securitized portfolios, and crosses are stock
portfolios.
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Figure 7: Beta and Co-skewness Premiums: Unconditional Model
The above figure depicts the time series of the cross sectional regression estimates
of beta (dotted curve) and co-skewness (solid curve) risk premiums for the period
1976 to 2005. The estimates are obtained by cross sectional regressions containing an
intercept term.
Figure 8: Time-varying Market Skewness
The above figure depicts the time series of skewness of excess market return, ob-
tained by rolling estimates using 60-month estimation windows (dashed curve), and
conditional moments characterized by smoothed short rate (solid curve).
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Figure 9: Prices of Beta and Co-skewness Risks
The above figure depicts the time series of the cross sectional regression estimates
of prices of beta and co-skewness risks in a conditional three-moment CAPM for
the period 1976 to 2005. The estimates are obtained by cross sectional regressions
containing an intercept term and betas and co-skewnesses are conditioned on short
rate.
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Chapter II
Modern Portfolio Management
with Conditioning Information‡
Abstract: This chapter studies models in which active portfolio managers optimize
performance relative to a benchmark and utilize conditioning information unavailable
to their clients. We provide explicit solutions for the optimal strategies with multiple
risky assets, with or without a risk free asset, and also consider various constraints on
portfolio risk or on portfolio weights. The equilibrium implications of the models are
discussed. A currency portfolio example shows that the optimal solutions improve
the measured performance by 53% out of sample, compared with portfolios ignoring
conditioning information.
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1 Introduction
A common problem in modern portfolio management is to earn higher expected return
than a pre-specified unmanaged benchmark portfolio, while minimizing the variance
of the difference of the two returns, the “tracking error variance.” Active managers,
who are compensated for performance relative to a given benchmark, typically face
this kind of problem. While this problem is obviously interesting in practice, it is also
important for academic scholars since its distinct portfolio policies and equilibrium
implications add new insights to the conventional mean-variance setting.
This paper makes the following contributions. We develop explicit solutions for
the optimal active portfolios, with an array of possible constraints, under the assump-
tion that active managers have information about security returns (the “conditioning
information,” which this paper interprets to mean any predetermined information
active managers can access) that is not available to their clients. We focus in par-
ticular, on problems in which the manager uses the information to optimize mean
variance performance measures that the client without the conditioning information
can observe. The generic form of the optimal portfolios can be characterized by three
components: a mean-variance efficient portfolio, a “hedging demand” for the bench-
mark portfolio, and the portfolio with global minimum conditional second moment.
Such a representation generalizes Hansen and Richard (1987), and specializes Fama
(1996) and Ferson, Siegel, and Xu (2006). A simulation shows that, abstracting from
misspecification and estimation errors, our solutions potentially improve the measured
performance by a factor of four when compared to portfolios ignoring conditioning
information. When implemented realistically on currency or equity data, the optimal
portfolios actually produce robust superior performance.
The problem of tracking error investing is formally posed in Roll (1992). He argues
that it takes a long time to reliably measure the value-added from a fund manager, and
a benchmark reduces the estimation error in portfolio performance. Starks (1987),
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Admati and Pfleiderer (1997), and Ou-Yang (2003) study compensation contracts
involving benchmarks and address the agency problems between the fund managers
and their clients that arises because the two parties potentially have conflicts of
interests. Jorion (2003) argues that active managers may not be willing to disclose
their information to the clients, and ex post performance based on realized returns is
very noisy. Such issues motivate the use of constraints on portfolio risk profiles. Roll
(1992), Jorion (2003), Stutzer (2003), and Alexander and Baptista (2008) consider
different constraints and provide analytical solutions. Brennan (1993), Cuoco and
Kaniel (2007), Go´mez and Zapatero (2003), Stutzer (2003), and Cornell and Roll
(2005) derive market equilibrium implications of tracking error variance minimization.
The above studies raise interesting issues related to tracking error variance mini-
mization but ignore the presence of conditioning information. Conditioning informa-
tion plays a central role in modern portfolio management since a substantial portion of
clients delegate their investment decisions to professional money managers in the be-
lief that managers are better informed; see Avramov and Chordia (2006), and Bansal,
Dahlquist, and Harvey (2004). This is the first study to explore the optimal portfo-
lios of tracking error investors and their equilibrium implications when conditioning
information is explicit.1
There are alternative ways to exploit conditioning information. An active manager
may pursue “conditional tracking efficiency” or CTE, where he uses the conditioning
information to optimize conditional measures. Even if conditioning information is not
explicitly stated, we can interpret the means and variances in previous studies like Roll
(1992), Jorion (2003), and Stutzer (2003) as conditional moments to produce CTE
solutions. This is what these authors probably have in mind. However, this paper
illustrates that when there is conditioning information, an active manager may pursue
1Zhou (2008) recently introduces conditioning information to the active portfolio management
context in a different problem. He revisits the fundamental law of active portfolio management by
Grinold (1989) and Grinold and Kahn (1999), and considers how an informed active manger can
maximize unconditional value-added, approximated by unconditional risk-adjusted portfolio return.
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“unconditional tracking efficiency” or UTE, where he uses conditioning information
to form portfolios that optimize unconditional performance measures.2 We argue this
is a natural formulation. We call problems which ignore conditioning information
altogether “no-information tracking efficiency” or NITE.
The central contribution of this paper is to develop the UTE problem. The infor-
mation structure of UTE is common in practice. The portfolio manager conducting
an optimization uses more information than is available to his clients. If the clients
do not have conditioning information, they can only form unconditional performance
measures. It is sensible that the active manager uses conditioning information to
form portfolios that maximize his performance from the clients’ perspective. Our
focus on unconditional measures is consistent with Dybvig and Ross (1985), Hansen
and Richard (1987), Ferson and Siegel (2001), Abhyankar, Basu, and Stremme (2005),
Ferson, Siegel, and Xu (2006), and Zhou (2008).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides solutions to UTE
versions of the modern portfolio management problem. It also discusses the properties
of the solutions, connecting them to the familiar concepts of mean-variance efficiency
and hedging demands. Section 3 gives extensions. Section 4 provides empirical ex-
amples. Section 5 presents an international financial market application. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 The Portfolio Management Problem
Consider an active manager who faces N risky assets. Suppose R is an N -dimensional
vector of raw asset returns, Rb is the raw return of the benchmark with unconditional
mean µb and unconditional variance σ
2
b . The unconditional moments are the ones we
estimate using the usual sample means and variances. At the beginning of the period,
2In an Appendix, Corollaries 1 and 4 provide simple analytical illustration of the amount of
unconditional inefficiency a CTE strategy produces.
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the active manager uses conditioning information Z to form the optimal portfolio
weights, x(Z), and the portfolio return is Rp = x(Z)
′R.
Under UTE versions of modern portfolio management, the active manager’s prob-
lem is to minimize the unconditional tracking error variance, var(Rp − Rb), for a
given level of “alpha” α¯p, i.e., IE(Rp − Rb) = α¯p. The active manager may also face
portfolio risk constraints such as cov(Rp, Rb) = σ¯bp or var(Rp) = σ¯
2
p for given values
of σ¯bp or σ¯
2
p. In addition, a portfolio weight constraint which restricts the sum of
the portfolio weights to be 1 may be imposed. The active manager’s problem can be
summarized as
min
x(Z)
var(Rp −Rb),
s.t. IE(Rp −Rb) = α¯p,
cov(Rp, Rb) = σ¯bp or var(Rp) = σ¯
2
p,
x(Z)′1 = 1.
(1)
where 1 is an N -dimensional vector of ones. The general solution to the optimization
problem (1) is provided in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The general solution for the UTE portfolios has the following generic
form,
x(Z) = λ1xmv(Z) + λ2xh(Z) + λ3x0(Z) (2)
≡ λ1Φ(Z)µ(Z) + λ2Φ(Z)γ(Z) + λ3x0(Z), (3)
where
µ(Z) = IE(R|Z),
Ω(Z) = IE(RR′|Z),
γ(Z) = IE[R(Rb − µb)|Z].
(4)
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and
Φ(Z) = Ω(Z)−1 − Ω(Z)
−111′Ω(Z)−1
1′Ω(Z)−11
, (5)
x0(Z) =
Ω(Z)−11
1′Ω(Z)−11
. (6)
The parameters λ1, λ2, and λ3 are constants, whose values depend on the portfolio
constraints, but not on the realizations of the conditioning information Z.
Proof: The solution can be found using calculus of variations, as shown in the Ap-
pendix.
2.1 Interpreting the Solution
The optimal portfolio weights in Equation (2) are the sum of three terms, similar to
Fama’s (1996) representation of multifactor minimum variance portfolios and Ferson,
Siegel, and Xu’s (2006) results for mimicking portfolios with conditioning informa-
tion. Motivated by Ferson and Siegel (2001) and Ferson, Siegel, and Xu (2006), we
interpret the zero net investment portfolios xmv(Z) and xh(Z) as the “mean-variance
component” and the “hedging demand component,” respectively, and the normal
portfolio x0(Z) as the “global minimum conditional second moment portfolio weight
vector.”
Hansen and Richard (1987) show that the return on an unconditional minimum
variance portfolio, Rumv, can be decomposed as
Rumv = λeRe +Rn, (7)
where Re is a zero net investment portfolio, λe is a constant, and Rn has portfolio
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weights that sum to 1. Our generic form of the UTE solution produces3
Rp = x(Z)
′R = λ1xmv(Z)′R + λ2xh(Z)′R + x0(Z)′R
≡ λ1Rmv + λ2Rh +R0.
(8)
Since x0(Z)
′1 = 1, xmv(Z)′1 = 0, xh(Z)′1 = 0, and λ1, λ2 are constants, Equation
(8) adds an additional term, Rh, to the Hansen and Richard (1987) representation.
This is a special case of Ferson, Siegel, and Xu’s (2006) “K + 2 fund separation,”
where K is the number of relevant risk factors to hedge in the mimicking portfolio
construction context. In our case, K = 1. Thus, a tracking error investor ends up
with an induced “hedging demand” relative to the benchmark portfolio.
The component λ1xmv(Z) captures mean-variance investing behavior. It is in-
teresting to compare this component with Ferson and Siegel’s (2001) uncondition-
ally mean-variance efficient portfolio, the portfolio minimizing unconditional portfo-
lio variance for a given unconditional expected return. For a given expected return
restriction, the solutions are not identical.4 The difference, in Lagrangian multiplier
rather than in conditional mean, is induced by tracking error variance minimization.
Intuitively, to maintain the same expected return as the unconditionally efficient
portfolio, the UTE portfolio has to adjust its position to offset the expected return
generated by the hedging demand component.
The term λ2xh(Z) captures the “hedging demand” induced by the benchmark.
Intuitively, to minimize tracking error, the manager tends to hedge fluctuations in the
benchmark. Appendix A.5 shows that hedging demand for the benchmark portfolio
can induce a priced risk factor in equilibrium.
Hedging demand does not always matter in modern portfolio management. Con-
sider two special cases: λ2 = 0 or γ(Z) = 0. In either case, the UTE portfolio will
3Here since xmv(Z) and xh(Z) are zero net investment portfolios, x(Z)′1 = 1 if and only if
λ3 = 1. Special cases are discussed below.
4Note imposing an alpha constraint is equivalent to imposing IE(Rp) = α¯p + µb.
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reduce to the unconditionally efficient portfolio of Ferson and Siegel (2001). γ(Z) = 0
is unlikely, because it implies that all portfolios have zero covariance with benchmark.
There is no way to hedge in this case, even the manager has preference for hedging
benchmark.5
The case λ2 = 0 can happen when a portfolio risk constraint is not binding. One
possibility is that the active manager has preference unaffected by the portfolio risk
constraint. Another possibility is that the constraint carries a zero shadow price.6
In either situation, the shadow price of the portfolio risk constraint is zero, and no
hedging demand is induced by the benchmark.
3 Extensions
The generic solution (3) can accommodate different portfolio constraints. This is
important because portfolio constraints are common in practice, and can be imposed
to improve the out-of-sample performance of classical mean-variance portfolio solu-
tions.7 However, the literature on unconditional portfolio efficiency with conditioning
information has not developed portfolio constraints. This paper studies portfolio
constraints and presents evidence of their effects on the out-of-sample performance
of UTE strategies. We consider constraints on systematic (beta) risk and on total
5An extreme case is when the benchmark in a risk free rate. In this case, the tracking error
variance minimization problem reduces to the classical minimum variance problem, and the optimal
portfolio is the same as Ferson and Siegel’s (2001) unconditionally efficient portfolio.
6For example, in Proposition 2 (no risk free rate, with a portfolio beta constraint), if we set the
constraint
β¯p =
1
σ2b
[
(α¯p + µb − µ0)ψ2
ψ1
+ σb0
]
, (9)
then λ2 = 0. Similarly, if we set
σ¯2p =
(α¯p + µb − µ0)2
ψ1
+Ω0 − (α¯p + µb)2, (10)
in Proposition 3 (no risk free rate, with a total portfolio variance constraint), then λ2 = 0 as well.
7See, for example, Frost and Savarino (1988), Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999), Jagan-
nathan and Ma (2003), DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2007), Kan and Zhou (2007), and Alexander,
Baptista, and Yan (2008), and DeMiguel, Garlappi, Nogales, and Uppal (2009).
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portfolio variance, without a risk free asset. In the absence of conditioning informa-
tion, these problems reduce to the formulations in Roll (1992), Jorion (2003), and
Alexandar and Baptista (2008). We allow a risk free asset and a fixed benchmark.
A special case reduces to Stutzer’s (2003) problem. We then discuss direct upper
and lower bound constraints on portfolio weights, e.g. Jagannathan and Ma (2003),
and relate our solutions to the norm-constrained portfolios of DeMiguel, Garlappi,
Nogales, and Uppal (2009). Finally, we consider a problem in which clients may have
a subset of the active manager’s information.
3.1 No Risk Free Asset, Constraints on Portfolio Risk
Consider an active manager who faces N risky assets, no risk free asset and a re-
striction that the portfolio beta on the benchmark equals a target beta β¯p, i.e.,
cov(Rp, Rb)/σ
2
b = β¯p. The beta constraint is equivalent to setting σ¯bp = β¯pσ
2
b in
(1). This constraint is sensible when the clients want to restrict the systematic risk
of the portfolio. The active manager’s problem is summarized as
min
x(Z)
var(Rp −Rb)
s.t. IE(Rp −Rb) = α¯p, cov(Rp, Rb) = β¯pσ2b , x(Z)′1 = 1.
(11)
Roll (1992) solves this problem without taking into account the conditioning infor-
mation. The solution to the optimization problem (11) is provided in Proposition 2
in the Appendix. It is a special case of (3) with particular values for the λ’s.
Jorion (2003) considers a total portfolio risk constraint, i.e., the active manager
has to maintain var(Rp) = σ¯
2
p. The total risk constraint can be translated into a
constraint on value-at-risk; see Jorion (2000) and Alexandar and Baptista (2008).
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The UTE version of this problem is summarized as
min
x(Z)
var(Rp −Rb)
s.t. IE(Rp −Rb) = α¯p,var(Rp, Rb) = σ¯2p, x(Z)′1 = 1.
(12)
The solution to the UTE version of Jorion’s (2003) problem with conditioning infor-
mation is presented in Proposition 3 in the Appendix. Once again the solution is a
special case of (3).
3.2 No Risk Free Asset and No Portfolio Risk Constraint
If we relax the constraints on portfolio risk, the active manager’s problem reduces to
the following problem
min
x(Z)
var(Rp −Rb)
s.t. IE(Rp −Rb) = α¯p, x(Z)′1 = 1.
(13)
Roll (1992) considers this problem but again no conditioning information is used.
The solution is provided in Proposition 4 in the Appendix.
3.3 Exogenous Benchmark Portfolio Weights
Suppose that the benchmark portfolio weights are exogenous, observable, and fixed
at the beginning of the holding period. The weights may vary from period to period,
provided that they are in the manager’s information set. The observability of fixed
exogenous benchmark portfolio weights is assumed in Roll (1992), Jorion (2003), and
Stutzer (2003), for example. This implies that the active manager is able to hold
or replicate the benchmark. Actual benchmark weights may also evolve during the
measurement period. We do not model the effects of intra-period variation in the
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benchmark weights.8
First suppose there is no risk free asset and the benchmark portfolio weight vector
is xb(Z). Define w(Z) ≡ x(Z)− xb(Z), where w(Z) is a zero net investment portfolio
weight vector. We can define the portfolio alpha, beta, variance, and tracking error
variance in terms of w(Z) and the conditional moments in (4). The active manager’s
problem is
min
w(Z)
var(Rp −Rb) = IE[w(Z)′Ω(Z)w(Z)]− {IE[w(Z)′µ(Z)]}2,
s.t. IE[w(Z)′µ(Z)] = α¯p,
cov(Rp, Rb) = σ¯bp or var(Rp) = σ¯
2
p,
w(Z)′1 = 0,
(14)
for pre-determined α¯p and σ¯bp or σ¯
2
p, where the choice variable is w(Z). As in Propo-
sition 1, the solution has the following generic form,
x(Z) = w(Z) + xb(Z),
w(Z) = λ1xmv(Z) + λ2xh(Z) + λ3x0(Z).
(15)
The solutions are provided in Propositions 5–7 in the Appendix, which solve for
the relevant values of the λ’s.
3.4 The Presence of a Risk Free Asset
Now we consider examples with a risk free asset with return Rf . The risk free rate
can be conditionally risk free, i.e. varying from period to period, and observed at the
beginning of each period. In this formulation of the problem the active manager faces
8In the case that the benchmark is difficult to replicate but an active portfolio manager can
engage in a futures contract on the benchmark, an exchange-traded fund indexing the benchmark,
or a managed portfolio mimicking the benchmark. Treating a feasible mimicking portfolio as an
investable asset, the active manager can apply our solutions as an approximation.
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a benchmark portfolio with return in excess of the risk free rate, i.e., rb ≡ Rb − Rf ,
and uses conditioning information, Z, to choose an unrestricted weights vector x(Z)
of the N risky assets, investing the rest of the investable funds in the risk free asset
or borrowing at the rate Rf . Suppose r ≡ (R − Rf1) is an N -vector of risky asset
returns in excess of the risk free rate, and rb is the benchmark return in excess of Rf .
The observed returns on the investor’s portfolio will be Rp = x(Z)
′r+Rf ≡ rp+Rf ,
where rp is the excess return of the active portfolio.
The active manager’s problem becomes
min
x(Z)
var(rp − rb)
s.t. IE(rp − rb) = α¯p
cov(rp, rb)/var(rb) = β¯p or var(rp) = σ¯
2
p.
(16)
The solutions are provided in Propositions 8 and 9 in the Appendix.9 Stutzer (2003)
solves a special case in which portfolio risk constraints and conditioning information
are absent.
3.5 Portfolio Weight Constraints
Direct constraints on portfolio weights are common in practice and well studied in
the academic literature. Empirical studies show that portfolio efficiency is gained out
of sample when certain portfolio weight constraints are imposed.10 We can consider a
portfolio weight lower bound x = (x1, . . . , xN)′, where xj corresponds to the minimum
weight on asset j. A lower bound becomes no short-sale constraint when x = 0. Upper
9Transforming the N risky asset returns into returns in excess of the benchmark and applying
the unconditionally efficient portfolio in Theorem 2 of Ferson and Siegel (2001) yields the UTE
solution in Proposition 9(iii). An assumption of this approach is that the active manager can hold
or replicate the benchmark portfolio.
10See Frost and Savarino (1988), Jagannathan and Ma (2003), and DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal
(2007), among others.
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bounds can be defined similarly as x¯ = (x1, . . . , xN)′.11
To impose the above constraints in the UTE problem, we add
xjp(Z) ≥ xj, (17)
xjp(Z) ≤ xj, (18)
j = 1, . . . , N . For simplicity, we ignore portfolio risk constraints for now. The optimal
solution to, problem (13) for example, along with constraints (17) and (18), has the
first order conditions of
Ω(Z)xp(Z) = λ1µ(Z) + γ(Z) + λ3(Z)1+ Λ(Z)− Λ(Z) almost surely, (19)
IE[xp(Z)
′µ(Z)] = α¯p + µb, (20)
Λj(Z) ≥ 0, or Λj(Z) = 0 if xjp(Z) > xj, (21)
Λ
j
(Z) ≥ 0, or Λj(Z) = 0 if xjp(Z) < xj, (22)
where Λ(Z) and Λ(Z) are N -vectors of shadow prices of constraints (17) and (18),
with typical elements Λj(Z) and Λ
j
(Z), respectively. The solution has the form
xp(Z) = λ1Φ(Z)µ(Z) + Φ(Z)γ(Z) + x0(Z) + Φ(Z)[Λ(Z)− Λ(Z)], (23)
subject to (21) and (22). Similar to DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2007), we can
define an adjusted conditional return vector
µ†(Z) = µ(Z) +
Λ(Z)− Λ(Z)
λ1
, (24)
and the above solution (23) becomes the familiar generic form (3). As a result, we
have a “shrinkage in conditional means” interpretation: assuming λ1 > 0, the lower
11Jagannathan and Ma (2003) set x = 0 and x1 = · · · = xN .
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(upper) bound constraint is more likely to be binding when conditional expected
return is low (high), and the adjusted conditional means tilt toward the average.
An alternative shrinkage interpretation focuses on shrinkage in the conditional
second moment matrix of returns, generalizing Jagannathan and Ma (2003). Define
Ω†(Z) = Ω(Z) + [1Λ(Z)′ + Λ(Z)1′]− [1Λ(Z)′ + Λ(Z)1′], (25)
and we will have12
Ω†(Z)xp(Z) = λ1µ(Z) + γ(Z) + [λ3(Z) + Λ(Z)′x− Λ(Z)′x]1 (26)
≡ λ1µ(Z) + γ(Z) + λ†3(Z)1, (27)
which corresponds to (87). In other words, xp(Z) solves a UTE problem in which
conditional second moment matrix is Ω†(Z) and no portfolio weight upper or lower
bound constraint is imposed. The optimal UTE solution has the familiar generic
form, with Φ(Z) replaced by
Φ†(Z) ≡ Ω†(Z)−1 − Ω
†(Z)−111′Ω†(Z)−1
1′Ω†(Z)−11
. (28)
Since the upper (lower) bound constraint is more likely to be binding when conditional
second moment of an asset is low (high), we have a shrinkage in conditional second
moments.
3.6 Relation to Portfolio Norm Constraints
DeMiguel, Garlappi, Nogales, and Uppal (2009) derive a general class nesting a num-
ber of portfolio weight constraints. When the UTE problem is considered, their
12We utilize the relations Λ(Z)′[xp(Z)− x] = 0, Λ(Z)′[xp(Z)− x] = 0, xp(Z)′1 = 1, and (19).
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“1-norm” constraint imposes
‖xp(Z)‖1 ≡ |xp(Z)|′1 ≤ d1. (29)
If we set d1 = 1, the above problem reduces to a shortsale-constrained problem,
13 and
the solution is (23) in which x = 0 and Λ(Z) is turned off.
DeMiguel, Garlappi, Nogales, and Uppal (2009) also consider an “A-norm” con-
straint, which imposes
‖xp(Z)‖A ≡ xp(Z)′Axp(Z) ≤ dA. (30)
The problem considered in (12) is a special case in which we only consider equality
constraint and set A to unconditional covariance matrix of returns and dA = σ¯2p.
3.7 Partial Observability of Conditioning Information by the
Clients
The UTE portfolios we develop are based on the assumption that the clients do not
have access to the conditioning information. In practice it may be possible that some
sophisticated clients observe part of the active manager’s conditioning information
and compensate him based on the conditional performance measure implied by their
information. Suppose the clients have information z ⊂ Z. The active manager’s
problem becomes a special CTE problem defined over z,
min
x(Z)
var(Rp −Rb|z),
s.t. IE(Rp −Rb|z) = α¯p(z), x(Z)′1 = 1,
(31)
13See Proposition 1 of DeMiguel, Garlappi, Nogales, and Uppal (2009).
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and possibly other portfolio risk constraints. The generic form of the optimal portfolio
becomes
x(Z) = λ1(z)xmv(Z) + λ2(z)xh(Z) + λ3x0(Z), (32)
where λ1(z) and λ2(z) depend on the clients’ information. The values of the condi-
tional λ(z)’s may be found as straightforward generalizations of our UTE solutions.
However, such solutions are more difficult to implement than the UTE portfolios,
given that z is heterogeneous across clients and hard to measure.
4 Empirical Examples
We consider two special cases to develop intuition about the relation between the
active portfolio weight function and the conditioning information. In the first case
we impose no portfolio risk constraint. In the second example we examine the effects
of a portfolio risk constraint.
4.1 Behavior of the UTE Portfolio Weights
Suppose the active manager has only two risky assets a and b with raw returns Ra
and Rb, respectively, and a risk free asset with return Rf . Assume asset b is the
benchmark, i.e., the benchmark portfolio weights are xb = (0, 1)
′. The conditioning
information is a scalar random variable Z.
Define ra and rb as the asset returns in excess of risk free rate and suppose that
the conditional expectations of ra and rb are linear in Z, and that the covariance
matrix of ra and rb conditional on Z is constant
14,
IE
 ra
rb
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Z
 =
 δ0a + δ1aZ
δ0b + δ1bZ
 ,var
 ra
rb
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Z
 =
 Σaa Σab
Σba Σbb
 . (33)
14Such a formulation corresponds to a linear predictive model with conditional homoskedasticity,
as would be implied by joint normality of (ra, rb, Z).
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Since there is a risk free asset and the benchmark portfolio weights are known,
Proposition 9(iii) gives the active portfolio weight function as x(Z) = w(Z) + xb,
where
w(Z) = λ1Ω(Z)
−1µ(Z)
=
λ1
|Ω(Z)|
 IE(r2b |Z)IE(ra|Z)− IE(rb|Z)IE(rarb|Z)
IE(r2a|Z)IE(rb|Z)− IE(ra|Z)IE(rarb|Z)
 , (34)
and
|Ω(Z)| = IE(r2a|Z)IE(r2b |Z)− [IE(rarb|Z)]2. (35)
In Equation (34) |Ω(Z)| is a function of Z4, and both IE(r2b |Z)IE(ra|Z)−IE(rb|Z)
IE(rarb|Z) and IE(r2a|Z)IE(rb|Z)−IE(ra|Z)IE(rarb|Z) are functions of Z3, so we con-
clude that w(Z) → 0 and thus x(Z) → xb as Z → ±∞. This result generalizes
Ferson and Siegel (2001), who show that the unconditionally efficient portfolio has a
conservative response to strong signals. Ferson, Siegel, and Xu (2006) use a similar
characterization. The active manager becomes very conservative when the signal is
strong – he simply holds the benchmark in the limit. The intuition is that when the
conditioning information is extreme, the active manager may easily satisfy the alpha
constraint by holding a tiny w(Z), and at the same time minimize the tracking error
variance by investing most of the fund in the benchmark.
Figure 1 depicts the relation between the portfolio weights in excess of the bench-
mark, i.e., w(Z), and the strength of (standardized) signal.15 Here Z is positively
correlated with ra and negatively correlated with rb. Consider the case when Z > 0.
As Z increases from zero, the portfolio weight on asset a (dotted curve) is positive
15We use a currency portfolio return (described below) to draw this picture. The Japanese Yen is
asset a, UK Pounds are asset b, and the conditioning information is the lagged return of Japanese
Yen. δ’s are estimated by least squares, and the conditional covariance matrix is the covariance
matrix of the residuals, scaled by 1%. α¯p is set to 5% annually.
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and increases initially. After hitting its peak where the standardized Z is 2.5, the
weight on asset a shrinks quickly and approaches zero. The portfolio weight on asset
b in excess of the benchmark (solid curve) decreases initially, and then increases and
approaches zero after reaching its trough at which the standardized Z is 3.3. When
Z < 0, the pattern reverses.
4.2 Portfolio Risk Constraints on UTE Weights
We illustrate the effects of portfolio risk constraints in the previous example. The
portfolio risk constraint is β¯p = 1.5. Proposition 9(i) or 9(ii) gives the optimal
portfolio weights as x(Z) = w(Z) + xb, where
w(Z) =
λ1 − λ2µb
|Ω(Z)|
 IE(r2b |Z)IE(ra|Z)− IE(rb|Z)IE(rarb|Z)
IE(r2a|Z)IE(rb|Z)− IE(ra|Z)IE(rarb|Z)
+ λ2xb, (36)
Under the assumption in (33), the first term of the right hand side of w(Z) approaches
(0, 0)′ as Z → ±∞, and the second term is a fraction of the benchmark portfolio,
proportional to the shadow price of the portfolio risk constraint. Thus x(Z) →
(1 + λ2)xb when the active manager receives a very strong signal.
The active manager does not hold the benchmark given an extreme signal, when a
portfolio risk constraint is imposed. Figure 2 depicts the influences of the constraint
on the portfolio weights in excess of the benchmark, using the same set of parameters
as in the first example and adding a β¯p = 1.5 constraint. While the weight on asset a
(dotted curve) displays similar limiting behavior to Figure 1, the portfolio weight on
asset b (solid curve) does not approach zero even when Z gets very large. Instead, it
approaches λ2 = 0.702. The reason is to meet the portfolio risk constraint. Here the
target beta is 1.5, while the realized beta is 1.702.
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5 Empirical Analysis
We assess the performance of the tracking efficient portfolios, with or without con-
ditioning information, in this section. We provide an application to international
financial data. We choose a currency portfolio management example for several rea-
sons. First, conditioning information is likely to be important in currency trading
given the large swings in conditional risk premiums (e.g. Hansen and Hodrick (1980),
Fama (1984), and Bekaert and Hodrick (1992)). Second, the currency market is
very large and liquid. Microstructure and default risk issues are relatively minor.16
Third, it is relatively easy to short currencies. The models without constraints may
therefore be more realistic in currency markets where short selling is relatively inex-
pensive. Fourth, there is room for active management since many currency market
participants, such as central banks, equity managers, tourists, and international busi-
nesses, do not concentrate on exchange rate exposure. Note that, our approach can be
applied to other asset classes as well; an application to equity portfolio management
is presented in Section 5.6.3.
Suppose that a US-based active manager speculates in currencies and forms cur-
rency portfolios using four major currencies: US Dollars, Japanese Yen, UK Pounds,
and Euro. The manager faces an unmanaged currency benchmark portfolio of the
above four currencies17, defined by Rb,t = x
′
b,t−1Rt, where xb,t−1 is a vector of exoge-
16For example, the bid-ask spread of Eurocurrencies could be as low as 15 basis points (Grabbe,
1996).
17In practice, currency benchmarks are often defined in the following fashion,
Rb,t = x′b,t−1[(1− ωh)Ruct + ωhRct ], (37)
where xb,t−1 depends on relative equity market value of each country, Ruct is a vector of uncovered
returns, defined in (39), Rct is a vector of covered returns, defined as
Rc,jt =
f jt−1(1 + y
j
t−1)
sjt−1
− 1, (38)
where f j is the forward exchange rate for currency j. Conventionally the pre-determined scalar ωh
is called “hedge ratio,” usually set to 0, 0.5, or 1 in practice. The case we consider in our empirical
study is a special case where ωh is set to zero. While not tabulated here, the UTE portfolios
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nous benchmark weights known at t− 1, and the return on currency j is
Rjt =
sjt(1 + y
j
t−1)
sjt−1
− 1, (39)
where sjt is the spot exchange rate for currency j, and y
j
t−1 is the one-period Eurocur-
rency deposit rate or Treasury rate for currency j, observed at time t− 1.18
We use monthly data for spot and forward exchange rates, and deposit rates for
the above four currencies for the period from August 1978 to January 2005. We
deflate all returns by US inflation rates19 so that all returns are risky real returns.
We annualize monthly real returns, and report annual rates by multiplying them by
12.
Motivated by Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Bilson (1981), and Fama (1984), we
consider the following conditioning information: past forecast errors, defined as the
difference between the spot exchange rate and the lagged forward exchange rate20;
the forward premium, defined as the difference between the logarithms of the forward
exchange rate and the contemporaneous spot exchange rate; past depreciation rates,
defined as the difference between the logarithms of the spot exchange rate and the
lagged spot exchange rate; and lagged real dollar returns on the individual currencies.
remain advantageous regardless the choice of ωh. This is because the predictable component in Rb
is increasing with ωh.
18We acquire exchange rate data for Japanese Yen from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
website, and the UK Pounds and synthetic Euro exchange rates from Datastream. The Eurodollar,
Euroyen, and Europound deposit rates are also available in Datastream. We construct the monthly
interest rate for synthetic Euro using the same method Datastream uses to calculate synthetic Euro
interest rate, which is a GDP-weighted average of Euro region interest rates. Should some interest
rates be unavailable, we rescale the other weights so that they sum to one.
19We define the inflation rate as the growth rate of the not-seasonally-adjusted Consumer Price
Index for all urban consumers (all items less food and energy), available from Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis website.
20All forward exchange rate data, except for synthetic Euro, are from Datastream. We construct
the implied forward exchange rates by assuming covered interest rate parity holds. We use similar
methods to construct the forward exchange rate for other currencies whenever explicit forward rate
data are missing.
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5.1 Estimation
We describe the estimation of the conditional moments in this section. As in the
previous section, we assume a very simple and conservative formulation for the re-
turn generating process: Suppose returns are linear in predictor variables and the
conditional covariance matrix is constant.21
Let Rjt denote the returns on currency j at time t. The conditioning information
available to the active manager at time t is Zt−1. The conditional expected return
for currency j, µj(Zt−1) = IE(Rj|Zt−1), is the fitted value of the following time series
regression,
Rjt = Z
′
t−1δ
j + εjt . (40)
The conditional second moment matrix Ω(Z) in the presence of conditioning infor-
mation is
Ω(Zt−1) = Σε + µ(Zt−1)µ(Zt−1)′, (41)
where Σε, assumed to be constant over time, is the covariance matrix of the εjt ’s in
(40). Ω(Zt−1) is time-varying due to the time-varying nature of µ(Zt−1). Estimators
δ and Σε are the maximum likelihood estimators under joint normality of R and Z.
We assume xb,t−1 is known throughout our empirical study. With the knowledge
of µ(Z) and Ω(Z), we infer γ(Z) by γ(Z) = Ω(Z)xb−µbµ(Z). With µ(Z), γ(Z), and
Ω(Z), we estimate the portfolio parameters µ0, σb0, Ω0, ψ’s, and η’s by taking the
sample means.
21Such a formulation is conservative in the sense that we model only a first order effect for
conditional means and assume conditional homoskedasticity for the covariance matrix estimator. As
described in a later subsection, a factor model capturing the first two moments of currency returns
provides substantial improvement to the UTE portfolios.
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5.2 In-Sample Predictability and Model Selection
For in-sample study, we use the sample from October 1978 to December 1998, a total
of 243 observations. The Euro was formally introduced in January 1999, and we leave
the post-1998 data, 73 observations, for an out-of-sample study.
Time series regressions like (40) of currency returns on all the instruments jointly
suggest that the instruments have explanatory power.22 To mitigate overfitting in the
out-of-sample experiments, we consider a parsimonious specification in which every
predictor variable has joint explanatory power for all currencies.23 The final instru-
ments are a constant, the depreciation rates of the Japanese Yen and UK Pounds, the
lagged returns of the Japanese Yen, UK Pounds, and US Dollars. These instruments
produce p-values below 0.2% in joint tests of significance with White’s (1980) correc-
tion, but the adjusted R2 is small; typically only half of one percent. Presumably in
practice some active managers could find conditioning information that works better.
If we find that the conditioning information in the examples is important, it is likely
to be more important in practice.
5.3 Potential Benefits of the UTE Portfolios
This section explores the potential advantage of our unconditionally tracking efficient
(UTE) solutions over the no-information tracking efficient (NITE) and the condition-
ally tracking efficient (CTE) portfolios.24 The comparison abstracts from misspec-
ification and estimation errors of the statistical moments. The reason we want to
abstract these issues is to allow the active manager to use the “correct” models for
the conditional moments in the simulations (i.e. the same ones that generate the
22The estimation results are available upon request.
23We use the following model selection procedure. We use GMM to estimate (40) for all assets
simultaneously. For each predictor variable Zi, we test the joint hypothesis of δ
j
i = 0 for all i, where
Zi and δ
j
i are the i-th element of Z and δj , respectively. We eliminate Zi if the δ
j
i ’s are not jointly
significant. Each equation is forced to have the same set of instruments.
24We consider a special case of CTE solutions which can be obtained by reinterpreting all the
moments in NITE solutions as conditional moments.
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simulated data).
We abstract from these issues because in the simulation we are able to observe
a large simulated data set and know its data generating process, we can use the
correctly specified models for the conditional moments and estimate the parameters
precisely.
We simulate 1,000 paths, each of them containing an artificial data set of 12,000
observations. This is equivalent to the number of monthly observations in 1,000
years.25 Since the parameters of the data generating process are fixed and the manager
knows the structure of the data generating process, the maximum likelihood estimates
that he uses will essentially be at the probability limits.
The performance of the active portfolios is summarized in Table 1. We first
consider the case where there is no portfolio risk constraint and no riskless rate. The
target alphas are set to 1%, 3%, and 5% per year. For each portfolio, we compute
the difference between the active portfolio return and the benchmark return. We
report the sample average of the difference between the two returns, “alpha,” and
the standard error of the difference, “tracking error volatility.” We also report the
statistic summarizing the ratio of alpha to tracking error volatility, the “information
ratio.”26
The advantage of using conditioning information to form dynamic portfolios is
25We first use a block bootstrap to resample the instruments and the growth rate of equity market
values in pairs, creating an artificial data set of 12,000 observations. The benchmark weights can be
calculated by simulated equity market values: We first randomly draw an observation from the equity
market value data and treat it as the initial value for the simulated series, then apply the simulated
growth rates to that initial value and then construct the whole artificial series for equity values.
Then we form the returns for individual currencies and the benchmark, using the return generating
process in the parsimonious regression model (using the model selection procedure in footnote 23) for
first moment and a constant covariance matrix for second moment. When estimating the conditional
moments, we use exactly the same specification used to calibrate the simulation. The unconditional
moments and other parameters can be obtained by taking sample averages. Then we form the NITE,
the CTE and the UTE portfolios and compute the performance measures. The exercise is repeated
1,000 times.
26Note this is different from Treynor and Black’s (1973) “appraisal ratio,” i.e. Jensen’s (1969) alpha
divided by residual volatility, which is also sometimes referred as information ratio (e.g. Grinold
and Kahn (1999)).
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obvious, and the dominance of the UTE portfolio is substantial. While Table 1 shows
that all of the active portfolios on average achieve target alphas precisely, the tracking
error volatilities of the NITE portfolios are larger than that of the UTE and the CTE
portfolios. With an information ratio of 0.358, the UTE portfolios almost double
that of the CTE portfolios (0.193) and are four times better than that of the NITE
portfolios (0.072).27 None of the 1,000 simulation paths presents NITE portfolios or
CTE portfolios with smaller tracking error volatilities or greater information ratios
than the UTE portfolios.
The potential benefit of the UTE portfolios can be visualized by the tracking effi-
ciency frontiers, defined as the graphical relation between the alphas of the portfolios
and their tracking error volatilities. Figure 3 shows the tracking efficiency frontiers,
averaged across the 1,000 simulation trials. Clearly the CTE portfolios dominate the
NITE portfolios, and UTE portfolios dominate the NITE and the CTE portfolios, in
the sense that for any given alpha, the superior portfolios have much lower tracking
error volatility than do the inferior portfolios.
5.4 In-Sample Performance
We next turn to the data to evaluate the performance of the tracking efficient portfo-
lios in a realistic finite sample. First we use the data for the period October 1978 to
December 1998 to estimate unconditional and conditional moments, assuming linear
conditional first moment and constant conditional covariance structure, and apply
the optimal portfolio solutions to the data.
Besides the information ratio, empirically we also consider the following measures:
the first one is an “incentive,” expressed as the additional performance required by the
NITE portfolio such that it is on par with a dynamic portfolio. Suppose uninformed
clients are indifferent between the performance of an enhanced NITE portfolio and
27Note in this case, since the Lagrangian multipliers are proportional to α¯p, the information ratio
is invariant to α¯p for non-zero alphas. See Corollary 2.
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the performance of an actively managed portfolio when we equate their unconditional
information ratios:
αp√
var(Rp −Rb)
=
αNITE + Ip√
var(RNITE −Rb)
. (42)
Solving,
Ip = ypαp − αNITE, (43)
yp ≡
√
var(RNITE −Rb)√
var(Rp −Rb)
, (44)
which has an equivalent representation
Ip = [ypIE(Rp) + (1− yp)µb]− IE(RNITE) (45)
≡ IE(RH)− IE(RNITE). (46)
Therefore Ip is a (vertical) distance measure extending M2 (see Graham and Harvey
(1997) and Modigliani and Modigliani (1997)) to the tracking-error investment con-
text: we use a managed portfolio and the benchmark portfolio to form a hypothetical
portfolio H, with return RH = ypRp + (1 − yp)Rb, whose tracking error volatility is
the same as that of the NITE portfolio, then we find the return differential of the
hypothetical portfolio and the NITE portfolio. Our incentive measure is consistent
with the information measure. In addition, it also illustrates an economic magnitude,
i.e. the amount by which a managed portfolio outperforms a NITE portfolio, if the
managed portfolio’s tracking error volatility is normalized to the level of the NITE
portfolio’s tracking error volatility.
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Although when we impose αp = αNITE = α¯, we have
Ip = α¯
(√
var(RNITE −Rb)√
var(Rp −Rb)
− 1
)
(47)
ex ante, empirically we use ex post alpha estimates instead of the ex ante ones to
include the possibility that estimation errors may drive resulting alphas away from
the target values.
Motivated by Fleming, Kirby, and Ostdiek (2001) and Ferson and Siegel (2001),
we also consider a management fee measure, which represents the percentage of assets
uninformed investors are willing to pay to switch from the NITE portfolio to an active
portfolio. Assuming uninformed investors have quadratic utility defined over tracking
errors, a management fee fp solves
T∑
t=1
[
(Rp,t −Rb,t − fp)−∆(Rp,t −Rb,t − fp)2
]
=
T∑
t=1
[
(RNITE,t −Rb,t)−∆(RNITE,t −Rb,t)2
]
,
(48)
where ∆ = 0.5RRA/(1 + RRA), and RRA is the relative risk aversion. Following
Fleming, Kirby, and Ostdiek (2001), we set RRA = 1 or 10 to represent risk tolerant
or highly risk averse behaviors. Note while the management fee measure is an intuitive
utility-based measure, this approach may mismatch alpha and its implied risk aversion
and lead to ambiguous implications.
Finally, we also include the familiar unconditional Sharpe (1966) ratio as a per-
formance measure for the sake of completeness. Jorion (2003) argues that putting a
total variance constraint on a tracking portfolio enhances its mean-variance perfor-
mance. Note that, however, our optimal tracking efficient portfolio does not necessary
have the highest unconditional Sharpe ratio since its main objective is to maximize
unconditional information ratio.
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Panel A of Table 2 does not impose portfolio risk constraints. The NITE and the
UTE portfolios generate alphas close to the target alphas, while the alphas of the
CTE portfolios are a bit above the target alphas. The UTE portfolios feature the
lowest tracking error volatilities, while the NITE portfolios have the highest tracking
error volatilities. The resulting information ratios of the UTE portfolios (0.415) are
four times better than that of the NITE portfolios (0.079) and 51% better than that of
the CTE portfolios (0.275). The incentives of UTE are uniformly higher than those
of CTE. Note that it is not surprising to have a higher incentive than a portfolio
alpha since we have to use leverage to construct hypothetical portfolios in this case.
In addition, the management fees for the dynamic portfolios are all positive. CTE
portfolios have the highest Sharpe ratios.
5.5 Out-of-Sample Performance
We use a “fixed window” evaluation scheme to explore the out-of-sample performance
of the active portfolios using the data after the introduction of the Euro.28 For the
UTE and the CTE portfolios, we estimate the models for conditional moments using
pre-1999 data, and apply the parameter estimates directly to the new conditioning
information to form the new conditional moments out of sample. For the NITE
portfolios, we estimate the unconditional moments in sample only and do not update
them out of sample.
Panel B of Table 2 summarizes the out-of-sample performance of the active portfo-
lios. It shows that the NITE portfolios always produce alphas higher than the target
alphas. Neither the UTE nor the CTE portfolios achieve the target alphas, however.
28The fixed window evaluation scheme highlights the time-invariant feature of NITE portfolio
weights (Grinblatt and Titman (1993) address similar issues). Other evaluation schemes, e.g., re-
cursive or rolling window, allow for re-estimation of unconditional as well as conditional moments.
They allow the NITE portfolios to use new return data, a type of conditioning information. Of
course, in practice one observes that NITE solutions are often paired with rolling windows. Thus,
this combination is worth evaluating as well on its own merits (rolling NITE). See Section 5.6.4 for
an evaluation of various methods.
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The tracking error volatilities for the UTE portfolios are always smaller than those of
the NITE and the CTE portfolios. In terms of the size of information ratios, the UTE
portfolios (0.177) still outperform the CTE (0.124) and the NITE (0.116) portfolios,
but the advantage is not as substantial as we have seen in sample. The information
ratios of the UTE portfolios are 43% better than that of the CTE portfolios and
53% better than that of the NITE portfolios. Consistent with information ratios, the
incentives of UTE portfolios are all positive and higher than those of CTE portfolios.
The management fee of UTE is higher than that of CTE only when clients are highly
risk averse and ask for 5% alpha. CTE portfolios also have the highest Sharpe ratios
out of sample.
Figures 4–7 depict out-of-sample portfolio weights in excess of the benchmark
weights. Since we use fixed-window evaluation scheme, NITE portfolio excess weights
are constant over time. Both CTE and UTE strategies display time-varying excess
weights, but the paths of CTE excess weights are much more volatile. This result
casts serious concern on the CTE strategy as it will induce high transaction cost.
On the other hand, the transaction cost incurred by the UTE portfolios should be
moderate.29
5.6 Robustness
5.6.1 Portfolio Risk Constraints
Now we examine whether the advantage of the UTE portfolios persists when a port-
folio risk constraint is imposed. Panels A and B of Table 3 consider a portfolio beta
constraint of β¯p = 1, and Panels C and D of Table 3 consider a total risk constraint
of σ¯2p = σ
2
b .
30 These are also interesting in view of Frost and Savarino (1988), who
find that constraints can actually improve the out-of-sample performance of mean
29Note that even the NITE strategy has transaction cost since it rebalances periodically.
30Similar constraints are studied by Roll (1992) and Jorion (2003), respectively.
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variance optimized portfolios.
Table 3 shows that the UTE portfolios still dominate the NITE and the CTE port-
folios in and out of sample.31 Compared with the results in Table 2, the performance
of the UTE portfolios is virtually unaffected when a portfolio risk constraint is im-
posed. Interestingly, the extra penalty from the portfolio risk constraint is relatively
more pronounced for the CTE portfolios. The intuition is that, when benchmark
weights are known, the Lagrangian multiplier for the hedging component of the port-
folio in excess of benchmark portfolio is zero when no portfolio risk constraint is
imposed, but it is nonzero when a portfolio risk constraint is imposed. Since the
Lagrangian multiplier is time-varying for the CTE portfolios, their portfolio weights
become too volatile, compared with the NITE and the UTE portfolios, and there-
fore their performance is severely impacted as their tracking error volatilities inflate
dramatically.
The incentives for UTE portfolios are higher than corresponding ones in Table 2
since the adverse effects of portfolio constraints on UTE portfolios are weaker than
those on other portfolios. Management fees are usually positive in sample, but only
UTE portfolio is able to deliver positive fee out of sample, when clients are highly
risk averse and targeting higher alphas. NITE portfolios tend to have higher Sharpe
ratios out of sample.
5.6.2 Conditional Heteroskedasticity
Motivated by Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999), we consider a conditional ver-
sion of a “common factor representation,” a factor model for the conditional moments
whose time variation is driven by factors as well as predictor instruments.32 We use
31Note that we do not report the results for target alphas of 3% and 5% when a total risk constraint
is imposed since such targets produce optimal NITE portfolio with complex numbers and thus are
infeasible. Jorion (2003) does not find alphas higher than 2% in a different data set.
32We also implement multivariate ARCH-type specifications but they are numerically unstable.
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a constant and the growth rate of a trade weighted US dollar exchange rate index33
as the common factors and call them F . The statistical model follows,
Ft = Z
′
t−1ξ + ut,
Rjt = F
′
tB
j(Zt−1) + v
j
t ,
Bj(Zt−1) = Z ′t−1pi
j,
(49)
where Bj(Zt−1) is the conditional regression beta of R
j
t on Ft, conditional on Zt−1.
Thus, IE(vjt |Z) = IE(vjtFt|Z) = IE(vjtFtZt−1|Z) = 0. We model
Ω(Zt−1) = [B(Zt−1)′ΣuB(Zt−1) + Σv] + µ(Zt−1)µ(Zt−1)′, (50)
where Σu and Σv are covariance matrices for ut and vt, respectively, and µ
j(Zt−1) =
ξ′Zt−1Z ′t−1pi
j.
Modeling conditional heteroskedasticity improves the performance of the UTE
portfolios substantially. Table 4 shows that, when no portfolio risk constraint is
imposed, the UTE portfolios have information ratios of 0.859 in sample, almost twice
as good as the CTE portfolios and ten times better than the NITE portfolios. Out
of sample, UTE portfolios produce information ratios of 0.240, which is 36% better
than the CTE portfolios and 107% better than the NITE portfolios.
Similarly, UTE tends to have higher incentives and only generate positive man-
agement fees when clients have higher risk aversion and aim at higher alphas. NITE
has higher Sharpe ratios out of sample.
5.6.3 An Equity Market Example
It is interesting to examine how our optimal UTE portfolios fare in other financial
markets. We present a small exercise using US equity data. We consider an active
33We use the index “for major currencies,” available from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
website.
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manager using four portfolios, including a large cap portfolio, a mid- and small-cap
portfolio, a value stock portfolio, and a growth stock portfolio34, to beat the Standard
and Poor 500 index. We use the predictive variables in Ferson and Harvey (1999) to
proxy the conditioning information available to the active manager.
Table 5 uses data for the sample period February 1979 to December 1998 for
the in-sample analysis and leaves the post-1998 data for out-of-sample evaluation35.
Without imposing portfolio risk constraints and without modeling conditional het-
eroskedasticity, Panels A and B of Table 5 shows that the UTE portfolios are still
the preferred portfolios. The UTE portfolios have the highest information ratios, in
and out of sample. The advantage of the UTE portfolios over the NITE portfolios
is not very large, however. Modeling conditional heteroskedasticity may improve the
performance of the UTE portfolios. For example, using CRSP index return as a fac-
tor in the single factor model setting, the UTE portfolios have information ratios 5%
better than those of the NITE portfolios. The results are summarized in Panels C
and D of Table 5.
In all cases, UTE portfolios have the highest incentives and positive management
fees, and CTE portfolios have the highest Sharpe ratios.
5.6.4 Alternative Estimation and Evaluation Schemes
So far we focus on the fixed window evaluation scheme for out-of-sample study. We
have used the pre-Euro sample period for initial estimation and do not allow for
re-estimation of statistical moments.
This section considers various sizes of initial estimation periods and also inves-
tigates alternative out-of-sample evaluation schemes. The active manager may use
34They are proxied by the Standard and Poor 500, Russell 2500, Russell 1000 (Value), and Russell
1000 (Growth), respectively. The data are from Datastream.
35The sample period is subject to data availability, while we make the division of in and out of
sample consistent with our currency portfolio example.
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60, 120, 180, or 240 months of data for initial estimation36. As new information ar-
rives, he may maintain all historical data (recursive scheme) or drop the most distant
observation (rolling window scheme), and then re-estimate the statistical moments.
Table 6 reports the information ratios of active currency portfolios when condi-
tional homoskedasticity is assumed and no portfolio risk constraint is imposed37. We
find the following patterns consistent across different sizes of initial samples. The
UTE portfolios clearly dominate the CTE and the NITE portfolios in sample. Out
of sample, UTE portfolios beat the NITE portfolios in 10 of the 12 occasions. UTE
portfolios are preferred to the CTE portfolios under the fixed window and recursive
schemes, but the CTE portfolios perform better than the UTE portfolios under the
rolling window scheme.
5.6.5 Naive Equal-Weighted Portfolio (“1/N”)
We compare our portfolio performance with that of a naive equal-weighted port-
folio. DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2007) compare this naive strategy with 14
sample-based mean-variance portfolios, and find that none of the 14 portfolios can
consistently beat the naive equal-weighted strategy in terms of out-of-sample mean-
variance performance measures.
We assess the performance of this naive strategy using the currency dataset and
report the results in Table 7. We consider several ways to split the sample such that
the results are directly comparable to Tables 2 and 6. Interestingly, we find that
UTE portfolio is able to outperform the naive strategy most of the time. Indeed 1/N
strategy might occasionally outperform the other tracking portfolios when we vary
in-sample estimation window, but generally speaking, the UTE portfolio has robust
out-of-sample performance.38 UTE portfolio remains the better one when we switch
36The numbers of observations out of sample are then 256, 196, 136, and 76, respectively.
37In this case, information ratio is neutral to the target alphas as long as they are non-negative.
38However, the advantage of dynamic portfolios may be eroded as the number of assets under
management increases and misspecification and estimation errors are amplified. DeMiguel, Garlappi,
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to equity dataset.39
5.6.6 Robustness Check: A Simulation Analysis
Our empirical evidence has shown that the UTE portfolios have outstanding ability
to optimize the trade-off between alpha and tracking error volatility. A few concerns
should be addressed here, however. First, the UTE portfolios tend to have poor
alphas out of sample. Second, the UTE portfolios are inferior to the CTE portfolios
when rolling window evaluation scheme is used. Third, although the advantage of
the UTE portfolios is economically significant, its statistical significance remains an
open question. It is possible that the above patterns are sample specific, given the
possible model misspecification and estimation errors.
We examine the robustness of our results by a simulation of 1,000 paths, allowing
for misspecification and estimation errors.40,41 Panel A of Table 8 shows that, in
sample, the NITE and the UTE portfolios on average produce precise alphas for every
given target alpha, while the CTE portfolios produce alphas slightly higher than the
target alphas.42 The average information ratios of the UTE portfolios (0.531) are 1.6
times as good as CTE portfolios (0.339), and 3.8 times as good as NITE portfolios
(0.141). Out of the 1,000 trials, the NITE portfolios never have higher information
and Uppal (2007) consider as many as 24 assets when studying actual data.
39For example, the 1/N strategy delivers an out-of-sample information ratio of 0.088, while the
UTE strategy delivers 0.386 when a constat covariance structure is imposed (see Table 5, Panel B).
40We block bootstrap the individual currency returns, all of the instruments, the factor, and the
growth rate of equity market values, and get the same number of observations as our empirical data.
We divide the data into “in-sample” and “out-of-sample,” both matching the number of observations
in Table 2. We implement a new model selection, re-estimate the first and second moments assuming
conditional homoskedasticity, and form the active portfolios without imposing portfolio constraints.
The out-of-sample performance is evaluated by fixed window, recursive, and rolling window schemes.
The procedure is repeated 1,000 times. Since neither a known return-generating process is assumed
nor a large data set is available for estimation purpose, this simulation allows for misspecification
and estimation errors.
41Note a parametric bootstrap is not appropriate here due to the dimension of the instruments.
42Although in sample, the NITE portfolios have alphas closer to the target alphas than the UTE
portfolios in every path, the difference is very tiny and indistinguishable (around 2% of the target
alpha). This result is a numerical issue: The alphas of the UTE portfolios are calculated by averaging
products of conditional moments and rounding errors may occur in floating point computation.
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ratios than do the UTE portfolios, while the CTE portfolios beat the UTE portfolios
for only six times. Overall the in-sample simulation evidence is consistent with the
evidence from actual data.
Our simulation results illustrate the statistical significance of the out-of-sample
dominance of the UTE portfolios. Panels B to D of Table 8 shows that the UTE
portfolios have substantial advantage out of sample, whatever the evaluation scheme
is. While none of the average alphas achieves the target alphas, the UTE portfolios
have alphas closest to the targets. Out of the 1,000 simulation paths, the NITE
portfolios produce alphas closer to the targets than do the UTE portfolios in fewer
than 24.3% of the times, and the CTE portfolios have alphas closer to the targets
than do the UTE portfolios in fewer than 49.8% of the times. In addition, the average
alphas for UTE portfolios are at least threefold as the numbers in Table 2. These
results reverse the evidence of poor alphas in the actual data.
On average the UTE portfolios produce clearly better out-of-sample information
ratios than those of the NITE and the CTE portfolios. Out of the 1,0000 simulation
paths, the NITE portfolios produce higher out-of-sample information ratios than do
the UTE portfolios for no more than 45 instances. Indeed, under the rolling window
scheme, the CTE portfolios may have better chance to beat the UTE portfolios, but
the probability is only 19.9%.
6 Concluding Remarks
We study models in which an active portfolio manager may use conditioning infor-
mation, i.e., the information about security returns that is unavailable to his clients.
Uninformed clients delegate their investment decisions to active managers, inducing
them try to beat a benchmark and minimize tracking error variance. The active
manager uses conditioning information to optimize the unconditional performance
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measures, which are observable by the uninformed client. The resulting optimal
strategy is “unconditionally tracking efficient” (UTE).
We provide solutions for the UTE portfolios and study their properties and perfor-
mance. From practitioners’ standpoint, the UTE solutions show how to use condition-
ing information efficiently. From academic perspective, the UTE problem suggests
a specific interpretation of hedging demand in an economy with delegated portfolio
management.
We find the portfolio risk constraints are crucial to the active manager’s response
to conditioning information. Without portfolio risk constraints, the manager is con-
servative in the face of strong signals and his limiting behavior is to hold the bench-
mark. When there are portfolio risk constraints the manager holds more or less in the
benchmark portfolios, depending on the shadow price of the portfolio risk constraint.
We also briefly discuss the equilibrium implications of the presence of UTE in-
vestors in an economy with delegated portfolio management. The implied asset pric-
ing model features testability in the stochastic discount factor representation and
time-varying factor loadings and premiums in the multibeta representation.
The economic significance of the advantages of the UTE portfolios is illustrated by
a realistic international financial market example. When implementing the strategies
with data for the pre-Euro period, we find the UTE portfolios outperform the NITE
and the CTE portfolios dramatically. The advantage of the UTE portfolios remains
robust to alternative model specifications, financial market data, estimation periods
and out-of-sample evaluation schemes.
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A Appendix
A.1 Specific Solutions
To develop the UTE version of the solutions, define the following parameters for
convenience,
ψ1 = IE[ψ1(Z)], ψ1(Z) ≡ µ(Z)′Φ(Z)µ(Z),
ψ2 = IE[ψ2(Z)], ψ2(Z) ≡ µ(Z)′Φ(Z)γ(Z),
ψ3 = IE[ψ3(Z)], ψ3(Z) ≡ γ(Z)′Φ(Z)γ(Z).
(51)
Let R0 = x0(Z)
′R denote the global minimum conditional second moment port-
folio return. It has expected value of,
µ0 = IE[µ0(Z)], µ0(Z) = µ(Z)
′x0(Z), (52)
and covariance with the benchmark return of,
σb0 = IE
[
1′Ω(Z)−1γ(Z)
1′Ω(Z)−11
]
. (53)
R0 has unconditional second moment of Ω0 with any portfolio y(Z) with weights that
sum to 1,43
IE[y(Z)′Ω(Z)x0(Z)] = IE
[
y(Z)′Ω(Z)Ω(Z)−11
1′Ω(Z)−11
]
= IE
[
1
1′Ω(Z)−11
]
≡ Ω0. (54)
Or to be more general IE[y(Z)′Ω(Z)x0(Z)] = cΩ0 if 1′y(Z) = c.44
Let I{·} denote an indicator function, taking value of 1 when the statement inside
{·} is true and 0 otherwise.
43Note this corresponds to the result IE(RiRn) = IE(R2n) of Hansen and Richard (1987).
44Thus for a zero net investment portfolio, its conditional second moment (and hence unconditional
second moment) with the global minimum conditional second moment portfolio is 0.
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A.1.1 No Risk Free Asset, Constraints on Portfolio Risk
Proposition 2 The unique solution to the problem in (11) is determined by the
weight function (2) where
λ1 =
[(α¯p + µb)− µ0]ψ3 − (β¯pσ2b − σb0)ψ2
ψ1ψ3 − ψ22
,
λ2 =
(β¯pσ
2
b − σb0)ψ1 − [(α¯p + µb)− µ0]ψ2
ψ1ψ3 − ψ22
,
λ3 = 1.
(55)
Proposition 3 The unique solution to the problem in (12) is determined by the
weight function (2) where
λ1 =
α¯p + µb − µ0
ψ1
− ψ2
ψ1
λ2,
λ2 = (−1)I{ψ1(ψ22−ψ1ψ3)>0}
√
κ,
κ =
[σ¯2p + (α¯p + µb)
2 − Ω0]ψ1 − (α¯p + µb − µ0)2
ψ1ψ3 − ψ22
≥ 0,
λ3 = 1.
(56)
For λ2 a real number, we require κ to be nonnegative. The non-negativity restriction
constrains the feasible set of target alphas.
A.1.2 No Risk Free Asset and No Portfolio Risk Constraint
Proposition 4 The unique solution to the problem in (13) is determined by the
weight function (2) where
λ1 =
[(α¯p + µb)− µ0]− ψ2
ψ1
,
λ2 = λ3 = 1.
(57)
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Lemma 1 For random variables X and Y , and X/Y also stochastic,
IE
(
X2
Y 2
)
>
[
IE
(
X
Y
)]2
≥ IE(X2)IE
(
1
Y 2
)
>
[IE(X)]2
[IE(Y )]2
>
[IE(X)]2
IE(Y 2)
, (58)
by Cauchy-Schwartz and Jensen’s inequalities.
Corollary 1 The solution in Proposition 4 yields ex ante unconditional tracking error
variance45
var(RUTE −Rb) = (α¯p + µb − µ0 − ψ2)
2
ψ1
− ψ3 + Ω0 − 2σb0. (59)
Given the same α¯p, the CTE counterpart has ex ante unconditional tracking error
variance of
var(RCTE−Rb) = IE
(
[α¯p + IE(Rb|Z)− IE(R0|Z)− ψ2(Z)]2
ψ1(Z)
)
−ψ3+Ω0−2σb0. (60)
Recognizing that ψ1(Z) is a quadratic form, var(RCTE − Rb) > var(RUTE − Rb) by
Lemma 1.
A.1.3 Solutions with Fixed Exogenous Benchmark Portfolio Weights
Propositions 5–7 provide the solutions to the optimization problem (11), (12), and
(13), respectively, with fixed exogenous benchmark portfolio weights. All moments
in Propositions 5–7 are defined in (4), (5), and (51).
Proposition 5 The unique solution to the problem in (11), given fixed exogenous
benchmark portfolio weights xb, is determined by the portfolio weight function (15),
where
λ1 =
α¯pψ3 − (β¯p − 1)σ2bψ2
ψ1ψ3 − ψ22
, λ2 =
(β¯p − 1)σ2bψ1 − α¯pψ2
ψ1ψ3 − ψ22
, λ3 = 0. (61)
45It follows from Φ(Z)′Ω(Z)Φ(Z) = 0 and Φ(Z)Ω(Z)x0(Z) = 0.
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Proposition 6 The unique solution to the problem in (12), given fixed exogenous
benchmark portfolio weights xb, is determined by the portfolio weight function (15),
where
λ1 =
α¯p
ψ1
− ψ2
ψ1
λ2,
λ2 = (−1)I{ψ1(ψ2−ψ1ψ3)>0}
[
1− α¯
2
p − 2α¯pψ2 − (σ¯2p + α¯2p − σ2b )ψ1
ψ1ψ3 − ψ22
]0.5
− 1 ∈ R,
λ3 = 0.
(62)
Proposition 7 The unique solution to the problem in (13), given fixed exogenous
benchmark portfolio weights xb, is determined by the portfolio weight function (15),
where
λ1 =
α¯p
ψ1
, λ2 = λ3 = 0. (63)
Corollary 2 The solution in Proposition 7 yields ex ante unconditional tracking error
variance quadratic in α¯p,
var(RUTE −Rb) = α¯2p
(
1
ψ1
− 1
)
. (64)
As a result, the ex ante information ratio is,
(
1
ψ1
− 1
)− 1
2
(−1)I{α¯p<0}, (65)
i.e., given the sign of α¯p, ex ante information ratio is invariant to α¯p.
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Corollary 3 Given the same α¯p,
var(RCTE −Rb) = α¯2pIE
(
1
µ(Z)′Φ(Z)µ(Z)
− 1
)
≥ var(RUTE −Rb), (66)
by Jensen’s inequality.
A.1.4 Solutions with a Risk Free Asset
To save notation, re-define
µb = IE(rb), µ(Z) = IE(r|Z),
σ2b = var(rb), Ω(Z) = IE(rr
′|Z), (67)
Φ(Z) = [IE(rr′|Z)]−1, γ(Z) = IE[r(rb − µb)|Z],
where Ω(Z) is non-singular and positive definite. Also define
η1 = IE[µ(Z)
′Ω(Z)−1µ(Z)],
η2 = IE[µ(Z)
′Ω(Z)−1γ(Z)],
η3 = IE[γ(Z)
′Ω(Z)−1γ(Z)],
(68)
where the conditional moments are defined in (67). The solutions to the UTE problem
in (16) when there are N risky assets and a risk free asset, with or without portfolio
risk constraints, are provided in Proposition 8. When there are fixed exogenous
benchmark portfolio weights, the solutions to the problem in (16) are summarized in
Proposition 9, in which all moments are defined in (67) and (68).
Proposition 8 (i) The unique solution to the problem in (16), given constraint on
portfolio beta β¯p, is determined by the weight function (2) where
λ1 =
(α¯p + µb)η3 − β¯pσ2bη2
η1η3 − η22
, λ2 =
β¯pσ
2
bη1 − (α¯p + µb)η2
η1η3 − η22
, λ3 = 0. (69)
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(ii) The unique solution to the problem in (16), given constraint on portfolio vari-
ance σ¯2p, is determined by the weight function (2) where
λ1 =
α¯p + µb
η1
− η2
η1
λ2,
λ2 = (−1)I{η22>η1η3}
[
[σ¯2p + (α¯p + µb)
2]η1 − (α¯p + µb)2
η1η3 − η22
]0.5
∈ R,
λ3 = 0.
(70)
(iii) The unique solution to the problem in (16), without constraint on portfolio
risk, is determined by the weight function (2) where
λ1 =
(α¯p + µb)− η2
η1
, λ2 = 1, λ3 = 0. (71)
Proposition 9 (i) The unique solution to the problem in (16), given fixed exogenous
benchmark portfolio weights xb and constraint on portfolio beta β¯p, is determined by
the weight function (15) where
λ1 =
α¯pη3 − (β¯p − 1)σ2bη2
η1η3 − η22
, λ2 =
(β¯p − 1)σ2bη1 − α¯pη2
η1η3 − η22
, λ3 = 0. (72)
(ii) The unique solution to the problem in (16), given fixed exogenous benchmark
portfolio weights xb and constraint on portfolio variance σ¯
2
p, is determined by the
weight function (15) where
λ1 =
α¯p
η1
− η2
η1
λ2,
λ2 = (−1)I{η22>η1η3}
[
1− α¯
2
p − 2α¯pη2 − (σ¯2p + α¯2p − σ2b )η1
η1η3 − η22
]0.5
− 1 ∈ R,
λ3 = 0.
(73)
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(iii) The unique solution to the problem in (16), given fixed exogenous benchmark
portfolio weights xb and without constraint on portfolio risk, is determined by the
weight function (15) where
λ1 =
α¯p
η1
, λ2 = λ3 = 0. (74)
Corollary 4 The solution in Proposition 9(iii) yields unconditional tracking error
variance of
var(RUTE −Rb) = var(rUTE − rb) = α¯2p
(
1
IE[µ(Z)′Ω(Z)−1µ(Z)]
− 1
)
, (75)
while a CTE counterpart, subject to the same α¯p but minimizing the conditional track-
ing error variance, yields unconditional tracking error variance of
var(RCTE −Rb) = var(rCTE − rb) = α¯2p
(
IE
[
1
µ(Z)′Ω(Z)−1µ(Z)
]
− 1
)
, (76)
which is greater than var(RUTE −Rb) by Jensen’s inequality.
A.2 Proof of Propositions 1–4
A.2.1 Generic Form of the Solutions
The agent’s optimization problem is (1). With the conditional moments defined in
(4), we can rewrite the portfolio alpha and tracking error variance as
IE(Rp −Rb) = IE[x(Z)′µ(Z)]− µb, (77)
var(Rp −Rb) = IE[x(Z)′Ω(Z)x(Z)]− {IE[x(Z)′µ(Z)]}2 + σ2b − 2IE[x(Z)′γ(Z)].
(78)
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First we consider the constraint cov(Rp, Rb) = σ¯bp. Given the restrictions on port-
folio alpha and covariance with the benchmark, the agent’s optimization problem is
equivalent to
min
x(Z)
IE[x(Z)′Ω(Z)x(Z)],
s.t. IE[x(Z)′µ(Z)] = α¯p + µb, IE[x(Z)′γ(Z)] = σ¯bp, x(Z)′1 = 1.
(79)
Set the Lagrangian as
L[x(Z)] = IE[x(Z)′Ω(Z)x(Z)]− 2λ1{IE[x(Z)′µ(Z)− (α¯p + µb)]}
− 2λ2{IE[x(Z)′γ(Z)]− σ¯bp} − 2IE{λ3(Z)[x(Z)′1− 1]}.
(80)
Consider a perturbation xˆ(Z) = x(Z)+εy(Z), where x(Z) is the optimal solution,
y(Z) is any other portfolio weight function, and ε is a constant. If the weight x(Z)
is optimal, the derivative of the Lagrangian for xˆ(Z) with respect to ε must be zero
when evaluated at ε = 0, i.e.,
∂L[xˆ(Z)]
∂ε
= 2IE[y(Z)′{Ω(Z)x(Z)− λ1µ(Z)− λ2γ(Z)− λ3(Z)1}] = 0, (81)
when evaluated at ε = 0. Since it must hold for all y(Z), it implies that the term in
{·} must be zero, almost surely in Z. Then we have,
x(Z) = Ω(Z)−1[λ1µ(Z) + λ2γ(Z) + λ3(Z)1]. (82)
Imposing the restriction 1′x(Z) = 1, we get the following expression for λ3(Z),
λ3(Z) = −λ1 1
′Ω(Z)−1
1′Ω(Z)−11
µ(Z)− λ2 1
′Ω(Z)−1
1′Ω(Z)−11
γ(Z) +
1
1′Ω(Z)−11
. (83)
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Plug (83) in (82) and the optimal portfolio is
x(Z) = Ω(Z)−1
[
λ1µ(Z) + λ2γ(Z)− λ111
′Ω(Z)−1
1′Ω(Z)−11
µ(Z)
−λ211
′Ω(Z)−1
1′Ω(Z)−11
γ(Z) +
1
1′Ω(Z)−11
]
= λ1Φ(Z)µ(Z) + λ2Φ(Z)γ(Z) + x0(Z),
(84)
where Φ(Z) and x0(Z) are defined in (5) and (6), respectively. It has the form of (2)
if we reinterpret λ3 = 1.
Now we consider another portfolio risk constraint var(Rp) = σ¯
2
p. Using the per-
turbation argument, we have the optimal solution
x(Z) = −λˆ−12 Ω(Z)−1[λˆ1µ(Z) + γ(Z) + λˆ3(Z)1]
≡ Ω(Z)−1[λ1µ(Z) + λ2γ(Z) + λ3(Z)1].
(85)
where λ1 = −λˆ1/λˆ2, λ2 = −1/λˆ2, and λ3(Z) = −λˆ3(Z)/λˆ2. Imposing 1′x(Z) = 1
allows us to express λ3(Z) as in (83). The optimal portfolio weights function becomes
x(Z) = λ1Φ(Z)µ(Z) + λ2Φ(Z)γ(Z) + x0(Z). (86)
It has the form of (2) if we reinterpret λ3 = 1.
Now we consider the case where no portfolio risk constraint is imposed. Using the
perturbation argument, we have the first order condition
Ω(Z)x(Z) = λ1µ(Z) + γ(Z) + λ3(Z)1, (87)
almost surely, and the optimal solution
x(Z) = Ω(Z)−1[λ1µ(Z) + γ(Z) + λ3(Z)1]. (88)
150
Impose the restriction 1′x(Z) = 1 and express λ3(Z) as in (83). The optimal portfolio
is then
x(Z) = λ1Φ(Z)µ(Z) + Φ(Z)γ(Z) + x0(Z), (89)
where Φ(Z) and x0(Z) are defined in (51). It has the form of (2) if we reinterpret
λ2 = λ3 = 1.
From (84), (86) and (89), we conclude that the UTE solution has generic form of
(2).
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The agent’s optimization problem is equivalent to (79) if σ¯bp = β¯pσ
2
b . The opti-
mal solution has the form of (84). To find the values for λ1 and λ2, impose that
IE[µ(Z)′x(Z)] = α¯p + µb,
IE[µ(Z)′x(Z)] = λ1ψ1 + λ2ψ2 + µ0 = (α¯p + µb), (90)
where ψ’s are also defined in (51). Rearrange,
ψ1λ1 + ψ2λ2 = (α¯p + µb)− µ0. (91)
Similarly, imposing IE[γ(Z)′x(Z)] = β¯pσ2b yields
ψ2λ1 + ψ3λ2 = β¯pσ
2
b − σb0. (92)
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Now we have the two-equation system (91) and (92), and we solve for λ1 and λ2 by
Cramer’s Rule,
λ1 =
[(α¯p + µb)− µ0]ψ3 − (β¯pσ2b − σb0)ψ2
ψ1ψ3 − ψ22
,
λ2 =
(β¯pσ
2
b − σb0)ψ1 − [(α¯p + µb)− µ0]ψ2
ψ1ψ3 − ψ22
.
(93)
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The agent’s optimization problem is equivalent to (12), whose optimal solution is
(86). Imposing IE[x(Z)′µ(Z)] = α¯p + µb produces,
ψ1λ1 + ψ2λ2 = α¯p + µb − µ0. (94)
Similarly, imposing IE[x(Z)′Ω(Z)x(Z)] = σ¯2p + (α¯p + µb)
2 yields
λ1(α¯p + µb − µ0) + λ1λ2ψ2 + λ22ψ3 + Ω0 = σ¯2p + (α¯p + µb)2. (95)
Rearrange (94) to express λ1 in terms of λ2
λ1 =
α¯p + µb − µ0
ψ1
− ψ2
ψ1
λ2. (96)
Plug in (95) and solve for λ2,
λ2 = ±
[
[σ¯2p + (α¯p + µb)
2 − Ω0]ψ1 − (α¯p + µb − µ0)2
ψ1ψ3 − ψ22
]1/2
. (97)
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The resulting tracking error variance is
var(Rp −Rb) = σ¯2p + σ2b − 2IE[γ(Z)′x(Z)]
= σ¯2p + σ
2
b − 2[λ1ψ2 + λ2ψ3]− 2σb0
= σ¯2p + σ
2
b − 2σb0 − 2
[
(α¯p + µb − µ0)ψ2
ψ1
+ λ2
ψ1ψ3 − ψ22
ψ1
]
.
(98)
To minimize tracking error variance, we pick positive root for λ2 when (ψ1ψ3 −
ψ22)/ψ1 > 0 and negative root for λ2 when (ψ1ψ3 − ψ22)/ψ1 < 0. Imposing such a
selection rule yields the optimal solution in Proposition 3.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The agent’s optimization problem is equivalent to (13) and the optimal solution is
(89). Impose that IE[µ(Z)′x(Z)] = α¯p + µb,
IE[µ(Z)′x(Z)] = λ1ψ1 + ψ2 + µ0 = (α¯p + µb). (99)
Solving for λ1,
λ1 =
(α¯p + µb)− µ0 − ψ2
ψ1
. (100)
A.3 Relation to Portable Alpha
Consider an active manager with information set Z is assigned a benchmark portfolio
b and uses other N assets with return vector R to form a zero net investment portfolio
with portfolio weight vector w(Z) in order to beat the benchmark while minimizing
tracking error variance. His optimization problem can be reinterpreted as the problem
(1) with an (N +1) weight vector x(Z) with the last element being the weight on the
benchmark portfolio, which is restricted to be one. We can rewrite x(Z) = w˜(Z)+ x˜b,
w˜(Z) = (w(Z)′, 0)′, and x˜b = (0′N , 1)
′, and treat x˜b as a “benchmark weight vector.”
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Since we can rewrite
IE[x˜(Z)′µN+1(Z)] = IE[w(Z)′µN(Z)] + µb, (101)
IE[x˜(Z)′ΩN+1(Z)x˜(Z)] = IE[w(Z)′ΩN(Z)w(Z)] + IE(R2b), (102)
IE[x˜(Z)′γN+1(Z)] = IE[w(Z)′γN(Z)] + σ2b , (103)
the portable alpha problem reduces to (14).
A.4 Relation to Utility Maximization
Fama (1996) shows how agents in Merton’s (1973) economy choose multifactor min-
imum variance portfolios under normality. Ferson, Siegel, and Xu (2006) extend the
results to incorporate conditioning information. If we treat the benchmark return
as a state variable, and use Ferson, Siegel, and Xu’s (2006) results, we know the in-
tertemporal optimization problem with wealthW , consumption C, and indirect utility
function J(., .), has the form
max
x(Zt−1),Ct−1
u(Ct−1) + IE[J(Wt, Rb,t)|Zt−1]
s.t. Wt = (Wt−1 − Ct−1)x(Zt−1)′Rt, x(Zt−1)′1 = 1,
(104)
which has the same solution x(Z) as the minimization problem
min
x(Z)
var(Rp|Z),
s.t. IE(Rp|Z) = m(Z), IE(RpRb|Z) = n(Z), x(Z)′1 = 1.
(105)
Notice that the problem (105) is equivalent to
min
x(Z)
var(Rp −Rb|Z),
s.t. α¯p(Z) = ap(Z), β¯p(Z) = bp(Z), x(Z)
′1 = 1,
(106)
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if the conditional mean and variance of Rb are given. This problem is the CTE
version of the modern portfolio management problem with a beta constraint. Since
unconditional efficiency is nested in conditional efficiency as a special case, an active
portfolio manager may solve the unconditional version optimization problem of (106).
We then try to answer what kind of preference will induce the manager to solve the
UTE problems.
Ferson and Siegel (2001) have shown that unconditional mean-variance portfo-
lios are optimal for agents with quadratic utility functions in a single period model.
Motivated by their result, we consider the following active manager’s utility function,
u(Rp −Rb) = (Rp −Rb)− ζ(Rp −Rb)2, (107)
where ζ > 0 is a constant characterizing the concavity of the utility function. The
absolute risk aversion (ARA) is
ARA = −u(Rp −Rb)
′′
u(Rp −Rb)′ =
2ζ
1− 2ζ(Rp −Rb) . (108)
When (Rp−Rb) is higher, the agent becomes more risk averse. We can use the results
of Ferson, Siegel, and Xu (2006) directly and show the utility function of the active
managers for whom our UTE solution is optimal, when a beta constraint is imposed.
In the intertemporal setting, managers with the indirect utility function
J(W , Rb) = (1− νRb)W − θW2. (109)
where ν and θ are constants, and who observe conditioning information, choose port-
folio weights minimizing unconditional tracking error variance for a given pair of
portfolio alpha and beta. This model is a good description for managers under pos-
sible portfolio risk constraints.
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A.5 Equilibrium Implications of UTE Portfolios
With the rapid growth of delegated portfolio management it is natural to conjecture
that tracking error investing behavior may affect asset prices in equilibrium. Brennan
(1993), Stutzer (2003), Go´mez and Zapatero (2003), and Cornell and Roll (2005) de-
rive equilibrium implications of tracking error investing. They show that equilibrium
expected asset returns display a multibeta representation46 in the presence of track-
ing error investors. However, these models do not explicitly incorporate conditioning
information.
This section presents an asset pricing model with tracking error investors who are
assumed to optimally hold UTE portfolios. The model features explicit considera-
tion of asymmetric information. We explore two representations. In the stochastic
discount factor representation the stochastic discount factor does not depend on the
conditioning information. This feature largely mitigates the testability problem raised
by Hansen and Richard (1987)47. In the multibeta representation, the factor loadings
and premiums are both functions of conditioning information.
Consider a market with N risky assets and one risk free asset. The economy has
two agents: an uninformed representative client and an informed active manager with
conditioning information Z. The client possesses all of the wealth in the economy.
She optimally delegates wa portion of her wealth to the manager, invests wb in an
unmanaged benchmark portfolio with weight xb, and puts the rest of her wealth in
the risk free asset. The active portfolio manager’s task is to outperform the bench-
mark, while minimizing tracking error variance. The manager is assumed to take the
46Cornell and Roll (2005) show that expected asset returns are linear in market portfolio return
and an additional adjustment term that is a function of betas. With some more algebra, one can
show an equivalent multibeta representation.
47Hansen and Richard (1987) show that, an econometrician can make inferences about an asset
pricing model without using the full information set as long as the stochastic discount factor is a
measurable function of the coarser information set or observable variables. If the stochastic discount
factor depends on unobserved information it is not generally possible to test the model on a subset
of the information.
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benchmark portfolio as exogenously specified. His optimization problem leads to the
UTE strategy:
x(Z) = λ1Ω(Z)
−1µ(Z) + λ2Ω(Z)−1γ(Z) + xb, (110)
where the conditional moments are defined in (67) and the parameters are defined in
Proposition 9 in the Appendix.
In equilibrium, the market portfolio weight is:
xm(Z) = wa[λ1Ω(Z)
−1µ(Z) + λ2Ω(Z)−1γ(Z) + xb] + wbxb. (111)
Let rm ≡ xm(Z)′r denote the excess return on market portfolio. Premultiplying
xm(Z) by Ω(Z) and rearranging terms yields the equilibrium conditional expected
return vector,
µ(Z) = IE(r|Z) = λmIE(rmr|Z) + λbIE(rbr|Z), (112)
where λm ≡ 1/wa(λ1 − µbλ2) and λb ≡ −(waλ2 + wa + wb)/wa(λ1 − µbλ2) are scalar
constants. Equation (112) is the asset pricing model with UTE investors. It says
the conditional expected excess return of any asset rj is a linear function of the
conditional comoment of rj with the market excess return, rm, and the conditional
comoment of rj with the benchmark excess return, rb. It is characterized by only two
parameters, λm and λb, which are constants across different assets. It is important
to recognize that the model implies λm and λb are constants that depend on uncon-
ditional moments, but not on the conditioning information, Z. It is this feature that
allows the model to escape the “Hansen and Richard (1987) critique.” For example,
if the conditioning information held by the active portfolio managers is finer than the
information available to the econometrician, Equation (112) can still be tested, after
taking iterated expectations using the coarser information.
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A stochastic discount factor representation of the asset pricing model can be ob-
tained by subtracting the right-hand-side of Equation (112) from its left-hand-side,
IE(Mr|Z) ≡ IE[(1− λmrm − λbrb)r|Z] = IE(e|Z) = 0, (113)
where e is an N -vector of the “pricing errors,” orthogonal to the conditioning infor-
mation Z held by the active manager. Intuitively, the active manager exploits Z in
his trading until (113) holds. If his information can predict pricing errors then his
portfolio is not yet optimal. The scalar random variable M ≡ (1 − λmrm − λbrb) is
the “stochastic discount factor.” Again, because λm and λb do not depend on unob-
servable conditioning information, the model is empirically testable on subsets of the
information.
Equation (113) is an empirically appealing representation of the model, as argued
above. Of course, the model can also be expressed in the more familiar multibeta
presentation48,
IE(rj|Z) ≡ B(m, j, b;Z)IE(rm|Z) + B(b, j,m;Z)IE(rb|Z), (114)
where
B(i, j, k;Z) = βi,k(Z)βk,j(Z)− βi,j(Z)
βi,k(Z)βk,i(Z)− 1 , (115)
βi,j(Z) =
IE(rirj|Z)
IE(r2i |Z)
. (116)
The multibeta representation shows that conditional expected asset returns are linear
in their conditional betas. The conditional betas are time-varying and nonlinear
functions of the conditioning information. This version of the model generalizes the
models of Brennan (1993), Stutzer (2003), Go´mez and Zapatero (2003), and Cornell
48The proof is available by request.
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and Roll (2005), if we interpret the moments in their models as conditional moments
given Z. Equations (112) and (113), however, are empirically more appealing.
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Table 1: Potential Benefit of the Unconditionally Tracking Efficient Portfolios
This table reports the potential benefit of using the unconditionally tracking efficient (UTE)
portfolios, compared with the no-information tracking efficient (NITE) portfolios and the
conditionally tracking efficient (CTE) portfolios. For each portfolio, we compute the dif-
ference between the portfolio return and the benchmark return, and then calculate the
following metrics: (1) the average difference between the two returns, “alpha,” (2) the stan-
dard error of the difference, “tracking error volatility,” and (3) the ratio of alpha to tracking
error volatility, “information ratio.” The alphas and tracking error volatilities are annual-
ized and in percentage points. The alphas, tracking error volatilities, and information ratios
are the average numbers across 1,000 simulation paths. Each of the paths contains 12,000
simulated observations. The data generating process features the parsimonious regression
specification and constant covariance structure. It is correctly specified in estimation.
Target Tracking Error Information
Alpha Alpha Volatility Ratio
NITE CTE UTE NITE CTE UTE NITE CTE UTE
1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 14.209 5.241 2.793 0.072 0.192 0.358
3.000 3.000 2.996 3.001 42.627 15.723 8.379 0.072 0.192 0.358
5.000 5.000 4.994 5.001 71.045 26.205 13.965 0.072 0.192 0.358
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Table 6: Estimation Periods and Evaluation Schemes
This table reports the in-sample and out-of-sample information ratios of the no-information
tracking efficient (NITE) portfolios, the conditionally tracking efficient (CTE) portfolios,
and the unconditionally tracking efficient (UTE) portfolios. The out-of-sample evaluation
scheme is fixed-window (Fixed), recursive (Recursive), or rolling-window (Rolling). The
number of observations in the initial window is 60, 120, 180, or 240. For each portfolio, we
report the information ratio.
NITE CTE UTE
Number of Initial Observations: 60
In-Sample 0.312 0.547 0.828
Fixed -0.059 0.166 0.232
Recursive 0.014 0.111 0.145
Rolling -0.016 0.137 0.097
Number of Initial Observations: 120
In-Sample 0.100 0.528 0.586
Fixed -0.013 0.056 0.155
Recursive 0.040 0.085 0.117
Rolling 0.007 0.125 0.103
Number of Initial Observations: 180
In-Sample 0.075 0.413 0.510
Fixed 0.007 0.054 0.057
Recursive 0.070 0.056 0.093
Rolling -0.126 0.107 0.080
Number of Initial Observations: 240
In-Sample 0.092 0.322 0.456
Fixed 0.055 0.055 0.014
Recursive 0.043 0.022 0.054
Rolling 0.096 0.050 0.038
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Table 7: Naive Strategy
This table reports the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of the naive (1/N) port-
folios. We split the sample of currency data (February 1979 to October 2004) by using
the initial 243, 60, 120, 180, or 240 observations as “in-sample” and the rest as “out-of-
sample,” such that the results are directly comparable to Tables 2 and 6. We report the
sample average of the portfolio return in excess of benchmark return, “alpha,” the standard
error, “tracking error volatility,” the ratio of alpha to tracking error volatility, “information
ratio,” and the Sharpe ratio.
Tracking Error Information Sharpe
Obs. Alpha Volatility Ratio Ratio
In-Sample 243.000 0.277 8.058 0.034 0.019
Out-of-Sample 73.000 0.554 6.443 0.086 0.086
In-Sample 60.000 -1.195 8.933 -0.134 -0.234
Out-of-Sample 256.000 0.701 7.363 0.095 0.097
In-Sample 120.000 -0.195 9.187 -0.021 -0.013
Out-of-Sample 196.000 0.669 6.643 0.101 0.066
In-Sample 180.000 0.227 8.623 0.026 0.031
Out-of-Sample 136.000 0.491 6.319 0.078 0.033
In-Sample 240.000 0.211 7.878 0.027 0.012
Out-of-Sample 76.000 0.750 7.171 0.105 0.107
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Table 8: Robustness Check: Simulation Evidence
This table reports the simulation results for the in-sample (Panel A) and out-of-sample
(Panels B to D) performance of the no-information tracking efficient portfolios (NITE), the
conditionally tracking efficient (CTE) portfolios, and the unconditionally tracking efficient
(UTE) portfolios. For each portfolio, we compute the difference between the active portfolio
return and the benchmark return and the following metrics: (1) the average difference
between the two returns, “alpha,” (2) the standard error of the difference, “tracking error
volatility,” and (3) the ratio of alpha to tracking error volatility, “information ratio.” The
alphas and tracking error volatilities are annualized and in percentage points. We take
averages of the above three metrics from 1,000 simulation paths, each of the paths contains
the same number of observations as the actual data. The out-of-sample evaluation scheme
is fixed-window (Panel B), recursive (Panel C), or rolling-window (Panel D). The numbers
in the parentheses are the probabilities of the NITE or the CTE portfolios with (1) alphas
closer to the target alphas, or (2) smaller tracking error volatilities, or (3) larger information
ratios, than those of the UTE portfolios.
Panel A: In-Sample Performance
Target Tracking Error Information
Alpha Alpha Volatility Ratio
NITE CTE UTE NITE CTE UTE NITE CTE UTE
1.000 1.000 1.062 1.021 8.972 3.390 1.978 0.141 0.339 0.531
(1.000) (0.119) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
3.000 3.000 3.186 3.062 26.917 10.171 5.934 0.141 0.339 0.531
(1.000) (0.119) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
5.000 5.000 5.310 5.103 44.862 16.952 9.890 0.141 0.339 0.531
(1.000) (0.119) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
Panel B: Out-of-Sample Performance: Fixed Window
Target Tracking Error Information
Alpha Alpha Volatility Ratio
NITE CTE UTE NITE CTE UTE NITE CTE UTE
1.000 0.393 0.703 0.637 9.024 3.520 1.997 0.057 0.227 0.329
(0.217) (0.467) (0.000) (0.026) (0.038) (0.187)
3.000 1.179 2.109 1.910 27.072 10.561 5.992 0.057 0.227 0.329
(0.217) (0.467) (0.000) (0.026) (0.038) (0.187)
5.000 1.965 3.515 3.183 45.120 17.602 9.987 0.057 0.227 0.329
(0.217) (0.467) (0.000) (0.026) (0.038) (0.187)
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Panel C: Out-of-Sample Performance: Recursive
Target Tracking Error Information
Alpha Alpha Volatility Ratio
NITE CTE UTE NITE CTE UTE NITE CTE UTE
1.000 0.557 0.741 0.665 9.268 3.565 2.060 0.083 0.235 0.336
(0.243) (0.452) (0.000) (0.017) (0.045) (0.189)
3.000 1.670 2.223 1.995 27.805 10.695 6.180 0.083 0.235 0.336
(0.243) (0.452) (0.000) (0.017) (0.045) (0.189)
5.000 2.783 3.706 3.324 46.341 17.824 10.299 0.083 0.235 0.336
(0.243) (0.452) (0.000) (0.017) (0.045) (0.189)
Panel D: Out-of-Sample Performance: Rolling Window
Target Tracking Error Information
Alpha Alpha Volatility Ratio
NITE CTE UTE NITE CTE UTE NITE CTE UTE
1.000 0.347 0.716 0.623 9.758 3.463 2.034 0.063 0.229 0.320
(0.238) (0.498) (0.000) (0.016) (0.045) (0.199)
3.000 1.042 2.147 1.870 29.274 10.390 6.102 0.063 0.229 0.320
(0.238) (0.498) (0.000) (0.016) (0.045) (0.199)
5.000 1.737 3.579 3.117 48.790 17.317 10.170 0.063 0.229 0.320
(0.238) (0.498) (0.000) (0.016) (0.045) (0.199)
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Figure 1: Unconditionally Tracking Efficient Portfolio Weights in Response to Con-
ditioning Information
The dashed curve depicts the unconditionally tracking efficient (UTE) portfolio weights
in asset a, and the solid curve depicts the UTE portfolio weights in asset b, both in excess
of the benchmark portfolio weights, for various outcomes of conditioning information (sig-
nal). Signal is pre-standardized. It is positively correlated with the return of asset a and
negatively correlated with the return of asset b. The target alpha is 5%.
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Figure 2: Unconditionally Tracking Efficient Portfolio Weights in Response to Con-
ditioning Information: With Beta Constraint
The dashed curve depicts the unconditionally tracking efficient (UTE) portfolio weights
in asset a, and the solid curve depicts the UTE portfolio weights in asset b, both in excess
of the benchmark portfolio weights, for various outcomes of conditioning information (sig-
nal). Signal is pre-standardized. It is positively correlated with the return of asset a and
negatively correlated with the return of asset b. The target alpha is 5%, and the target beta
is 1.5.
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Figure 3: Tracking Efficiency Frontiers
The dashed curve is the tracking efficiency frontier for the no-information tracking
efficient (NITE) portfolios, the dotted curve is the tracking efficiency frontier for the con-
ditionally tracking efficient (CTE) portfolios, and the solid curve is the tracking efficiency
frontier for the unconditionally tracking efficient (UTE) portfolios. The portfolios are con-
structed by conditional or unconditional moments based on 12,000 simulated observations.
All of the conditional moments are constructed by the true data generating process used to
calibrate the simulation.
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Figure 4: Portfolio Weights in Excess of Benchmark Weights: Japanese Yen
Dashed, dotted, and solid curves are out-of-sample NITE, CTE, and UTE portfolio
weights on Japanese Yen, respectively, in excess of the weight in the benchmark portfolio.
The target alpha is 5%.
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Figure 5: Portfolio Weights in Excess of Benchmark Weights: UK Pounds
Dashed, dotted, and solid curves are out-of-sample NITE, CTE, and UTE portfolio
weights on UK Pounds, respectively, in excess of the weight in the benchmark portfolio.
The target alpha is 5%.
178
Figure 6: Portfolio Weights in Excess of Benchmark Weights: Euro
Dashed, dotted, and solid curves are out-of-sample NITE, CTE, and UTE portfolio
weights on Euro, respectively, in excess of the weight in the benchmark portfolio. The
target alpha is 5%.
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Figure 7: Portfolio Weights in Excess of Benchmark Weights: US Dollars
Dashed, dotted, and solid curves are out-of-sample NITE, CTE, and UTE portfolio
weights on US Dollars, respectively, in excess of the weight in the benchmark portfolio.
The target alpha is 5%.
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